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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND & PURPOSE 
Two considerations have driven this research. The first consideration relates to child 
malnutrition and nutritionists’ challenge to find integrative solutions that include socio-
economic approaches. Malnutrition is defined as an “imbalance between nutrient 
requirements and intake that results in cumulative deficits of energy, protein, or 
micronutrients” (MEHTA ET AL., 2013). This disorder adversely affects human growth, 
development and mortality. It is generally addressed through the diet, care practices and 
health, which enhancements are interrelated with the underlying socio-economic factors 
(United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 1990). Malnutrition is therefore not just a 
physiological problem. It also results from socio-economic challenges. Female empowerment 
or improvement in the economic status of households might lead to substantial benefits for 
pediatric malnutrition. It is thus necessary not to restrict nutritional practice to proximal 
resolutions but to also look for alternative and complementary strategies that address the 
social dimension of nutrition (BEAUMAN ET AL., 2005). This is particularly urgent as child 
malnutrition is still prevailing worldwide at unacceptable levels (UNICEF, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO], & WORLD BANK, 2012).  
The second consideration relates to microfinance as a potential poverty alleviation tool. 
Microfinance is generally understood as the delivery of small amounts of credits to the poor. 
It has become a popular strategy since the success of Grameen Bank, an institution 
launched in Bangladesh by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus in the 1980s. 
Behind the microfinance concept is the recognition that the poor generally have limited 
access to formal banks due to lack of collaterals; yet, endowed with endless potential. If 
given the opportunity to borrow, they could improve their earnings by setting up small 
enterprises and pull themselves as well as their households out of poverty (YUNUS & JOLIS, 
1999). The Grameen model is collateral-free and incorporates group lending. It focuses on 
women and their empowerment. This innovative design has been replicated worldwide since 
then.  
Considering that malnutrition has socio-economic roots and that the microfinance approach 
can induce positive socio-economic changes at household level, couldn’t it be used to 
improve the nutritional challenge that households and children are facing? This research 
aims at examining the effect that microfinance can have on nutrition security. The purpose 
is to understand if, how and when does microfinance affect child nutrition. A particular 
attention is brought to the sex of the respondents as a potential moderator of 
microfinance effect. 
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In fact, extensive research has been made on the socio-economic impact of microfinance 
(VAN ROOYEN, STEWART, & DE WET, 2012; DUVENDACK ET AL. 2011). But only few studies 
inquired about the relationship between microfinance and children's nutritional status. Some 
of these studies concluded that no correlation existed (DIAGNE, 1998); whereas others noted 
a relationship only under specific conditions. According to the latter studies, the gender of the 
microfinance participants tends to influence microfinance effect on nutritional status (SPEAR, 
2001; HAZARIKA & GUHA-KHASNOBIS, 2008; PITT & KHANDKER, 2003; DOOCY, TEFERRA, 
NORELL, & BURNHAM, 2005). The effect seems to also be conditional on geographical 
contexts (MKKELLY & DUNFORD, 1998; MkKELLY & DUNFORD, 1999). The literature review 
suggests that microfinance effect on child nutritional status might be indirect but none of the 
studies really investigates the mechanisms underlying the potential contribution of 
microfinance to child nutritional status. Some studies examine the linkage between 
microfinance and specific potential outcome factors (MkKELLY & DUNFORD, 1998; KELLY & 
DUNFORD, 1999). Others include an analysis of the relation between child nutritional status 
and potential predictors. They rarely try to connect the potential mediating factors to both 
microfinance intervention and child nutritional status. There is thus a need for comprehensive 
studies which not only test the conditional effect of microfinance but also include an analysis 
of the different pathways through which microfinance participation is “converted” into a better 
child nutritional status.  
The present study attempts to fill this gap. Testing “if” microfinance is effective in meeting 
nutritional household goals is essential to orient nutritionists in their search for integrative 
solutions that work. Assessing “when” nutritional outcomes of microfinance are positive and 
substantial offers guidance to check the appropriatness of the microfinance model in specific 
contexts and to define target groups. Understanding “how” microfinance outputs are 
transmitted to children gives practical indications on what to focus on while adjusting socio-
economic instruments for nutritional purpose.  
The study is based on a mediation and moderation analysis. The empirical data are from 
households living in refugee settlements in the West Nile region of Uganda. The choice of 
the area was guided by the observation that malnutrition is particularly widespread in such 
crises-affected settings and that the appropriatness of microfinance has to be tested in such 
contexts as well.. 
This thesis essentially argues that microfinance effect on child nutritional status is positive 
and significant in refugee settings of West Nile for both households with female or male 
microfinance participants. The effect is essentially mediated through improved household 
wealth and not through individual social-empowerment. At a proximal level, microfinance 
induces ameliorative changes for household diet and deteriorative changes for child feeding 
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practices. Yet what matters for child nutritional status is essentially household health 
security.   
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to inquire the relationship between 
microfinance and child nutritional status in the specific context of refugee settings. It is also 
the first study applying statistical mediation and moderation procedures to understand 
mechanisms of nutritional contribution of microfinance at household level. It thus provides 
both susbstantial and methodological insights for the discipline. 
 
 
1.2 CONTENTS OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter two Theoretical Framework reviews the empirical studies linking microfinance and 
nutritional status in order to build a theoretical framework and hypotheses that will 
subsequently be tested on the ground.  
Chapter three Empirical Approach describes the methodology applied for this research. The 
empirical approach is characterized by the selection of a study area affected by forced 
migration (refugee settlements of West Nile, Uganda), a cross-sectional household survey, a 
quasi-experimental design to capture the intervention variable (established versus incoming 
and non clients of the DED microcredit program), adequate height-for-age as outcome 
variable, individual socio-economic empowerment, household economic status and 
household food, health and care capacities as mediators, and a hierarchical, mediation and 
moderation analysis as statistical tool. 
Chapter four Empirical Evidence describes the results of the bivariate and multivariate 
analyses in a hierarchical way. In a first section, the relationship between microfinance and 
child nutritional status is tested based on bivariate analyses and a logistic regression taking 
into account inherent variables at child and household levels. In a second section, the 
indirect effect of microfinance on child nutritional status through individual income and social 
power is assessed. The third section describes the analysis of household economic status as 
a potential mediator at an intermediate level. The fourth section tests household diet, heath 
care and child feeding practices as potential mediators at a proximal level. The fifth section is 
a moderation analysis testing differences in microfinance effect between households with 
male or female microfinance participants. 
Chapter five Discussion discusses the limits and strengths of the methodological approach 
applied for this research and presents the contributions provided through answering the 
research questions. In summary, this research has the following implications: firstly, it uses a 
 4 
relatively new methodology in the field of either microfinance or nutrition security or gender 
studies: the moderation and mediation procedures. Secondly, it tests a hypothesis in a 
country and a context where it has not been used before. Thirdly, it provides substantial 
insights into nutritional processes in place at household level. These contributions and the 
importance of the research problem on several theoretical and practical grounds are 
justifications for this research. 
 
 
1.3 DEFINITIONS 
Table 1.3.1 summarises how key terms are defined and have to be understood in this 
dissertation. 
Tab. 1.3-1  Definitions & terms 
Term Definition 
Ameliorative Factor  Variable that positively influences outcome  
Deteriorative Factor Variable that negatively influences outcome  
Impact Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a 
development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended 
Impact Analysis Examination of the process through which an intervention produces an 
outcome 
Mediation Mechanism through which a predictor influences an outcome variable 
Mediator Variable through which a predictor influences an outcome variable  
Microfinance Delivery of small amounts of loans to the poor 
Moderated mediation  Mediational model is significant only at certain levels of a moderator variable  
Moderation  Mechanism by which a variable influences the strength or direction of a 
relationship between a predictor and an outcome 
Moderator  Variable that influences the strength or direction of a relationship between a 
predictor and an outcome  
Nutrition Security "When all people at all times consume food of sufficient quantity and quality in 
terms of variety, diversity, nutrient content and safety to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life, coupled with a 
sanitary environment, adequate health, education and care" 
Nutritional Status Imbalance between nutrient requirements and intake 
Sources: CFS, 2012; MEHTA ET AL., 2013; OECD, 2002; ROSE, HOLMBECK, COAKLEY, & FRANKS, 
2004. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Overall-aim of this research is to investigate the effect of microfinance on child nutritional 
status. The first step consisted in building a theoretical framework upon which the 
subsequent empirical research would be based. The present chapter exposes the theoretical 
framework. It summarises the conceptual approaches of microfinance (section 2.1) and of 
nutritional status (section 2.2) before focusing on the actual connection between both 
elements (section 2.3). The ultimate result of the review was the identification of a theoretical 
model and of hypotheses described in the last section (2.4). 
 
2.1 MICROFINANCE & ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES  
This section describes the theory of microfinance impact. It starts by presenting the main 
theoretical strands of microfinance effect and then explains the hypothetical paths of 
microfinance socio-economic impact on the household (SEBSTAD & CHEN, 1996; KARLAN, 
2001). 
2.1.1 Poverty Lending Approach of Microfinance 
There are three main perspectives on microfinance: the poverty lending approach, the 
financial system approach and the outreach approach (HULME, 2000; ROBINSON, 2001).  
Poverty lending approach 
The poverty lending approach is also called the development approach, the household 
approach, the welfare approach or the intended beneficiary school (HULME, 2000). Welfarists 
put an emphasis on beneficiaries of financial services and on their development. They 
conceive microfinance as a mean to improve the life of households and communities, as a 
tool for poverty alleviation.  
Financial system approach 
Contrasting with this approach is an idea of microfinance as an end in itself, as an 
organization delivering specific types of financial services with the primary goal of making 
profits. The focus here is clearly on microfinance institutions. Households are of interest as 
they can contribute to the financial sustainability of the microfinance institutions. This view is 
more common among the so-called “institutionists”. Cost minimization and financial efficiency 
are the dominated objects of inquiry within this strand. This approach is variously referred to 
as financial system approach, financial sustainability approach, intermediary approach 
(HULME, 2000; ROBINSON, 2001) or ‘new’ microfinance paradigm (ROBINSON, 2001). 
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Outreach approach 
Sometimes defined as a sub-approach within the financial sustainability school or as an 
independent strand between the household and the financial sustainability perspectives is 
the so-called “outreach approach”. Departure point here is also the microfinance institution. 
Yet microfinance is considered in a more beneficiary-oriented manner. The issue is to reach 
those considered as the target group of microfinance: the poor. The focus is on designing 
financial services so as to increase extent and depth of outreach. The outreach approach 
considers the social goal of microfinance institutions and assesses the social efficiency of 
microfinance. But it does not go as far as the poverty lending approach. The goal is to reach 
the maximum of poor and the most poor. Yet what happens with the financial services and 
what changes are induced at household level is not what primarily matters. 
These three perspectives are still the subject of an ongoing debate but there seems to be a 
tendency towards a converging and integrating concept of microfinance which should 
theoretically be at the same time, financially sustainable, designed for reaching the poor and 
improving their life. 
Microfinance improves lives at different levels and through different channels. 
2.1.2 Individual Socio-Economic Empowerment as Outcome of Microfinance 
At an immediate level, microfinance can lead to a socio-economic empowerment of the 
individual client, particularly when the client is female. In fact microcredits might serve as a 
capital for initiating or expanding a business and thus resulting in more individual income 
(DUVENDACK, PALMER-JONES, & COPESTAKE 2011; DUNFORD, 2012). Microfinance might also 
improve the psycho-social position of the individual by increasing self-confidence, decisional 
power within the household and social engagement in the community (MAYOUX, 1999). The 
low initial income and power of women contribute to make these effects more flagrant by 
female clients. 
2.1.3 Household Economic Wealth as Outcome of Microfinance 
At an intermediate level, microfinance might improve the economic status of the beneficiary 
household, particularly when households face shocks. In fact, the individual improvement of 
the socio-economic situation of the client might have some positive consequences for the 
poverty level of the household he/she is living in as he/she might use the profits of her/his 
business for improving consumption and accumulating assets for the whole family. This 
improvement might be particularly important when the household situation is compromised 
by unplanned negative events. In such case, taking a credit might serve as a strategy to 
smooth household income and consumption (ZAMAN, 1999). 
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2.2 CHILD NUTRITIONAL STATUS & ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS  
2.2.1 UNICEF Approach of Child Nutritional Status 
Nutrition encompasses “processes leading to and involved with the utilisation of nutrients for 
growth, development, maintenance and activity” (UNICEF, 1990). There are two main 
approaches to malnutrition: the physiological approach and the broad approach. 
Physiological Approach 
The physiological approach focuses on biological disorders within the body and associates 
malnutrition with an imbalance between nutrient requirements and intake resulting in 
cumulative nutrient deficiencies. Clinical, anthropometric and laboratory analyses are 
involved in the diagnosis of these disorders, which are classified in two categories: 
macronutrient and micronutrient deficiencies (table 2.2.1). Macronutrient deficiencies have to 
do with an imbalance in protein and energy. The most common manifestations amoung 
young children are stunting, underweight, wasting and low upper arm circumference 
(REINHARD, 2000). Frequent micronutrient deficiencies are anemia and deficits in vitamin A. 
The type of malnutrition identified in individual cases and its prevalence range in a 
community are used as an orientation for public health action. The criteria have been defined 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) (ONIS & BLÖSSNER, 1997; BROWN & AKRÉ, 1998; 
ALLEN, DE BENOIST, DARY, & HURRELL, 2006).   
 
Tab. 2.2-1 Classification of malnutrition as public health problem 
Severity of Public Health Problem 
(% of population deficient) 
Nutritional 
Disorder 
Indicator 
Low Mild Moderate Severe 
Stunting Low Height-for-Age z-score (<-2sd) <20% 20-30% 30-40% ≥40% 
Underweight Low weight-for-age z-score(<-2sd) <10% 10-20% 20-30% ≥30% 
Wasting Low weight-for-height z-score (<-2sd) <5% 5-10% 10-15% ≥15% 
Anemia Low blood haemoglobin (< 110g/l) <5% 5 -20% 20–40% ≥40% 
Vitamin A 
Deficiency 
Low serum retinol (< 0.70 μmol/l) <2% 2-10% 10-20% ≥20% 
Source : Own compilation based on ALLEN ET AL ,2006; BROWN & AKRÉ 1998; ONIS & BLOESSNER 1997 
 
 
 
 8 
UNICEF Causal Approach 
The UNICEF approach of malnutrition is broader than the physiological approach. It is based 
on the analysis of both biological and social causes of malnutrition as a basis for action. The 
predictive model takes into account the multi-sectoral and multilevel nature of the 
malnutrition problem. It does not only incorporate proximal causes of malnutrition but also 
considers more distal socio-economic factors at basic level. Public health programs are 
designed based on the identified causes. The UNICEF conceptual framework for the analysis 
of the causes of malnutrition in specific contexts is presented in figure 2.2.1.   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2-1 UNICEF causal approach of malnutrition (Source: UNICEF, 1990) 
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2.2.2 Proximal Determinants of Child Malnutrition 
The UNICEF framework indicates that the most immediate causes of child malnutrition are 
inadequate dietary intake and disease, which are themselves the result of the following 
household related factors: food security, health security and care (UNICEF, 1990). 
Accordingly, 'nutrition security’ conceptually requires not only ‘food security’, but also non-
food factors like ‘health security’ and adequate ‘caring practices’ (GLOBAL FORUM ON FOOD 
SECURITY AND NUTRITION, 2012: 8). 
Inadequate household food security can lead to child malnutrition. Dietary inadequacies at 
the child level might be the result of an inadequacy of the household diet. In fact, families 
might offer a diet of poor quality, which does not include a variety of food categories. The 
poor diet diversity can lead to nutrient deficiencies. But the problem might also be one of 
quantity since some families do not achieve to eat several times per day or to offer the 
adequate food ratio. A diet must at the same time be fully-balanced and present the 
minimum meal frequency to meet the nutrient requirements (WHO, 2008).   
Inadequate household health security can lead to child malnutrition. Inadequate access to 
water and environmental sanitation does not only influence health. It also directly affects 
general hygiene, food production and preparation (UNICEF, 1990). Poor access to water has 
also indirect effects on nutrition by increasing the work-load of women and reducing the time 
available for child care. Access and use of health services for treatment of illnesses, 
immunization, antenatal care and sensitization can prevent malnutrition. 
Inadequate care can lead to child malnutrition. Care refers to «behaviors performed by 
caregivers that affect nutrient intake, health, and the cognitive and psychosocial development 
of the child » (ENGLE, MENON & HADDAD, 1999). Care practices include in particular 
breastfeeding and feeding of very young children that have a direct impact on dietary intake 
and occurrence of infections. Optimal child feeding practices include an early breasfeeding 
intiation, exclusive breastfeeding for six months, introduction of complementary foods at six 
months and prolonged breastfeeding (WHO, 2008). 
 
 
2.2.3 Basic Determinants of Child Malnutrition 
Each proximal factor has its roots in the socio-economic condtions prevailing at household 
and community levels. 
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Poverty leads to child malnutrition as economic resources directly affect the proximal 
determinants of nutritional status and particularly access to food, health services and 
sanitation infrastructures. 
Demographic Characteristics influence Child Malnutrition. Inherent characteristics of the 
child,(age, sex), of the household (education, household size, shocks), and of the community 
influence child malnutrition. 
 
2.3 MICROFINANCE EFFECT ON CHILD NUTRITIONAL STATUS: EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
Extensive research has been made on the socio-economic impact of microfinance (VAN 
ROOYEN, STEWART, & DE WET, 2012; DUVENDACK ET AL. 2011). But only few studies inquired 
the relationship between microfinance and child nutritional status. An overview of such 
studies is given in table 2.3.1. 
 
Tab. 2.3-1 Previous studies on microfinance effect on child nutritional status 
 Survey 
Period 
Country Microfinance 
Institution 
Data Collection Nutriitional 
Status 
SOURCE 
1 1985-86 Bangladesh GB RCS  H-QEXP + RAHMAN 19871 
2 1988-90 Bangladesh Various LS C/H-EXP +/0 FOSTER 1995 
3 1991-92 Bangladesh Various  C-QEXP +/0 PITT 2003 
4 1992 Bangladesh  GB SCS H-EXP +/0 TODD 19961 
5 1993 Mali CwE LS C/H-QEXP 0/- DE GROOTE 1996 
6 1992-93 Ghana Various   +/0 KENNEDY 19941 
7 1992-95 Bangladesh BRAC RCS C-QEXP +/0 KHATUN 1998 
8 1994-95 Bangladesh  Various RCS QEXP 0 ZELLER 2001 
9.1 +/0/- DIAGNE 1998 
9.2 +/0 SPEAR 2001 
9.3 
1995 Malawi Various RCS QEXP 
+/0 HAZARIKA 2008  
10 1993-96 Ghana  CwE RCS C/H-QEXP +/0 MKNELLY 1998 
11 1994-97 Bolivia CwE RCS C/H-QEXP -/0/+ MKNELLY 1999 
12 1993-2000 Indonesia, Various RCS C-QEXP + DELOACH 2011 
13 2000 Papua NZ ROSCAs SCS  + IMAI 2008 
14 2003 Ethiopia  WISDOM SCS  +/0 DOOCY 2005 
15 2002-04, Bangladesh CFPR/TUP LS H-QEXP +/0 AHMED 2005 
16 2007-08 West Bengal SHGs SCS H-EXP + DE 2011 
17 2007-08 Peru CwE SCS C/H-EXP 0 HAMAD 2011 
18 2011 Ghana CwE SCS C/H-EXP + MARQUIS 2012 
H-QEXP=Household–Quasi-experimental design; H-EXP=Household–experimental design; C-QEXP; Community-Quasi-
experimental design; C-EXP: Community Experimental design; RCS: Repeated Cross-sectional Survey; SCS: Single Cross 
sectional Survey; LS: Longitidunal Survey, CwE: Credit with Education; GB (Grameen Group), +: positive effect; -: negative 
effect; 0: no effect 
                                                
1 Original work was unavailable: RAHMAN, 1987 as cited in QUANINE 1988; TODD, 1996 as cited in 
ASHRAFI, 2012; KENNEDY 1994 as cited in DE GROOTE et al., 1996. 
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The geographical focus of most studies is Asia and particularly Bangladesh, where the 
Grameen Bank and similar microfinance institutions were launched in the 1980s. One of the 
earliest studies was a survey on children younger than nine years of age conducted in 1985-
86 by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS). The Grameen Bank was 
determined to have a positive effect as 50 percent of the children of bank members had 
normal weight-for-height compared to 30 percent for non-bank members' children (RAHMAN, 
1987 as cited in QUANINE, 1989). In 1988, Bangladesh was hit by a severe food and an aid 
flood assessment was carried out in two rounds by the USAID (U.S. Agency for International 
Development). FORSTER (1995) used a data subset on the weight of more than 1,000 
children aged six to 36 months to assess the effectiveness of existing mechanisms in 
reducing the impact of the flood on child weight. The analysis schowed that both landless 
and landowning households used credits to meet consumption needs during the post-flood 
period. These mechanisms were partially effective for protecting children's nutritional status 
in the landowning households. In constrast, children from landless households were 
especially vulnerable to the flood due to higher costs of borrowing. In 1991-92, a survey was 
undertaken by the World Bank with the aim of assessing the effect of the three major group-
based microcredit programs of Bangladesh: Grameen Bank, BRAC and BRDB. In this study, 
female credit is found to have a significant impact on the arm circumference and height-for-
age of both boys and girls younger than 15 years old, but not on their body mass index 
(BMI). Men's credit has no statistically significant impact (PITT, 2003). An anthropological 
study run in 1992 among clients of the Grameen bank also included an anthropometric 
module. Children of Grameen borrowers were found to be somewhat taller and much heavier 
than children of non-borrowers and the average Bangladeshi child (TODD, 1996 as cited in 
ASHRAFI, 2012). A repeated cross-sectional survey undertaken in Bangladesh in 1992 and 
1995 indicated a significant decline in the prevalence of severe malnutrition as measured by 
MUAC, among children whose mothers participated in the BRAC credit program in 
comparison to those of non-members (KHATUN, BHUIYA, & CHOWDHURY, 1998). A 
longitudinal survey conducted in Bangladesh after 18 months of operation of the CFPR/TUP 
microcredit program concluded that the nutritional status of children from intervention 
households improved better over time than that of children from control households, when 
considering indicators of severe MUAC and severe wasting. They did not performed better 
for severe underweight or stunting (AHMED & RANA, 2005).  
The International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington (IFPRI) conducted a multi-
country project in order to provide guidance for designing food security strategies. 
Anthropometric data were collected in seven of the nine countries surveyed between 1992 
and 1995 but the results on the impact of access to credit on nutritional status were only 
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available for Bangladesh, Malawi and Mali (ZELLER & SHARMA, 1998). In Bangladesh, the 
repeated cross-sectional study found no statistically signiﬁcant difference in children height-
for-age, weight-for-age and weight-for-height between microfinance participants and 
nonparticipants (ZELLER, SHARMAR, AHMED, & RASHID, 2001). The Malawi data have been 
analyzed thrice. IFPRI found no statistically significant differences in the acute and chronic 
malnutrition of preschoolers in credit program member and noncurrent member households 
(DIAGNE, 1998). SPEAR (2001) found that male formal access to credit had no impact on child 
nutritional status. Female formal access to credit showed signs of positive influence on girl 
nutritional status in specific versions of the statistical model. HAZARIKA and GUHA-KHASNOBIS 
(2008) confirmed no effect of men’s access to credit on child nutritional status. Women’s 
access improved the height-for-age of girls; but did not impact that of boys and the weight-
for-height of either girls or boys.  
The IFPRI study in Mali was undertaken in cooperation with the USAID, which also 
supported several studies on the impact of "Credit with Education" (CwE), a new approach 
integrating financial services and nutrition-related education. In Mali, there was some 
evidence of a positive association between CwE and female income, which was in turn 
related to better children weight-for height (DE GROOTE, KENNEDY, PAYONGAYONG, & HADDAD, 
1996). Two other studies were implemented by the international NGO Freedom from Hunger. 
In Ghana, the weight-for-age and the height-for-age z-scores of participants ‘children were 
significantly improved between the years compared to children living in the control 
communities (MKKNELLY & DUNFORD, 1998). In Bolivia, women’s participation in the Credit 
with Education program did not impact the weight-for-age, height-for-age and weight-for-
height of their children. The results suggest an even negative effect on children weight-for-
age (MKNELLY & DUNFORD, 1999). The education component of a Credit with Education 
program was evaluated in Peru and found no changes in anthropometric measures (HAMAD, 
FERNALD, & KARLAN, 2011). In Ghana, an integrated approach of microcredit and nutrition 
education was evaluated in 2011 conjointly by the Canadian`s School of Dietetics and 
Human Nutrition of McGill University and the Departement of Nutrition and Food Science of 
the University of Ghana. The study demonstrated much lower underweight and wasting 
prevalence rates in the intervention communities than in other areas in the regions (MARQUIS 
& COLECRAFT, 2012). 
The issue of microfinance and nutritional status has been also analyzed in Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and West Bengal. In May 2003, data were collected in 
Ethiopia by the Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and 
Public Health with the objective of assessing the impact of the WISDOM Microfinance 
institution on nutritional status and well-being. Considering the sample as a whole, the data 
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analysis indicated that the participation in the WISDOM microcredit program did not have a 
significant effect on child nutritional status. But in Sodo, one of both Ethiopian survey sites, 
children of female clients had significantly greater odds of acute malnutrition than children of 
both male clients and community controls (DOOCY ET AL., 2005). Data collected in 1993, 1997 
and 2000 in Indonesia showed that the height-for-age of children living in communities with 
microfinance institutions improved significantly compared to those living in communities 
which lost access to these institutions (DELOACH & LAMANNA, 2011). The School of Social 
Sciences of the University of Manchester drew upon survey data from 2000 to show that 
autonomous women's community-based organisations in Papua New Guinea were more 
efficient in improving child weight-for-age than those externally supported (IIMAI & ELKLONG, 
2008). In West Bengal, a study conducted in 2007-2008 by the Centre for Economic Studies 
of Kolkata found that mother’s earnings from saving and credit had positive and significant 
effect on the weight-for-age for the children of women belonging to self-help groups (DE & 
SARKER, 2011). 
In summary, the studies showed some evidence of an impact of microfinance on child 
nutritional status. The impact seems to depend on specific conditions. Gender seems to play 
an important moderating role. It is yet worth mentioning that most of the studies are from 
Bangladesh. The studies outside Bangladesh are testing either the "Credit with Education" 
approach or general access to formal credits or informal microfinance (Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations, Self-Help Groups). There has only been one study outside Bangladesh 
that evaluated the impact of a specific microfinance instiution (DOOCY ET AL., 2005).   
 
  
2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.4.1 Theoretical Model 
The framework guiding this study is depicted in the following diagram (Model 0). The 
mediational model was an integration of the poverty lending approach of microfinance impact 
and of the UNICEF causal approach of child malnutrition. The model also implied a gender 
perspective. 
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Model 01: Theoretical model 
 
2.4.2 Hypotheses 
In order to solve the research problem, it has been necessary to define the following specific 
hypotheses: 
- H1. Microfinance has a positive and significant total effect on child nutritional status. 
- H2: At a distal level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through individual 
socio-economic empowerment;  
- H3: At an intermediate level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through 
higher household economic status; 
- H4: At a proximal level, microfinance influences child nutritional through better 
household diet, health care and child feeding practices;  
- H5: Microfinance’s positive effect on child nutritional status is stronger, when the 
microfinance participant is female. 
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3 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Chapter two exposed a theoretical framework, which is worth being tested on the ground. 
The present chapter describes the methodology used to gather data and to analyze them. It 
is organised around five major topics: study area, data collection, sampling, indicators and 
data analysis. 
3.1 STUDY AREA 
After the definition of the hypotheses, the next step was to define a study population to verify 
them empirically. Four main criteria guided our choice while selecting the location for the 
case study: a critical prevalence of children malnutrition, the presence of microfinance 
institutions, a context of crises and the availability of institutional partners willing to materially 
support the research project. These conditions were fulfilled for the population living in the 
refugee settlements of Arua District in Uganda. This section depicts the selection steps as 
well as the study population in terms of socio-economic characteristics, nutritional situation, 
microfinance landscape, and crises exposure. 
3.1.1 An Area located within Arua District in the West Nile Region of Uganda 
The geographical focus of the research section in which this thesis is embedded is Africa 
(LEONHÄUSER, 2013; LEONHÄUSER, DRESCHL-BOGALE, LEMKE, YEO, & PETERMANN, 2005). It 
was clear from the beginning that the study area would be localized somewhere in Africa. 
The selection of the country started with the identification of institutional partners for 
supporting the research project. After hesitating between Côte d’Ívoire, Mali and Uganda, it 
became apparent that Uganda would provide more opportunities to see the realization of the 
research project. A one-week journey was organised2 which was fruitful as it allowed to 
identify the West Nile Food and Nutrition Security Project (FNS) as a partner willing to 
logistically support the survey and to provide a workplace during the research. The FNS 
project is a project initiated by the German Cooperation (GTZ) with the aim of improving the 
nutritional situation and the stability of the West Nile region in Uganda. It is operating in the 
refugee-hosting sub-counties of Arua and Yumbe district in Northern Uganda. Once on the 
ground, the decision was made to focus our study on the three refugee settlements of the 
Arua District: Madi-Okollo, Imvepi and Rhino Camp (figure 3.1.2). 
Uganda lies in East Africa over an area of 241,038 square kilometers. The country was 
divided into 56 districts at the time of the survey. The Arua district is located in the North 
Western part of Uganda (West Nile region) 520 km from the main town Kampala (figure 
                                                
2 Yeo, A.E. (2004, June). Contribution of microfinance to nutrition security in the context of crises : An example 
from Uganda (Unpublished report on the field mission in Uganda from 5th- to 13 June 2004). Gießen: ZEU. 25p.. 
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3.1.1). It borders Sudan and the Yumbe district to the north, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the west, Nebbi in the south and Gulu in the southeast. The district was 
administratively sub-divided into seven counties, 36 sub-counties, 241 parishes and 2026 
villages. It hosted three refugee settlements distributed between five sub-counties. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1-1 Location of Arua District 
 
Table 3.1.1 describes the population of the district at the time of the survey.  
 
Tab. 3.1-1 Population figures in the study area, End 2004 
 Total Aged <5 Aged >18 Female aged >18 
Arua Districta         921 274 188 861 412 730 213 738 
Refugee settlementsb 59 693 10 736 22 267 11 385
     Rhino Camp 26 735 5 080 9 892 5 259
     Imvepi 25 513 3 572 9 695 4 572
     Madi-Okollo 7 445 2 085 2 680 1 555
DED Participantsc 855 NA 855 512
     Rhino Camp 570 NA 570 360
     Imvepi 245 NA 245 139
     Madi-Okollo 40 NA 40 13
Source: Own compilation based on apopulation projections for 2004 estimated from 2002 Uganda 
Population and Housing Census (UBOS, 2002) ; brefugee population figures for december 2004 
(UNHCR, 2005); and  cDED Client Database from November, 2004 ; NA: Not Available. 
 
 
UGANDA 
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In 2002, Arua had a population of 855,055 inhabitants (Uganda Bureau of Statistics [UBOS], 
2002). The yearly growth rate over the period 1991-2002 was 3.8 percent. The predicted 
population size in 2004 was thus approximatively 921,274. This population was distributed in 
153,701 households with an average of 5.5 members. Some 20.5 percent of the population 
was under five (175,287). Arua population was characterized by a sex ratio of 93.1 males to 
100 females and a population density of 153 inhabitants per square kilometres. The rural 
population represented 91.2 percent of the district population.  
 
Fig. 3.1-2 Map of the study area 
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3.1.2 An Area affected by Conflicts & Refugee Movements 
Conflict & Refugees Movements in West Nile 
The West Nile region of Uganda has a long history of collective conflict which occurred with 
various degrees of severity since 1971 (GERSONY, 1997). Nearly every change of political 
regime has set off a new phase in the conflict (figure 3.1.33).  
 
Fig. 3.1-3 Conflict in West Nile 
 
As Uganda got its independence from the United Kingdom in 1962, Obote Milton became its 
first president. 1971, Obote was militarily overthrown by Idi Amin, a native from Arua District. 
West Nilers were said to be prominently represented in Amin’s army. From 1962 under the 
Obote I regime and then from 1971 to 1979, the West Nile region enjoyed a peaceful 
situation. This relative stability was interrupted by the invasion of the Tanzanian army which 
achieved pacification of the West Nile in mid-1979. During 1980, the Tanzanian occupying 
forces were replaced by the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) reconstituted by 
Obote. The UNLA engaged in violent repressions against the West Nilers, who had to flee to 
southern Sudan and Congo. The massive population displacements that took place from 
West Nile in the early 1980 lasted until the end of the Obote II regime in 1985.  In 1986, the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Museveni came to power. Repatriation of the 
Ugandan refugees in the region and almost one decade of peace followed. 1995 saw the 
emergence of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) which activities intensified in 1996 and 
affected the security of West Nile. The WNBF rebels were demobilized in 1997 and 
reintegration programs of the former were still in place at the time of the survey. 
                                                
3 The graph was constructed by the author based on a conflict analysis according to the USAID model for five 
levels of conflict (Samarasinghe, Donaldson & McGinn 2001): Level 1: Peaceful Stable Situation; Level 2: Political 
Tension Situation; Level 3: Violent Political Conflict; Level 4: Low-Intensity Conflict; Level 5: High-Intensity 
Conflict. A conflict timeline was produced for the West Nile region on the basis of events reported in the literature. 
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Conflict in Sudan & Refugee Mouvements into West Nile 
Parallel to the movements of the Ugandan population from and back to West Nile, there were 
also some refugee movements into the district. In August 1993, refugees arrived from the 
Equatorial Province in southern Sudan and were first accommodated in transit camps in 
Koboko County. By the end of 1996, 101,000 refugees were distributed between Rhino 
Camp, Imvepi, Koboko and Ikafe (Yumbe district). In March 1997, half of the refugees in 
Arua district spontaneously returned to their home areas. Most of the remaining caseload 
(little more than 50,000) remained in Koboko Town and was then transferred in Rhino Camp 
and Imvepi. The movement of the refugees has continued since then with an influx of a total 
of some 2,000 new arrivals in 1999 and over 3,000 in 2000. In 2004, Rhino Camp 
accommodated 26,735 refugees (UNHCR, 2005) on 225 km2. The settlement was allocated 
in 1992 66 km east of Arua town. It straddles Odupi sub-county in Terego county and Rigbo 
in Madi-Okollo sub-county. Imvepi was allocated in 1995 76 km northeast of Arua Town. It 
accommodates 25,513 refugees on 120 km2. 
The Madi-Okollo refugee settlement was set up in September 2003 in order to re-locate 
Sudanese Acholi refugees. These refugees were displaced from the Acholi-pii settlement in 
Pader district in July 2002 after the camp was attacked by the LRA. There were temporally 
settled in Kiryandongo refugee camp, Masindi district before being moved to Madi-Okollo 
(Arua district) and Ikafe (Yumbe district). In December 2004, 7,445 of them were living in 
Madi-Okollo (UNHCR, 2005). 
About one third of the district’s refugees are adults (37 percent).  The proportion of women in 
the adult refugee population tends to be around 50 percent, except for Madi-Okollo where 
women are over-represented (58 percent). Some 63 percent of the refugees are children 
under the age of 18, whereas 18 percent are under the age of five (table 3.1.1). The 
proportion of children under five varies greatly, depending on the refugee settlement. This 
age group represents 28 percent of the whole population of Madi-Okollo settlement and only 
14 and 19 percent of the population of Imvepi and Rhino Camp, respectively. 
3.1.3 An Area with a Critical Malnutrition Prevalence 
Was child malnutrition a public health problem in the study area? This section is an attempt 
to answer this question and get a picture of the nutritional context in which the empirical 
study is embedded. Malnutrition statistics at national, regional and local level are evaluated 
against the criteria defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) to assess the severity of 
a nutritional situation (ONIS & BLÖSSNER, 1997; BROWN & AKRÉ, 1998; ALLEN ET AL., 2006). 
The WHO criteria are based on prevalence ranges which differ for each form of malnutrition. 
They are summarised in table 2.2.1.  
 20 
Child Nutritional Status in Uganda 
At national level, malnutrition statistics can be derived from the Uganda Demographic and 
Health Surveys (UDHS). These surveys are conjointly undertaken by the Ugandan Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS) and Macro International approximatively every five years (MOH & MACRO, 
1989; STATISTICS DEPARTMENT UGANDA & MACRO, 1996; UBOS & ORC MACRO, 2001; UBOS 
& MACRO, 2007). UBOS is a semi-autonomous body providing statistics on the national 
socio-economic developments. It was originally called The Uganda Bureau of Statistics and 
stood under the umbrella of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development 
(MoFPED). Macro International is an Initiative of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) which aims at providing data to monitor health and nutrition programs 
in developing countries. In Uganda, it has assisted four nutrition surveys since 1988. UDHS 
surveys have the advantages of producing nutritional data that are publicly available and 
nationally representative. They include information on the prevalence of stunting, 
underweight, wasting, anemia and vitamin A deficiency among children. The sampled 
population is aged between 6 and 59 months for the statistics on anemia and between 0 and 
59 months for the other forms of malnutrition. The indicators are those defined in table 2.2.1. 
Figure 3.1.4 gives an overview of the prevalence of malnutrition in Uganda in 2006. The 
prevalence rates of stunting, underweight, wasting, anemia and vitamin A deficiency are 
classified along a severity scale extrapolated from the WHO criteria for public health severity 
defined in table 2.2.1 on page 7.  
 
Fig. 3.1-4 Prevalence & public health severity of child malnutrition in Uganda, UDHS 20064 
                                                
4 Diagram built from the author based on figures from UDHS, 2006  
 21 
The graph shows that in Uganda malnutrition was a public health problem for all forms of 
malnutrition. The prevalence of macronutrient and micronutrient defiencies was above the 
critical level over which they can be considered as a serious public health concern. Within 
these critical prevalence range, there were however different degrees of severity according 
to the type of malnutrition. Micronutrient deficiencies represented the most severe problems. 
A total of 72.6 percent, i.e almost three fourth of the children population suffered from 
anemia. This is huge if we remind that a prevalence of five percent is already considered as 
critical (table 2.2.1). The vitamin A status of the Ugandan children was also alarming. The 
prevailing prevalence of 20.4 percent was up ten times that socalled “trigger-level” which is 
defined at two percent. Macronutrient deficiencies, especially in the form of stunting reached 
appalling prevalence levels too. A total of 38.1 percent of the children had a low height for 
age. This level corresponds to a public health problem with a severity estimated to be at the 
limit between high and very high. In fact a stunting prevalence ranging between 30 and 40 
percent is considered as moderate while we already face a severe situation by prevalence 
over 40 percent. The other macronutrient deficiencies, namely underweight and wasting had 
prevalence ranges which also call for action but at a less severe level. Underweight was 
present among 15.9 percent of the children while wasting prevailed among 6.1 percent of 
them. 
Our survey thus took place in a country where child malnutrition was an actual and persistent 
problem. In fact, nutritional surveys undertaken in the 1950s confirm that nutritional 
deficiencies already prevailed among Ugandan children at that time (RUTISHAUSER, 1971).  
An observation of national trends since 1989 has also shown alarming levels of malnutrition 
over the years, especially for stunting. Although there have been some improvements 
between 1989 and 1995, stunting prevalence remains at critical high levels since then. 
Underweight showed a high prevalence until 1995 but the situation improved in 2006. In 
contrast, wasting which was low in 1989 has risen to a public health problem of mild 
importance over the years. Statistics on anemia and vitamin A indicated that the nutritional 
situation has worsened for anemia while it has improved for vitamin A between 2001 and 
2006.  
 
Child Nutritional Status in the West Nile Region, Uganda 
Regional data on children's nutritional status could be obtained from the UDHS survey of 
2006 which compiled nutritional statistics for the West Nile region5 (UBOS & MACRO, 2007). 
                                                
5 The survey was designed to be nationally representative and the sample size equals only 156 children for West 
Nile. Proper representative results are thus not necessarily ensured at the regional strata level. 
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As for the national statistics, the malnutrition prevalence was judged against the criteria for 
public health severity (table 2.2.1) and portrayed as a graph (figure 3.1.5). 
 
 
Fig. 3.1-5 Public health severity of child malnutrition in West Nile/ Uganda, UDHS 20066  
 
 
Malnutrition appeared to be at critical levels in the study region. The degree of public health 
severity followed similar patterns as for the whole country. In fact, anemia was the most 
severe deficiency and affected 69.2 percent of the children in West Nile, It was followed by 
vitamin A deficiency and stunting which are of less importance than anemia but tended to 
reach extremely high prevalence levels. Some 19.6 percent of the children had a low vitamin 
A status and 37.7 percent were stunted. Underweight and wasting represented public health 
problems of moderate magnitude. They affected 16.6 percent of the children for underweight 
and 8.3 percent for wasting. 
A comparison with the national data reveals that anemia, stunting and vitamin A deficiencies 
showed slightly lower prevalence in West Nile than the national average. For underweight 
and wasting, the picture was rather worse in West Nile with a higher proportion of affected 
children than in Uganda as a whole. 
                                                
6 Diagram built from the author based on figures from UDHS, 2006 
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Was malnutrition a new phenomenom in the region? Earlier studies indicated that this was 
not the case. JELLIFFE and BENNETT (1962) showed in their pediatric study of the Lugbara 
children that growth retardation was already prevailing in the region in the sixties. Protein-
energy malnutrition was also present but at a low prevalence level. Nutritional surveys 
carried out in West Nile since 1987 are summarised in table 3.1.2. They sampled children 
aged 0 to 59 months except the one of MATERIA ET AL. (1995) which excluded those younger 
than six months. The geographical target areas were not identical. Their results are thus 
hardly comparable. Nethertheless they give an idea of how the nutritional situation evolved 
over the time.  
 
Tab. 3.1-2 Trends in child malnutrition prevalence, West Nile 1987-2006 
Results Survey Area Sample 
Size 
Date 
Stunting Underweight Wasting 
Source 
Arua 1066 1987 42.4% 24.8% 3.0% VELLA  ET AL., 1992 
West Nile7 209 1989 44.9% 33.1% 3.9% MOH & MACRO, 1989 
Arua 514 1992 49.2% -  4.7% MATERIA  ET AL., 1995 
Arua 245 2005 32.0% 25-30% 8.0% VINCK, 2006 
West Nile8 156 2006 37.7% 16.6% 8.3% UBOS & MACRO, 2007 
 
Regarding stunting, the conditions seemed to be at their worst during the war and in the 
years following resettlement of the displaced natives. Studies undertaken between 1987 and 
1992 indicated stunting prevalence ranges over 40 percent, corresponding to severe public 
health problems (MATERIA ET AL., 1995; MOH & MACRO, 1989; VELLA ET AL., 1992). Compared 
to this period, the prevalence found around the time of our study indicated an improvement of 
the situation (UBOS & MACRO, 2007; VINCK, 2006). The trends were not as clear regarding 
underweight. The prevalence seemed to have always oscillated within ranges of mild to 
moderate importance in Arua. In contrast and similarly to the national trends, wasting 
showed low prevalence in the past and emerged as a significant public health problem only 
recently.  
Child Nutritional Status in Arua Refugee Settlements, West Nile 
Our study took place within the refugee settlements of the Arua district. Unfortunately very 
few data on stunting or underweight were available for the refugee population. The available 
data came from a survey carried out in 1994 in Koboko, a refugee camp that received a 
massive influx of refugees in the mid of 1992 and that was closed by the end of 1996 
                                                
7 Arua, Moyo, Nebbi districts 
8 Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Nyadri, Nebbi & Yumbe districts 
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(ORACH, 1999). The survey revealed a very high prevalence of stunting and a high 
prevalence of underweight during this period. Some 48.9 percent of the children had a low 
height-for-age and 36.7 percent had a low weight-for-age.  
Although this study points out that stunting and underweight were serious public health 
problems among refugees, nutritional data were generally available only for wasting. These 
data were provided by small scale emergency nutrition surveys undertaken by the District 
Directorate of  Health Services of Arua (DDHS) since 2002 and by various non governmental 
organisations (NGO) operating all over the district before. The surveys were organised on a 
regular basis with the aim of monitoring the activities in the settlements. They applied the 
standard World Health Organization EPI methodology (WHO, 1991). Their results are 
detailed in table A2.1 provided in annex A2. Most of the original reports could not be 
obtained but the results were made availaible through the UNSSCN website. 
The prevailing wasting prevalence was again analyzed using the WHO criteria for public 
health severity and summarised as a graph (figure 3.1.6). 
 
 
Fig. 3.1-6 Trends in prevalence of wasting 1993-2005, Arua refugee settlements9 
 
The curve for Koboko showed that wasting was a severe public health problem in the camp 
in 1993. The prevalence was over 30 percent. The situation somewhat improved in the 
                                                
9 Diagram built from the author based on figures from the reports cited in annex A2 
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following times. It nevertheless further oscillated between prevalence of medium to high 
levels. In Rhino Camp, the prevalence of wasting was also very high in 1995. There was a 
significant improvement since then and the prevalence remained within a stable and medium 
range. The situation was not much different in Madi-Okollo and Imvepi settlements where the 
wasting prevalence was within the medium range of five to ten percent as well. The situation 
appeared to be stable and there was no tendency towards lower prevalence levels. 
In total, wasting remained at critical levels among refugees of Arua and had to be tackled. It 
yet represented a public health problem of mild magnitude. 
 
3.1.4 An Area with Microfinance Institutions 
This section provides a brief overview of the regulatory environment and of the types of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) present in the Arua District during the sample period. The 
institutions were identified through formal interviews with operational staff of ten MFIS and 
consultations with four non-MFI organisations in November 2004 and later from 5th to 11th 
April 2005. The respondents were mostly interviewed individually but sometimes also in a 
group. The author compiled the gathered information in a report10. 
Microfinance Environment 
Several microfinance institutions were operating in Arua. According to their legal status, they 
belonged to the formal, the semi-formal and the informal sector.  
Formal financial institutions are regulated and supervised by the Bank of Uganda (BoU). 
They are of three types: Commercial banks (Tier 1) and credit institutions (Tier 2) which are 
licensed by the Financial Institutions Act 2004 and Micro-finance Deposit Taking Institutions 
(Tier 3) which fall under the Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI) Act 2003 
(STASCHEN, 2003). In Arua, the formal banking sector consisted of five commercial banks 
(STANBIC, CERUDEB, DFCU, Coop Bank, UCB), one Postal bank (Post bank), two 
Insurance companies (EXCEL, United) and two MDIs (Pride, FINCA). So far, only 
CERUDEB, Coop Bank, Post bank, Pride and FINCA were offering micro-financial services. 
Tier-4 institutions are semi-formal microfinance institutions that are not regulated by the BoU. 
They can gain the legal status of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Companies, 
cooperatives, etc. and fall under specific legislations and licensing authorities according to 
their corporate status. Savings & Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) are co-operative 
                                                
10 Yeo, A.E. (2005, September). Microfinance Institutions in Arua District, Uganda: Institutional Survey 
in April 2005 (Unpublished report). Giessen: ZEU .20p. 
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societies engaged in microfinance business. The Registrar of Cooperatives, one staff of the 
production office in Arua was in charge of their registration. In April 2005, about 100 co-
operatives were registered in this office, of them four were SACCOS: Arudi, Ayivu, Koboko 
United and West Nile Teachers. Six other SACCOS were identified: Bidibidi, Omugo, Vurra 
patriotic, Yumbe Farmers, Upper-Madi and Oli Division. The savings and credit cooperatives 
got their capital from membership fees, shares and savings. There were also a number of 
local or international NGO-MFIs operating in the district like WENWA, PARUDA, CEFORD, 
CREAM, PROMIC Arua Diocese, JRS Rhino Camp and DED refugee-program.  
The informal microfinance sector of Arua was made of various institutions which did not have 
any form of registration or only were registered at district or sub-county level for 
administrative purpose. This type of registration confers no corporate status and those 
organisations that are not incorporated under any law can be considered as informal 
(STASCHEN, 2003). Informal institutions were of several types: Accumulating Savings and 
Credit Association (ASCAs), Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCAs), Money 
lenders and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). 
Microfinance in Arua Refugee Settlements: The DED Loan Program 
Of the formal or semi-formal microfinance institutions, only the DED refugee program and 
JRS Rhino Camp were targeting refugees. JRS Rhino Camp (Jesuites Refugee Services) 
provided basic pastoral care/services and adult literacy to the refugee community of Rhino 
Camp settlement. The promotion of Income Generating Activities (IGA) by JRS Rhino Camp 
started in 199811. In April 2004, the Women's empowerment/ Income Generating Program 
started again with the recruitment of a credit officer. The IGA activities targeted refugee 
women. Loans were offered to 65 women’s groups (10 old and 55 new groups) made up of 
165 women.  
DED Arua refugee program was a program run by the German Development Service with the 
aim of administrating the three Arua refugee settlements: Rhino camp, Imvepi and Madi-
Okollo. It had one office in Arua town and one in each of the three settlements. The program 
offered services in education, health, agriculture/forestry/environment, administration, 
community services, construction of infrastructures, and also services for supporting Income 
Generating Activities (IGA). The activities of IGA promotion started in 1996. The overall 
objective of the IGA sector was to empower refugees and nationals within the catchments 
area and give them the opportunity to work and generate income so that they would be able 
to maintain their dignity, care for their household and access basic services. The activities 
                                                
11 Yeo, A.E. (2005, September). The role of microfinance for nutrition security in the context of crisis: The case of 
the Jesuits Refugees Services in Arua, Uganda. Survey from 31 November to 1st December 2004. ZEU 
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consisted in the provision of extension services and loan facilities (loan revolving program) 
and the promotion of skills training. They were managed by a loan officer and several 
assistants and trainers. A total of 855 individuals participated in the DED loan revolving 
program. They represented about four percent of the whole adult population living in the 
settlements. Women represented 60 percent of the DED participants. The percentage of 
female participants varied by refugee settlement and was of 33 percent in Madi-Okollo, of 57 
percent in Imvepi and of 63 percent in Rhino Camp.  
3.2 SAMPLING 
3.2.1 Sampling Frame, Sampling Units & Sampling Size 
The following sampling strategy was applied: 
 Sampling Frame: Households12 with members of the DED loan program and 
neighbouring households as comparison group. 
 Sampling Units: DED members and non-members, their households and children 6-
59 months living in their households. 
 Sampling Size: The initial sample included 235 respondents. The analysis was yet 
restricted to respondents from households with children aged 6-59 months. The 
analysis sample included 141 respondents from 139 households with 205 children 
(figure 3.2-1). 
 
 
 
                                                
12 A household is "a collection of people living and eating together" (CHEATER, 2003:115)  
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Fig. 3.2-1 Sampling Strategy 
 
3.2.2 Sampling Procedure 
Sampling Scheme 
A two stage cluster sampling following the scheme: 
o Selection of the locations: The villages were selected randomly from the list of 
villages where the DED loan program is operating. When a village was selected, all 
villages of the corresponding zone were included in the sample. Villages were 
selected until the estimated and wished number of respondents was reached. 
o Selection of the respondents: All DED members (incoming or established; 
male or female) living in the visited villages and present at the moment of the survey 
were interviewed and their households were visited. In addition, for every fifth DED 
household that was visited, the nearest neighbouring household was also visited. In 
these households without DED-members, the first adult met (male or female) was 
interviewed as respondent.   
o Selection of the children within the households: In each randomly selected 
household, all children with a length between 65 and 110 cm and without disability 
were included in the survey. These children were identified using a quick stick 
indicating 65 cm, 85 cm and 110 cm.  It was assumed that they were between the 
age of 6 to 59 months. 
235 respondents
141 respondents
94 respondents with 
no child <6 years in household 
30 DED members 
with no credit or credit <6months 
84 DED members  
with credit ≥ 6 months 
27 non-members 
84 established clients 
(INTERVENTION GROUP) 
57 incoming clients 
(CONTROL GROUP) 
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o Selection of Index children: Among all selected children of a given household, 
the youngest child aging between 6 and 59 months was considered as the index child 
of the household. Care-related practices were assessed for this specific child.  
 
Non-independence due to cluster effect 
The 205 children are nested under 139 households which are nested under three refugee 
settlements. The assumption that errors of the models should be independent might 
therefore be violated. In order to account for the setllement cluster, the fixed effect approach 
was applied (COHEN ET AL., 2003: 539–544, HAYES, 2013: 434-435).This procedure consisted 
in including the dummies for two of the settlements as covariates in all regressions. Any 
effect due to location could therefore be removed from estimates of the coefficients and 
standard errors in the models. This fixed effect approach is recommended for large clusters, 
where the number of clusters is small relative to the total sample size. For the household 
cluster, the data structure (one to two children in each household and 139 households 
relative to 205 children) is not an ideal cluster structure for either the fixed effect approach or 
the multilevel model. The decision was therefore made to ignore the data structure. The 
calculation of the ICC (Intra-class correlation) reveals however that there is a household 
effect. About 25 percent of the variance might be attributed to differences between 
households, a fact to bear in mind while interpreting the data.  
 
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
A Cross-sectional Design 
A cross-sectional quantitative household survey was conducted from 21st February to 2nd 
March 2005 in three refugee settlements of Arua District, Northern Uganda with established 
and incoming clients of the DED loan program.  
Survey Team 
The survey team comprised five interviewers and one supervisor. Thirty interviews (20 to 40) 
were conducted on average each day which corresponds to six interviews (between three 
and ten) per interviewer per day. Interviews took fourty minutes on average. The survey team 
reflected the ethnic and language composition of the study population and presented a 
diversity of gender. The author received a four-months training at PlanetFinance Paris on 
Microfinance, impact methodologies and statistical analysis. 
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Survey Instruments 
The survey’s goal was to assess the impact of the loan programme in terms of individual 
socio-economic empowerment, household wealth, household nutrition security and child 
nutritional status. A household questionnaire was developed based on the theoretical model 
and hypotheses (DED Household Questionnaire in Annex A1). Data were collected on 
demographic characteristics of the respondent, micro-financial services, socio-economic 
information on the household, sources of income and empowerment, household‘s diet, 
household’s needs and crises and child’s nutrition. Pilot-tests were undertaken with the 
microfinance institutions FINCA in Arua town and JRS in Rhino camp settlement.  
Ethical Considerations 
The study was approved by the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology in 
Kampala. Research permissions were also obtained from the Office of the Prime Minister 
(OPM), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and DED (German 
Development Cooperation) offices in Arua. Consentment was obtained verbally from the 
respondents, who were informed on the purpose of the survey and the voluntary and 
confidential nature of the interviews. 
 
3.4 INDICATORS 
In order to assess the sequence of the process of “transformation” of microfinance 
intervention into child nutritional status, the key variables have been ordered at different 
hierarchical levels. The inherent level embraces the intervention variable (microfinance) and 
the inherent covariates. The distal (or basic) level includes the factors close to the 
intervention and distant to the ultimate outcome, namely individual income and psycho-social 
power. The proximal (or immediate) level comprises the factors close to the ultimate outcome 
and distant to the intervention, namely household diet, health care and child feeding 
practices. The intermediate level stands between the proximal and the distal level and takes 
into account the household wealth status. The ultimate level is the level of the ultimate 
outcome variable: the child nutritional status. 
 
Core variables represent the key variables used for the multivariate regression analysis. In 
addition secondary variables have been assessed for a better descriptive analysis. Some 
core variables are indices constructed on the basis of the secondary variables. An overview 
of the indicators applied for the survey is given in table 3.4.1. Core variables are written in 
bold. 
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Tab. 3.4-1 Core and secondary indicators for the survey 
DOMAIN SUB-DOMAIN INDICATOR 
Outcome Variable Y  (Child level) 
Child Height-for-Age Height-for-age z-score 
Height-for-age z-score ≥ -2SD (yes/no) 
Weight-for-age z-score ≥-2SD (yes/no) 
CHILD NUTRITIONAL 
STATUS Optimal nutritional status 
Weight-for-height z-score ≥-2SD (yes/no) 
Treatment Variable X (Respondent level)  
DED Credit  > 6 months (yes/no) Intervention 
Participation in DED 
Loan amount 
Frequency of Loans 
Repayment Period 
Loan characteristics 
Interest Rate 
MICROFINANCE 
Satisfaction Satisfaction with DED Services, suggestions 
Mediators  at a Distal Level 1: M1 et M2 (Respondent Level) Monthly Income (Ush) 
Subjective Change in Income 
Income Diversification 
Individual Income 
Enterprise Characteristics 
Individual Social Power Social Power Index 
Personal Power Gender Attitude 
Relational Power Household Decisions’ Making 
Collective Power Participation in Groups 
INDIVIDUAL SOCIO-
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
 
Other Social Aspects Workload/time availability, social support 
Mediators at an Intermediate Level 2: M3 (Household Level) 
Subjective Wealth (better off /same /worse) 
Assets 
Household Wealth 
Monthly Expenditures 
Subjective Change in Housing Housing 
Type of Housing 
Subjective change in coping ability 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC 
STATUS 
Coping  Capacity 
Nature of Coping Strategies 
Mediators at a Proximal Level 3: M4 , M5 et M6 (Household Level) Diet Index (ideal/middle/bad) 
Meal Frequency 
Dietary Diversity Index 
Household Diet 
Subjective Change in Diet 
Child Feeding Practices Index (ideal/middle 
/ bad) 
ever breastfed 
early breastfeeding initiation 
continued breastfeeding at 20 months 
Child Feeding Practices 
receiving solid food 
Health Care Index (ideal/middle/bad) 
Hygiene, sanitation, Access to facilities 
HOUSEHOLD NUTRITION 
SECURITY 
 
 
Household Health Care 
Type and prevalence of infections 
Moderator W & Covariates Ii (Respondent & Household Levels) MODERATOR =GENDER Respondent Sex Sex of Respondent (female/male) 
Household Size 
Experience of Shocks last Year (yes/no) 
Household Demographic 
Profile 
Highest Level of Education (years) 
Child Sex (female/male) Child Demographic Profile 
Child Age (months) 
Madi-Okollo settlement (yes/no) 
INHERENT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Location 
Imvepi settlement (yes/no) 
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3.4.1 Outcome Variable: Child Nutritional Status 
Core Indicator: The outcome variable Y is the child nutritional status expressed as height-for-
age z-score. The height-for-age z-score is calculated by dividing the difference between the 
observed height of a child of a given age and the median height of the reference population 
of that age by the standard deviation value of the reference population. Height-for-age is a 
long-term indicator which reflects the linear growth of the child. It is an indicator of chronic 
malnutrition (stunting). The z-score values of the surveyed children were compared to the 
WHO Child Growth Standards (WHO, 2006). For calculating the height-for-age index, it has 
been necessary to assess the following raw body parameters at all children aged 6 to 59 
months: height, age and sex. The children older than two years were measured by standing 
and those younger than two in the lying position. Standard portable, wooden measuring 
height boards were used with a standard error of plus/minus 0.1 centimeters. The body 
measurements were performed by a team of two measurers for each child. In order to assure 
the accuracy of anthropometric data and minimize errors, the interviewers were trained to 
measure children. Spot checks on measurement techniques were made by an experienced 
anthropometrist during the field survey. The child sex was determined by checking the health 
cards or by physical observation. The child age was reported in months. It was calculated 
based on birth dates of children, which was probed carefully and obtained from health cards 
whenever possible.  
Secondary Indicators: For the descriptive analysis, child nutritional status is expressed using 
both cutt-off-based prevalences and z-score summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
standard error) for all indices (weight-for-age, height-for-age and weight-for-height). 
Regarding the dummies for normal height-for-age, normal weight-for-age or normal weight-
for-height, a child receives the value one if its z-score equals or is above minus two standard 
deviations. He/she receives the value zero if its height-for-age z-score is below minus two 
standard deviations. The weight was assessed by using a hanging Salter/Sprint scale 
calibrated from 0-25 kg. The precision was of plus/minus 0.1 kg. 
 
3.4.2 Intervention Variable: Microfinance 
The survey has a quasi-experimental design. The microfinance “treatment” variable X is an 
independent variable which takes the value one for microfinance intervention and the value 
zero for the control group. Microfinance intervention is defined as having received a credit 
from the DED loan programme for more than six months. Established borrowers are 
compared to a control group made up of eligible individuals not having received a loan yet or 
having received a loan only recently. As six months is the official time required to pay back 
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the loan, borrowers who received their loans for less than six months are supposed to be still 
in the process of paying it back and are considered as not having benefited from their loans 
yet. The conditions for receiving microcredits from DED are 1) applying for a credit; and 2) 
having a business or being in a group with a business or business project. 
 
3.4.3 Mediators at Distal Level: Individual Income & Social Power 
Two variables are considered as potential mediators at a distal level: the individual income 
and the individual social power. 
Individual Income  
Core Indicator: Individual income (M1) is assessed through the monthly profit levels of the 
respondents expressed in Ugandan Shillings13.  
Secondary Indicators: For the descriptive analysis, the following aspects of economic 
empowerment were also assessed: subjective change in income, income diversification and 
enterprise characteristics like ownership, employment, capital, duration of enterprise, use of 
profits. 
Individual Social Power 
Core Indicator: Social power (M2) is measured through a composite index of psycho-social 
power that takes into account the three dimensions: gender attitudes, involvement in 
household decisions and social engagement (cf. ROWLANDS 1997). Scores based on these 
three factors were derived by adding the scores for thirteen items and by dividing this sum by 
thirteen. The social power index ranges from zero to one. Its internal reliability was tested 
through the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
Secondary Indicators: Gender attitudes were measured through opinions about four 
statements reflecting a lower status of women in the society (MENON, RUEL, ARIMOND, & 
FRESUS, 2003: 62). Households’ decision making was assessed through questions about 
involvement in seven key decision areas. The degree of social engagement was assessed at 
respondent level through questions related to participation in social activities and to 
leadership positions. For each of these dimensions, a score was calculated by adding 
positive responses and dividing the sum by the maximal number of items. The three 
secondary indices of social power range from zero to one. Their internal reliability was tested 
through the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  
                                                
13 1 EUR = 2400 Ugandan Shillings. 
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3.4.4 Mediator at Intermediate Level: Household Wealth 
One variable M3 is considered as potential mediator at an intermediate level: the household 
wealth status. 
Core Indicator: The household wealth status was assessed through a subjective wealth 
variable. Respondents were asked how they would describe the wealth of their household 
within their community: as better off than most people (value one), as about the same as 
most people (value zero) or as a bit worse off than most people (value minus one). 
Secondary Indicators:  Asset ownership and household expenditures were assessed as 
complementary indicators of household wealth. For assessing asset ownership, respondents 
were read a list of items (house, bicycle, radio, car) and of domestic animals (cow, goat, pig, 
chicken, sheep) and were asked if anyone in their household owns any of the items and how 
many. For assessing household expenditures, respondents were asked how much they 
would estimate that their household spent on the following per month: food, education, 
health, transport, special event, housing and savings. Household’s monthly expenditures 
were adjusted for intrahousehoud inequalities (household age and composition effects) using 
adult equivalence scales. 
 
3.4.5 Mediators at Proximal Level: Household Diet, Health & Child Feeding 
At a proximal level, household nutrition security is considered to mediate microfinance effect 
on child nutritional status. It is measured through three aspects: household diet (M4), child 
feeding practices (M5) and health care (M6). 
Household Diet 
Core Indicator: Household diet was expressed as a diet summary index taking the value 
minus one for a poor diet, zero for a middle diet and plus one for an ideal diet. This 
composite indicator was calculated based on the household meal frequency and dietary 
diversity on the previous day (similar to WHO, 2008:7). The “ideal diet” category refers to 
households with the minimum food frequency (three meals or more per day) and a fully 
balanced diet (dietary diversity index =4). The “middle diet” category describes the proportion 
of households with the minimum food frequency and a dietary diversity index equaling three. 
Households in the “poor diet” category have a food frequency of less than three meals per 
day.  
Secondary Indicators: The meal frequency is based on the respondent report and includes 
both meals and snacks consumed by any household member the day preceding the 
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interview. The minimum number of meals is defined as three times per day. Concerning food 
diversity, the types of foods eaten by the household members the day before the interview 
were assessed and put in categories according to their nutrient contents: Fruits, greens, 
vegetables, pumpkin, carrots were considered as vitamin-rich; fish, meat, eggs, milk, 
peas/beans were considered as protein rich; oil/fat, groundnuts were considered as fat rich; 
and tubers, grains, bread were seen as carbohydrates-rich foods. A dietary diversity index 
ranging from zero to four was then constructed based on the number of food categories 
present in the diet. A dietary diversity index of four was equivalent to a fully balanced diet. 
Households with a value of three or more were categorized as having the minimum dietary 
diversity. Subjective change in diet was assessed by asking the respondent if he perceived a 
worsening, an improvement or no change in household diet during the twelve months 
preceding the survey.  
Child Feeding Practices 
Core Indicator: Child feeding practices were expressed as a Child Feeding Index (CFI) taking 
the value one for ideal feeding practices, the value zero for middle practices and the value 
minus one for bad practices. The child feeding index was constructed based on the following 
criteria: ever breastfed, early breastfeeding initiation, continued breastfeeding at 20 months 
and receiving solid foods (WHO, 2008). Positive answers regarding all four aspects were 
summed up. An additive score equalling four was equivalent to an ideal child feeding 
practice; a score equalling two to three was considered as a middle practice and a score of 
zero to one was judged as bad. The internal reliability of the Child Feeding Index was tested 
through the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
Secondary Indicators:. The Children Ever Breastfed indicator measures the proportion of 
children aged 6-60 months who were ever breastfed. The Early Initiation of Breastfeeding 
indicator describes the proportion of children aged 6 to 60 months who were put to the breast 
within twenty-four hours of birth. Both indicators are based on historic recall.  
Household Health Care 
Core Indicator: Household health care practices were expressed as a Health Care Index 
taking the value one for ideal feeding practices, the value zero for middle practices and the 
value minus one for bad practices. The health care index encompasses the preventive, 
curative and environmental dimensions of health care. Positive answers regarding the 
following seven key practices were summed up: treatment of sick children at health centre, 
full immunization, antenatal care, sensitisation on nutrition, cleanness of the compound, safe 
drinking water and ownership of latrine. A household obtaining the maximal score of seven 
was considered as having ideal health care practices. With a score comprised between five 
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and six, the practices were regarded as middle practices and with a score below five they 
were seen as bad. The internal reliability of the Household Health care Index was tested 
through the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
Secondary Indicators: The Child Treatment at Health Centre Indicator takes the value one for 
children brought to health centre while sick and for children who were not sick in the last two 
weeks. It takes the value zero when the index child was not brought to health centre despite 
having suffered from diarrhoea, fever, cough/cold or shortness of breath in the last two 
weeks. The Full Immunization Indicator was adjusted for age according to the Ugandan 
MOH/UNEPI National immunization Schedule (MOH, 2003) and measures the proportion of 
children full vaccinated with BCG (at birth), polio (at birth or within two weeks), DPT (six 
weeks), Measles (≥ nine months) and who received Vitamin A supplementation. The 
Antenatal Care Indicator indicates the proportion of caregivers who did use antenatal care 
during their last and current pregnancy. The Compound Cleanness indicator takes the value 
one when the household compound was evaluated as clean or very clean according to a 
spot observation of the interviewer. It takes the value zero for satisfactory, dirty or very dirty 
compounds. The Nutrition Sensitization Indicator expresses the proportion of caregivers who 
did ever receive information about the nutrition requirements of children. The Drinking Water 
Indicator takes the value one for households obtaining drinking water mainly from a borehole 
and it takes the value zero for households drinking from a river. The Pit Latrine Indicator 
points to a positive practice when the household has an own latrine and for a negative one 
when it shares the pit latrine with other households or do not have any.  
 
3.4.6 Moderator & Covariates: Gender & Inherent Characteristics 
Gender Moderator: The gender variable W describes the sex of the respondent. It was 
considered as moderating microfinance effect on child nutritional status. This variable takes 
the value one for a female respondent and the value zero for a male respondent.  
Covariates: Covariates are independent variables influencing child nutritional status without 
being influenced by microfinance. They could also explain some differences in the height-for-
age of the children and were controlled for in multivariate analyses. Five variables describing 
inherent characteristics of the household, of the child and of their geographical location were 
considered as covariates: the household size, the household education level, the child age, 
the child sex and the refugee settlement. The household size was derived from the number 
of people who lived together and shared the same food at least once a day, including the 
respondent. The highest level of education was assessed for each household member and 
converted into years of education. Uganda’s formal education system follows the four-tier 
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educational model: seven years of primary education, four years of ordinary level secondary 
education, two years of advanced level secondary education and the tertiary level of 
education. The household education variable corresponds to the highest years of education 
attained by any individual of the household. The household shock variable indicates the 
experience of shocks by the household in the twelve months preceding the survey. The 
respondents were asked if during the last twelve months, anything had happened to their 
household which had a serious negative effect on how the household operates. The variable 
takes the value one when the household had experienced some kinds of shock and the value 
zero for those households with no shock in the preceding year. The child age is expressed in 
months. The child sex takes the value one for girls and the value zero for boys. The 
household location variable refers to the refugee settlement where the household lives. This 
variable is specified as a cluster variable with three units. It takes the value one for Rhino 
Camp, the value two for Imvepi and the value three for Madi-Okollo settlement. Rhino camp 
is used as the reference while Imvepi and Madi-Okollo dummies are included as additional 
predictors in all linear models generated as part of analysis. The objective is to remove any 
effect due to cluster from estimates of the coefficients and standard errors in the model 
according to the "fixed effect approach" (COHEN ET AL., 2003: 539–544, HAYES, 2013: 434-
435). 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.5.1 Data Processing 
The questionnaires were checked by the investigator on the field and missing or suspect 
answers were clarified and rectified day by day. Data entry, check of data entry and data 
cleaning were performed by the main researcher using SPSS 12. Extreme values were 
detected using boxplot diagrams especially for the monetary variables (household 
expenditures, profits). Extreme or missing values were rectified using Expectation-
Maximisation imputation (EM imputation). The underestimation of variances is often seen as 
a limit of this regression-based single imputation approach (GRAHAM, 2012: 52). But given 
the very low rate of extreme or missing values in the sample (<1%), this underestimation 
should not be noticeable.  
WHO ANTHRO software (WHO, 2007) was used to calculate standard deviations of 
anthropometric z-scores from the WHO child growth standards. The data were then exported 
to SPSS using the Macro WHO IGROWUP SPSS. The z-scores were not available in the 
following cases: 1) child's age was below six months or above 60 completed months, 2) 
child's age was unknown, 3) child's length was lower than 45 cm or higher than 110 cm and 
his/her age was less than 24 months and 4) child's height was lower than 65 cm or higher 
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than 120 cm and his/her age was 24 months or older. Children with missing z-scores for 
height-for-age were excluded from the survey.  
Data analysis was performed using SPSS 19 with integration of the macro PROCESS 
(HAYES, 2012b). 
3.5.2 Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
Descriptive statistics in the form of proportions and means were produced for all core and 
secondary indicators.  
These indicators were further disaggregated and reported for the following comparison 
groups: well-nourished versus malnourished children, microfinance intervention group versus 
control group. Within these comparison groups as well as for the whole sample, differences 
according to the gender of the respondent (basic level) were also identified. 
Group differences were detected using non-parametric statistical tests (table 3.5.1). 
Observations of categorical variables were compared using the asymptotic significance of 
the Pearson chi-square test. If one or more frequencies were lower than five, the exact 
significance of the Fisher’s Exact Test was calculated. For observations of the metric 
variables, the first step consisted in testing for homogeneity of variance for each dependent 
variable using the Levene test. Then, for variables with significantly different variances, the 
non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test was used to analyze group differences. For all other 
metric variables one-way ANOVAs were performed.   
 
Tab. 3.5-1 Non-parametric statistical tests for the bivariate analysis 
Categorical Variables Metric Variables 
Frequencies Normality test of Distribution 
All Frequencies >5 Non-normal  Normal 
 
Some  frequencies < 5 
 Levene test 
   Unequal variance Equal variance 
Pearson Chi-test Fisher’s Exact test Kolmogoroff 
Smirnoff-Test 
Kruskal-Wallis test One-way ANOVA 
 
3.5.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was also used to compare groups. This approach differs from the 
bivariate analysis as more than two variables can be added in the analysis and as it implies 
directionality (LOCKWOOD, DE FRANCESCO, ELLIOT, BERESFORD, & TOOBERT, 2010). It offers 
the advantages to control for factors that could also explain a group difference (covariates). A 
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predictor or independent variable (X) is defined, and it is related to the dependent or outcome 
variable (Y). This provides a regression coefficient, which is a measure of the effect of the 
predictor on the outcome.  A test is performed to determine the probability or p value that the 
observed difference occured by chance. If the p value equals or is higher than 0.10, the 
relationship between predictor and outcome is considered as non-significant. A p value lower 
than 0.01, indicates that the effect is highly significant. A p value between 0.01 and 0.05 
indicates a moderately significant effect and a p value between 0.05 and 0.10 a lowly 
significant effect.  
Regression analysis was used for measuring the total effect of microfinance on child 
nutritional status (section 4.1.4). The relationship between microfinance and child nutritional 
status was established using a linear regression model labeled as regression 0.1. In this 
model, the dependent variable Y (height-for-age z-score) is regressed on the independent 
variable X (microcredit for more than six months) and on inherent covariates W (respondent’s 
sex) and Ik (location, household size, education level, household shock, child age and child 
sex) as follows:   Y = iy* + c1X + c2W+ cIk1Ik + ey*                     (0.1). 
 
Multivariate regressions were also applied for the mediation and moderation analyses. 
Mediation and moderated mediation procedures are explained in the next sections (3.5.4 and 
3.5.5, respectively). 
 
3.5.4 Multivariate Simple Mediation Analysis 
Mediation, Direct, Indirect, total Effect 
One objective of the study is to test the mediating effect of the following six factors Mj: 
individual income, individual social power, household wealth, household diet, child feeding 
practices and household health care. In order to achieve this objective, statistical mediation 
procedures based on multivariate regressions were applied. In particular, the simple 
mediation model has been selected. This model was operationalised as "Model No. 4" for 
SPSS (HAYES, 2012b). The conceptual and statistical models are presented in figure 3.5.1.  
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Fig. 3.5-1 Simple mediation: conceptual & statistical models (X=Predictor; M=Mediator; 
Y=Outcome, HAYES 2012b) 
 
Mediation analysis is typically used to answer analytical questions of ‘how’. The objective is 
to determine the extent to which some hypothetical causal variable X influences some 
outcome Y through one or more mediator variables Mj. (HAYES, 2012a).  As depicted in figure 
3.5.1, the predictor X is modeled to influence the outcome Y directly as well as indirectly 
through the mediator variable Mj, which is causally located between X and Y. The direct and 
indirect effects of X are derived from two regression models: one linear regression estimating 
Mj from X: (Mj=iMj+a1jX+eM) and a second linear regression estimating Y from both X and Mj 
(Y=iy+c’1X+b1Mj+ey). The direct effect of X on Y is estimated with c'1 in the second equation. 
The indirect or mediating effect of X on Y through M is estimated as a1jb1j. The direct and 
indirect effects of X on Y sum to yield the total effect of X on Y.  
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Multiple & Multilevel Mediators 
In order to assess the sequence of the process of “transformation” of microfinance 
intervention into child nutritional status, the variables have been ordered at different 
hierarchical levels: 1) the distal model tests the mediating effect of individual income and 
psycho-social power; 2) the intermediate model tests the mediating effect of the household 
wealth status; and 3) the proximal model tests the mediating model of household diet, health 
care and child feeding practices. At distal and proximal levels, multiple mediators operate in 
parallel.  
In an attempt to better understand how microfinance affects each of the mediators, mediation 
analyses have also been run with the six factors (individual income, individual social power, 
household wealth, household diet, child feeding practices and household health care) as 
outcome variables.  
The regression models run for the mediation analysis are summarised in table 3.5.2. 
 
Statistical Inference about the indirect effect 
Bootstrapping has been used as inferential method for testing hypotheses about indirect 
effects. It consists in constructing confidence intervals for a relative indirect effect by 
repeatedly estimating all the coefficients in the mediation model using the two equations in 
each bootstrap sample (1,000 bootstrap samples). Bootstrapped confidence intervals for the 
indirect effect were generated with a bias-corrected level of confidence of 99 percent, 95 
percent and 90 percent, respectively.  
If the bias-corrected 99% bootstrap percentile confidence interval failed to include 0, then the 
p-value was deemed to be less than 0.01, and the effect was said to be highly significant. If 
the 99% bootstrap percentile confidence interval included 0, then the bootstraped confidence 
intervals were generated with a confidence level of 95 percent. 
If the bias-corrected 95% bootstrap percentile confidence interval failed to include 0, then the 
p-value was deemed to be less than 0.05, and the effect was said to be moderately 
significant. If the 95% bootstrap percentile confidence interval included 0, then the 
bootstraped confidence intervals were generated with a confidence level of 90 percent. 
If the bias-corrected 90% bootstrap percentile confidence interval failed to include 0, then the 
p-value was deemed to be less than 0.10, and the effect was said to be lowly significant. If 
the 90% bootstrap percentile confidence interval included 0, then the p-value was deemed to 
be more or equal to 0.10, and the effect was said to be not significant. 
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Tab. 3.5-2 Summary of regression models for the simple mediation analysis 
   Child Nutritional 
Status 
Individual 
Income 
Individual 
Social 
Power 
Household 
Wealth 
Household  
Food 
Security 
Houshold 
Child Care 
Household 
Health 
Security 
          
 A. OUTCOME VARIABLE  Height-for-age z-
score (Y) 
Monthly  
Profits in 
Ush (M1) 
Social 
Power Index 
(M2) 
Perceived 
Wealth 
Index (M3) 
Diet Summary 
Index (M4) 
Child Feeding 
Index (M5) 
Health Care 
Index (M6) 
          
 B. REGRESSION MODEL  Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
                    
 C. LABEL  0.1 1.1 2.1 3.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.4 0.5 1.5 2.5 0.6 1.6 2.6 0.7 1.7 2.7 
                    
 D. PREDICTING VARIABLES                   
 Microfinance Intervention                   
 Credit since more than 6 months  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors                   
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Imvepi settlement  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Household Size  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Highest HH Education Level (yrs)  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Shock  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Female Respondent  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Child is female  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Child Age  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 Mediation at Level 1:                    
 Monthly Profits in Ush   √ √ √    √  √ √  √ √  √ √ 
 Social Power    √ √ √    √  √ √  √ √  √ √ 
 Mediation at Level 2                   
 Household Wealth    √ √       √   √   √ 
 Mediation at Level 3                   
 Diet Index     √              
 Child Feeding Index     √              
 Health Care Index     √              
√: inclusion of the variable in the model; Sample= 205 children in all regressions 
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3.5.5 Multivariate Moderated Mediation Analysis 
Simple Moderation, Conditional Effect 
One objective of the study is to test the moderating effect of respondent’s sex on the relation 
between microfinance and child nutritional status. In order to achieve this objective, statistical 
moderation procedures based on multivariate regressions were applied. 
The simple moderation model has been selected for testing gender moderation of the total 
effect of microfinance on nutritional status. This model was operationalized as "Model No. 1" 
for SPSS (HAYES, 2012b). The conceptual and statistical models are presented in figure 
3.5.2.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5-2 Simple moderation analysis: conceptual & statistical models (X=Predictor; W= 
Moderator; Y=Outcome; Source: HAYES 2012b) 
 
Moderation analysis is typically applied to answer analytical questions of when. The goal is to 
determine whether the sign or the significance of the effect of some hypothetical variable X 
on outcome Y depends on the values of a moderator variable. The moderating effect of sex 
(W) on the relation between microfinance (X) and child nutritional status (Y) is tested by 
adding the interaction term “microfinance x sex” (XW) in the equation of the regression 
estimating Y from both X and W:  Y = b + bX2X + bW2W + bXWXW + bIi2I + eY2). The conditional 
effect of microfinance on empowerment is calculated for women and for men based on the 
formula: conditional effect of X on Y = bX2 + bXWY. 
 
W
W 
W 
XW 
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Moderated Mediation Analysis 
In order to better understand gender moderation of microfinance on child nutritional status, 
the moderation of the mediation processes had been tested at each level. For this aim, the 
statistical model described as “First Stage and Direct Effect Moderation Model” was selected 
(EDWARDS & LAMBERT, 2007). This model is operationalized as "Model No. 8" for SPSS 
(HAYES, 2012b). The moderated mediation model is depicted in figure 3.5.3. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5-3 Moderated mediation analysis: conceptual & statistical models (X=Predictor; W= 
Moderator; M=Mediator; Y=Outcome; Source: HAYES 2012b) 
 
The regression models used for the simple moderation analysis and for the moderated 
mediation analysis are summarised in table 3.5.3. 
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Tab. 3.5-3 Summary of regression models for the moderated mediation analysis 
  Child  
Nutritional Status 
Individual 
Income 
Individual 
Social 
Power 
Househol
d Wealth 
Household 
Food 
Security 
Houshold 
Child  
Care 
Househol
d Health 
Security 
         
A. OUTCOME VARIABLEi  Height-for-age z-score (Y) Monthly 
Profits 
(Ush) 
Social 
Power 
Index 
Perceived 
Wealth 
Index 
Diet 
Summary 
Index 
Child 
Feeding 
Index 
Health 
Care Index 
B. REGRESSION MODEL  Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
         
C. LABEL  0.8 1.8 2.8 3.8 0.9 0.10 1.11  2.12   2.13   2.14 
D. PREDICTING VARIABLES              
Microfinance Intervention              
Credit since more than 6 months  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Level 0: Inherent Factors              
Madi-Okollo Settlement  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Imvepi settlement  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Household Size  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Highest HH Education Level (yrs)  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Shock  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Female Respondent  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Child is Female  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Child Age  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
Mediation at Level 1:               
Monthly Profits in Ush   √ √ √   √  √ √  √ 
Social Power    √ √ √   √  √ √  √ 
Mediation at Level 2              
Household Wealth    √ √     √ √  √ 
Mediation at Level 3              
Diet Index     √         
Child Feeding Index     √         
Health Care Index     √         
Gender Moderation              
Gender x Microfinance  √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √  √ 
 
√: inclusion of the variable in the model; Sample= 205 children in all regressions; HH: Household
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3.5.6 Reporting 
The results are reported using tables, figures and path diagrams. Tables, figures and path 
diagrams are based on the own DED survey and they are built from the author unless the 
source is cited differently.  
Effect Size Measures 
Effect sizes are reported in tables as estimates of the unstandardised regression coefficient 
B plus its 95 percent confidence intervalI (CI) as well as the standardised coefficient beta (β). 
Following COHEN (1988:82) standards, they are interpretated as trivial, small, medium and 
large when the standardised coefficient is lower than 0.1, is between 0.1 and 0.3, is between 
0.3 and 0.5, and is higher than 0.5, respectively. 
For indirect effects which are products of two effects, these benchmarks are squarred 
(KENNY, 2014). Thus, a trivial indirect effect size is a standardised value lower than 0.01, 
small is between 0.01 and 0.09, medium is between 0.09 and 0.25, and large is higher than 
0.25. The standardised values correspond to the Completely Standardized Indirect Effect 
(PREACHER & KELLEY, 2011) which is reported in tables in addition to the Unstandardised 
Indirect Effect and its 95 percent bootstrapped confidence interval (95% BootCI). When the 
indirect effect is lowly or highly significant, the corresponding 90 percent bootstrapped 
confidence interval or the 99 percent bootstrapped confidence interval are also reported in 
the text. 
 
Visualising Effects through Graphs 
Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is visualized by plotting the mean predicted 
values for height-for-age z-score against the observed values for microfinance intervention x. 
These predicted values are derived from the linear regressions of the height-for-age z-score.  
Microfinance effect on the potential mediators is visualized by plotting the mean predicted 
values for the mediators (mi-predicted) against the observed values for microfinance 
intervention (x= zero or one). The predicted values for the mediators are derived from the 
linear regressions of the mediating variables for each value of the independent variable X. 
The inherent covariates were set to their sample mean when deriving the predicted values. 
The 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimated marginal means are also plotted (95% 
upper and lower limits). The data were processed using the statistical software SPSS 19.   
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Visualising Effects through Path Diagrams 
Flow Diagrams are used to report the results of the different effects tested in the 
regressions.These diagrams are labeled Result 1 to Result 5. The color, the style and the 
weight of the lines vary to help visualizing the sign, the size and the significance of the tested 
effect. The arrows indicate the direction of effects. A diagram legend is given in table 3.5.4. 
 
 
Tab. 3.5-4 Representation of effects on path diagrams 
 
 Sign of Effect 
 Positive  Negative 
 Statistical Significance  Statistical Significance 
Effect 
size 
 Non-significant  Significant  Non-significant  Significant 
Trivial          
Small          
Medium          
Large          
Non significant effect: p≥ 0.10 or 90%BootCI includes zero; Significant effect: p<0.10 or 90%BootCI does not include zero 
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4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 MICROFINANCE TOTAL EFFECT ON CHILD NUTRITIONAL STATUS 
  
 
Model 12: Microfinance total effect on child nutritional status 
 
 
This section describes the demographic characteristics of the sample population at 
household, respondent and child levels and presents the use and satisfaction of microfinance 
services. It then draws a picture on the nutritional status of children. The two last parts are 
attempts to establish the relationship between microfinance and child nutritional status using 
either bivariate or multivariate analyses. 
 
The main hypothesis being tested is: 
H1: Microfinance has a positive and significant total effect on child nutritional status. 
 
 
4.1.1 Demographic Characteristics 
The demographic characteristics of the study population are given in table 4.1.1 for the 
sample of respondents, households and children. 
LEVEL 1 
INDIVIDUAL SOCIO-
ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
LEVEL 3 
HOUSEHOLD 
NUTRITION 
SECURITY 
LEVEL 2  
HOUSEHOLD 
ECONOMIC STATUS 
 
 
Household 
Wealth (M3) 
 
 
MICRO-
FINANCE 
(X) 
Child Feeding 
Practices (M5) 
Household 
Health Care 
((M6) 
 
CHILD 
NUTRITIONAL 
STATUS 
 (Y) 
Individual 
Social Power 
(M2) 
Individual 
Income (M1) 
Household Diet 
(M4) 
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Tab. 4.1-1 Demographic characteristics at respondent, household and child Level 
Indicators Mean & Proportions  
Respondent Level (N=141)  
Is female  62%  
Age in years 32.99  
Is married 89%  
Has formal education 74%  
Is a refugee 93%  
Years in settlement   9.03  
Number of alive children   4.97  
Has a business 90%  
Lives in Rhino Camp Settlement 69%  
Lives in Imvepi Settlement 25%  
Lives in Madi-Okollo Settlement 6%  
Household Level (N=139)  
Household size   7.47  
Number of children   5.06  
Age of head of household in years 36.29  
Head has formal education 84%  
Head is female 24%  
Highest level of education in the household in years 9.00  
Shock 77%  
Demographic shock 75%  
Economic shock 39%  
Natural shock 48%  
Child Level (N=205)  
Child age in months 31.97  
Child Is female 46%  
 
Respondent’s Inherent Characteristics. Initially, a total of 235 respondents were sampled. 
This analysis is yet restricted to the 141 respondents living in households with children aged 
between six months and five years. Their demographic profile is given in table 4.1.1 as mean 
values or proportions. On average respondents were about 33 years old and had four 
children. The majority was married (89 percent of all respondents) and had some kind of 
formal education (74 percent). Most of them were refugees from Sudan living in the 
settlement for about nine years. Some seven percent were natives from Uganda who were 
also living in the refugee settlements for a mean of eleven years. The nationals were either 
from the Lugbara, Madi or Kakwa tribes (71 percent, 24 percent and 5 percent, respectively). 
Refugees belonged mostly to the Kakwa (44 percent), Pojulu (17 percent), Kuku (11 
percent), Luo (9 percent) or Madi tribes (four percent). Other tribes like Dinka, Muru, Bari, 
Kaliko, etc. represented only a minority in our sample (twelve percent in total). The 
respondents were unequally distributed between the three refugee settlements. Some 69 
percent were from Rhino Camp, 25 percent from Imvepi and 6 percent from Madi-Okollo. 
Women represented 62 percent of the sample. Comparison tests indicate significant 
educational gaps between men and women, with a significantly higher proportion of women 
 50 
who did not receive any kind of formal education or having been at secondary school or 
university.  
 
Household Demographic Characteristics: A total of 139 households with an average of seven 
members (minimum: 3, maximum: 18) and five children (minimum: 1, maximum: 13) were 
visited. The heads of these households were aged between 21 and 80 years and had an 
average of 36 years old. The majority of them (84 percent) had some kind of formal 
education and 24 percent were women. The highest level of education in the household 
varied between zero and 17 years and had a mean of nine years. 
 
Household Shocks: Respondents were asked if in the last twelve months anything had 
happened to their household which had a serious negative effect on how the household 
operates. According to their responses, 77 percent of the households were affected by one 
(38 percent) or more (39 percent) shock events in the year before the survey. According to 
the type of assets affected by the shock, three types of shocks were identified: demographic, 
natural and economic shocks. Demographic shocks are events which negatively affect 
human resources. Chronic illness or death of a family member, recent migration, marriage or 
new members in the household are examples of events which might cause labour problems 
or modify the household composition or size. With a proportion of 75 percent of the 
households experiencing this kind of event, demographic shocks represented the most 
frequent type of shock affecting the households. Natural shocks affect natural resources and 
result in harvest failure. They comprise covariant events like two much rain and drought or 
idiosyncratic events like fire, pest and invasion of grasshoppers or wild animals. About half of 
the households (49 percent) experienced such shocks in the year before the survey. 
Economic shocks are those events with a direct negative impact on physical and financial 
assets. They comprise money or equipment losses due to fire, theft, breakdowns, unpaid 
lending or market fluctuations. Some 39 percent of the households reported having been 
negatively affected by economic shocks. 
 
Child Characteristics: A total of 205 children between six and sixty months old were living in 
the visited households. Figure 4.1.1 shows the distribution of the children population by age 
and sex. There were slightly more boys than girls (54 percent versus 46 percent). Children’s 
average age was 32 months old. Children younger than one year old or between two and 
three years old were slightly less represented compared to the other age groups. The sex 
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distribution was relatively similar across age classes, except for the four to five years old 
aging groups which had considerably less female than male children. 
 
Fig. 4.1-1 Children distribution by age and sex 
 
 
4.1.2 Microfinance Intervention 
Treatment versus Control Groups: This analysis was restricted to the 141 respondents living 
in households with children aged between six months and five years old. From these 141 
respondents, sixty percent were from the microfinance intervention group and forty percent 
from the control group (table 4.1.2). Microfinance intervention is defined as having received a 
credit from the DED loan program for more than six months. The 84 established borrowers 
are compared to a group made of 57 individuals who had not received a loan yet or had 
received a loan only recently. At the child level, microfinance intervention is defined as living 
in a household with an established DED borrower. A total of 205 children aged between six 
months and five years were living in the households visited. Some 62 percent of the children 
were benefiting from microfinance. The control group included 78 children who represented 
38 percent of the sample. 
 
Tab. 4.1-2 Microfinance comparison groups at respondent, household and child level 
Level Total Intervention Control 
Respondents 141 84 (60%) 57 (40%) 
Households 139 83 (60%) 56 (40%) 
Children 205 127 (62%) 78 (38%) 
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Program Membership: Of the 141 respondents, 11414 were members of the DED program 
(cf. fig 3.2-1). They participated in the DED program since an average of 51 months 
(minimum: 24 days; maximum: 12 years). Only five of them (four percent) participated as 
individuals. The big majority belonged to groups with a minimum of two, a maximum of 25 
and an average of five members. The groups organised internal meetings on a regular basis. 
The frequency of internal meetings varied between having no meeting at all to meetings 
thrice per week. It was twice per month on average. The majority of the members met either 
monthly or every two weeks (75 percent). Features of membership in DED program are 
detailed in table 4.1.3 for all members. Comparisons between men and women show no 
significant difference across gender in terms of participation in the DED program. Only the 
proportion of individual members is significantly lower among women (p<0.05).   
 
Tab. 4.1-3 Characteristics of program membership: group means 
 Whole Sample Women Men p 
 N=114 members N=72 N=42  
Groups versus individuals     
    Group member 96% 99% 90% ** 
    Individual member  4%  1% 10%  
Duration in MFI in months 50.9 49.2 53.8  
     <12 months   4%   3%  7%  
     12-24 months 15% 15% 13%  
     > 24 months 81% 82% 80%  
Monthly frequency of 
meetings 
1.8 2.0 1.6  
     Less than once per month   9%   9%  9%  
    Once monthly 27% 20% 39% ** 
    Twice per month 48% 53% 39%  
    More than twice per   month 15% 16% 10%  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; MFI: Microfinance Institution 
 
Characteristics of Loans: Characteristics of the loans are given in table 4.1.4 for all borrowers 
and by gender group. Of the respondents, 99 had received at least one loan. For those who 
received a loan, the number of loans delivered varied between one and four credits and was 
1.7 on average. The last loan amount varied between 100,000 and 2,000,000 Ugandan 
shillings15 (Ush) per group (mean: 422,300 Ush) and between 10,630 Ush and 360,000 per 
member equivalent (mean=82,940 Ush). Duration since the first loan was of an average of 
40.3 months and oscillated between 1.6 months and seven years. The average and official 
                                                
14 84 established members from the intervention group plus 30 new members from the control group.  
15 1 EUR = 2400 Ugandan Shillings at time of survey. 
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time required to pay back the loan was of six months. Among the borrowers, only a few 
clients (19 percent) reported a repayment period differing from six months and varying from 
one to 12 months. The frequency of repayment was monthly for 94 percent of the borrowers 
and on average. The average interest rate was one percent monthly and six percent for the 
total repayment period. In our sample, 80 percent of the borrowers paid the official interest 
rate of six percent in total. The others needed either longer or shorter to repay and paid more 
or less than six percent in total (5 and 16 percent of the respondents, respectively). 
Comparison tests revealed significant differences between women and men according to the 
loan amount they received. In fact the amount women received for their last loan was 
significantly lower (72,350 versus 102,840 Ush, p<0.10). 
 
Tab. 4.1-4 Characteristics of loans: group means 
 Borrowers 
Sample Women Men 
p 
 N=9916 N=64 N=35  
Number of loans            1.7            1.8            1.6  
Months since 1st loan          40.3          38.1          44.4  
Group last loan amount (Ush) 422,300 399,830 463,400  
Individual last loan amount (Ush)  82,940   72,350 102,840 * 
Individual Savings (Ush) 140,550 111,470 205,190  
Total interest rate (%)            5.9            5.9            6.0  
Repayment Frequency (per month)             1.0            1.0            0.9  
Repayment Length in months            6.1            6.1            6.0  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Satisfaction with Microfinance Services: Respondents who used microfinance services from 
DED were asked about their satisfaction with the products offered. They evaluated each of 
the seven criteria by answering either “yes” or “no” or “neither yes or no”. These answers 
were coded one, minus one and zero, respectively. A total satisfaction index was calculated 
for each respondent by adding the scores of all criteria and by dividing the obtained value by 
the number of criteria (seven). The mean values are portrayed in figure 4.1.2 for female and 
male borrowers. It appears that respondents’ total evaluation was positive on average. The 
mean value of 0.1 tends however more to zero than to one, revealing a partial rather than full 
satisfaction. Of the seven criteria, full satisfaction is shown only for internal meetings 
frequency (mean=0.8).  Respondents were partially satisfied with the interest rate, the 
repayment frequency and access to loans (mean=0.2, 0.1 and 0.1, respectively).  They 
showed partial dissatisfaction for the repayment period, the number of credits and the loan 
                                                
16 99 respondents had received at least one loan. 
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amount (means =-0.1, -0.3 and -0.1, respectively). Comparisons across gender reveal that 
women’s satisfaction for DED loan services was comparable to men.  
 
Fig. 4.1-2 Satisfaction with microfinance services 
 
 
 
 
Purpose of Loans: Although other types of loans (consumption, agricultural, staff loans) were 
offered in the district, DED proposed to the refugees business loans only. All the borrowers 
of the sample invested their last loan in income generating activities. They bought either 
equipment or stock or both for their business. Loans were used for other purposes as well by 
22 percent of the borrowers. Buying food and repaying the loan represented the most 
frequent use of the loans, after business investment (15 and 14 percent of the borrowers, 
respectively). Loans were also spent for medical care, schooling, clothing and emergency 
(respectively eight, eight, four and two percent of the borrowers). Utilisation of loans is 
described in figure 4.1.3 for both men and women.  
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Fig. 4.1-3 Purpose of Loans 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Child Nutritional Status 
A total of 205 children aging between six and sixty months old were anthropometrically 
measured. Their nutritional status is expressed in height-for-age, weight-for-age and weight-
for-height z-scores deviations from the WHO child growth standards. The descriptive 
statistics of the z-scores are given in table 4.1.5. The z-score distribution curves can be 
found in annex A2 (figure A2.1).   
 
Tab. 4.1-5 Child Nutritional Status: Z-scores descriptive statistics 
 Height-for-Age 
z-score 
Weight-for-age 
z-score 
Weight-for-height 
z-score 
N 205 204 203 
Mean [95% C.I.*] -1.00   [-1.22 - -0.78] -0.50  [-0.67 – 0.34] 0.05 [-0.13 – 0.23] 
 % below-2SD [95% C.I.] 26.8% [20.7-32.9%] 7.3%  [ 5.5 - 9.2%] 4.9% [3.7 – 11.0%] 
 % below-3SD [95% C.I.] 8.8%   [4.9-12.7%] 2.9% 2.4% 
Min - Max -5.67 to 3.89  -4.66 to 4.35 -4.33 to 4.04 
Standard Deviation (SD) 1.61 1.18 1.28 
*C.I. confidence interval 
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The mean z-scores indicate a clear deficit in height-for-age but only limited evidence of 
underweight and wasting. In fact the entire children height-for-age z-scores distribution has 
shifted downward compared to the normal distribution. The average child deviates one unit 
negatively from the normal z-score. For 26.8 percent of the children, the deficit was 
excessive, as their z-score was below the conventional benchmark of minus two standard 
deviations. These children were considered as stunted. Some 8.8 percent had a z-score 
even lower than minus three standard deviations. Those last cases were severely stunted. 
With an average z-score of respectively minus 0.5 and plus 0.05, the weight-for-age and 
weight-for-height z-scores’ distributions were closer to the WHO “normal” reference 
population17. Some 7.3 and 4.9 percent of the children were respectively underweight and 
wasted. Severe cases of these malnutrition forms were rare: 2.9 percent for severe 
underweight and 2.4 percent for severe wasting. 
The standard deviations were of respectively 1.61, 1.18 and 1.28 for the observed height-for-
age, weight-for-age and weight-for-height z-scores. These values are comprised in the 
expected ranges of standard deviations of the z-score distributions for all three 
anthropometric indicators and this is an indication of good data quality (MEI & GRUMMER-
STRAWN, 2007). The width of the 95% confidence interval is within 30 percent of the 
estimated prevalence of stunting and underweight but not for wasting. The survey is thus 
sufficiently precise and the sample size sufficiently large for the first two measures of 
malnutrition (PRUDHON & SPIEGEL, 2007).  
What about the extent of malnutrition as a public health problem? Figure 4.1.4 compares the 
prevalence of stunting, underweight and wasting to the WHO criteria for public health 
severity.  
 
                                                
17 The WHO Child Growth Standards are derived from an international sample of healthy breastfed 
infants and young children raised in environments that do not constrain growth (de Onis et al. 2006). 
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Fig. 4.1-4 Public health severity of child malnutrition, DED study - 200518 
 
It appears that stunting represented a public health problem in our child population. A 
prevalence range between 20 and 30 percent indicates that the problem was of mild 
magnitude. In contrast, underweight had prevalence lower than ten percent and wasting 
lower than five percent. This is considered low according to international conventions.  
Hence, underweight and wasting existed among the sampled children but they did not have 
the same severity level as stunting. This was the case also in the general population (chapter 
3.1.3, page 19). Stunting represented the major problem in the settlements, in the region and 
at national level. There was however a difference in the degree of severity of the malnutrition 
problem. In our sample, wasting and underweight were at lower prevalence than the trigger 
levels and did not necessarily call for action. This was not the case in the general population. 
Underweight and wasting were of mild magnitude but they still represented public health 
dilemmas. The degree of severety of stunting was also lower than the one found in West Nile 
or in Uganda. This might be an indication that our sample represented a specific population 
where malnutrition was not as severe as it is in the general population.  
Stunting was thus the major problem in our sample. It is considered as the core indicator of 
child nutritional status in the rest of our analysis.  
                                                
18 Diagram built from the author based on the results of the own DED survey 
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4.1.4 Microfinance & Child Nutritional Status: Bivariate Analysis 
Demographic Characteristics: A non-parametric comparison of inherent characteristics of the 
group of children with an optimal height-for-age and those with a low height-for-age is given 
in table 4.1.6.  
 
Tab. 4.1-6 Demographic factors by children's nutritional status: group means & 
proportions 
Inherent Factors All  Children Height for 
Age 
p 
   OK  <-2SD  
 (N=205) (N=150)  (n=55)
Child mean age (months) 31.97 32.45  30.68
Child is female  46% 50%  36% *
Mean household size   7.47   7.58    7.16
Mean highest level of education in the household ((years) 9.00   9.06    8.81
Household Shock 74% 71%  82%
Respondent is female  62% 63%  58%
Rhino Camp settlement 69% 71%  64%
Imvepi settlement 25% 25%  25%
Madi-Okollo settlement 6% 4%  11%
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
The figures show that well-nourished and malnourished children did not differ inherently at 
household, respondent or community level. The only significant difference regarded the sex 
of the child. The group of well-nourished children had a higher proportion of girls compared 
to malnourished children and this difference is significant at the ten percent level (p<0.10). 
 
 
Child Nutritional Status & Microfinance: Bivariate Analysis 
The relationship between microfinance and nutritional status could be tested by comparing 
the children anthropometric z-scores and the deriving malnutrition prevalence across 
intervention and control group. The results are illustrated in figure 4.1.5 for height-for-age 
and in table A2.2 for different possible anthropometric indicators. 
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Figure 4.1.5 shows that children in the control group had a height-for-age z-score distribution 
further away from the normal distribution than children in the intervention group. In fact the 
height-for-age z-score was on average higher for children in the intervention group and this 
difference is significant at the five percent level. The mean value was of minus 1.3 in the 
control group and of minus 0.8 in the intervention group. The stunting prevalence was of 
“only” 18.9 percent in the intervention group compared to 39.7 percent in the control group. 
This prevalence difference is highly significant (p<0.01). The stunting prevalence in the 
intervention group is considered low while the encountered prevalence in the control group is 
above 30 percent and thus evaluated as alarming. From a positive perspective, it also means 
that in the intervention group, 81.1 percent of the children deviated positively from the minus 
two standard deviations benchmark while this was the case for only 60.3 percent of the 
children in the control group. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1-5 Children nutritional status by microfinance profile: - z-scores distribution 
 
Microfinance 
Control 
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4.1.5 Microfinance Total Effect on Child Nutritional Status: Multivariate Analysis 
The bivariate analysis confirmed the hypothesis that microfinance is positively and 
significantly related to child nutritional status. However this conclusion was based on testing 
simple bivariate cause and effect relationships between indicators of microfinance and of 
nutritional status and did not take into account the fact that effects can not be absolutely 
independent of contextual and personal inherent factors.  
A linear regression taking into account child age and sex, gender of the respondent, 
household shock and size as potential influencing parameters confirms the ameliorative total 
effect of microfinance on nutritional status (regression 0.1 in table 4.1.7).  
 
Tab. 4.1-7 Microfinance´s total effect on height-for-age: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
In fact, the coefficient sign was positive for the microfinance intervention variable, which 
indicates an ameliorative effect. The p value for the difference in nutritional status along the 
microfinance variable was lower than 0.10, wich indicates a lowly significant effect (p=0.061). 
This significant microfinance effect is a small one as inferred from a beta value comprised 
between the Cohen benchmarks of 0.1 and 0.3 (β=0.138). The regression also shows that 
household shocks affect the nutritional status of children significantly and negatively (p<0.05) 
while higher education levels in the famile affect it positively (p<0.05). 
 
Figure 4.1.6 shows that the predicted children height-for-age z-score weakly increased from 
the control group to the intervention group.  
   Outcome Variable Y:  
Child Height-for-Age z-score 
 
   (0.1)  
 Microfinance Intervention  Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
         
X Credit since ≥ 6 months c’1  0.456 0.242 -0.021 to 0.933 0.061*  0.138 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Imvepi Settlement   0.194 0.262 -0.322 to  0.710 0.459  0.052 
 Madi_Okollo settlement   -0.161 0.516 -1.177 to  0.856 0.756 -0.023 
 Household Size   0.036 0.048 -0.059 to  0.130 0.460  0.055 
 Household Education Level   0.099 0.041  0.017 to  0.180 0.018**  0.176 
 Shock  -0.565 0.266 -1.088 to -0.041 0.035** -0.154 
 Female Respondent   0.194 0.232 -0.265 to  0.652 0.406  0.059 
 Child Age   0.002 0.007 -0.011 to  0.016 0.751  0.022 
 Child Sex   0.358 0.225 -0.085 to  0.801 0.113  0.111 
 Constant  -2.414 0.554 -3.507 to -1.321 0.000***  
 R2Y,X=0.094      0.021  
 N=205 children   
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Fig. 4.1-6 Microfinance total effect on child nutritional status (205 children) 
 
 
 
4.1.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The multivariate total effect analysis confirms the hypothesis that microfinance has a 
significant independent and ameliorative effect on child nutritional status. This effect is lowly 
significant and small (unstandardised effect=0.456; 95%CI: -0.021, 0.933; p=0.061; 
standardised effect=0.138). 
 
 
 Result 14-1: Microfinance total effect on child nutritional status is positive & significant  
 
In order to better understand the effect of microfinance on child nutritional status, it is also 
necessary to inquire the pathways through which microfinance impacts nutritional status. The 
next step of our analysis will thus consist of evaluating how microfinance effect on child 
nutritional status is mediated, and particularly if this effect materialises through socio-
economic empowerment of the respondent.  
Microfinance Nutritional Status
Main Total Effect
*
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4.2 MEDIATION AT A DISTAL LEVEL: INDIVIDUAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
 
Model 23: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at a distal level 
 
The purpose of this section is to test the potential role of individual social empowerment as 
mediator between microfinance and nutritional status.The analysis is based on a simple 
mediated model (Model 2). At first, individual income and social power are described and the 
effect of microfinance on both factors is tested through bivariate and first stage regression 
analyses. In a second stage, the effect of individual income and social power on child 
nutritional status is assessed and their mediated effect derived. The results are summarised 
in a diagram as concluding remarks (Result 2).  
The main hypothesis being tested is: 
H2: At a distal level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through individual socio-
economic empowerment. 
This central hypothesis can be divided in the following part hypotheses: 
- H2.1 Microfinance effect on nutritional status is mediated through individual Income 
- H2.2. Microfinance has an ameliorative effect on individual Income 
- H2.3 Individual Income has an ameliorative effect on child nutritional status 
- H2.4 Microfinance effect on nutritional status is mediated through individual social power 
- H2.5  Microfinance has an ameliorative effect on individual social power 
- H2.6 Individual social power has an ameliorative effect on child nutritional status 
LEVEL 1 
INDIVIDUAL   
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
LEVEL 3  
HOUSEHOLD 
NUTRITION 
SECURITY 
LEVEL 2  
HOUSEHOLD 
ECONOMIC STATUS 
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FINANCE 
(X) 
 
CHILD 
NUTRITIONAL 
STATUS      
(Y) 
 
 
Household 
Wealth (M3) 
Child Feeding 
Practices (M5) 
Household 
Health Care 
(M6)
Individual 
Social Power 
(M2) 
Individual 
Income      
(M1) 
Household Diet 
(M4) 
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4.2.1 Individual Income 
Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
This section is a descriptive and bivariate analysis of economic power and its relationship to 
microfinance. It aims at testing hypothesis H2.2.3. Economic activities run by the 
respondents are described in table 4.2.1 for the 141 respondents living in households with 
children under five as well as by microfinance and nutritional categories. 
 
 
Tab. 4.2-1 Income by microfinance & nutritional profile: group means & proportions 
 All  Microfinance  Child Height-for-
Age 
   Interv. Control p  OK <-2SD p
          
Respondent Level (N=141)  (N=84) (N=57)   (N=150)a (N=55)a  
Level of Income         
Monthly Profits in Ush (mean) 31800  32830 30290   35780 27350  
Characteristics of Income Generating Activities      
Has an Income 91%  94% 86%   90% 89%  
Number of Income Generating 
Activities 
1.55  1.64 1.42 **  1.54 1.58  
Duration of Enterprise (months) 65,52  66,97 62.90   67.47 64.72  
Owns business alone 62%  64% 58%     
Loan as Capital 17%  26% 4% ***  18% 11%  
Help in business activities 51%  61% 37% ***  56% 47%  
Use Profits for Food 80%  83% 75%   79% 80%  
Use Profits for Health 53%  60% 44% *  57% 55%  
Subjective Change in Income  0.14  0.15 0.14   0.22 0.05  
   Improved 37%  39% 35%   44% 29% *
   Stayed the same 40%  37% 44%   35% 47%  
   Worsened 23%  24% 21%   21% 24%  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01; a: The sample of children is compared here (155 + 55=205 children) 
 
 
Income Level: Economic power was measured by assessing the level of business profits 
which vary from zero to 200,000 Ugandan Shillings (Ush) per month. Profits were of 31,800 
Ugandan shillings on average (table 4.2.1). Of the sample, half earned less than 20,000 Ush 
monthly, 75 percent earned less than 40,000 and 90 percent less than 80,000 Ush. The 
monthly profits of the respondents are illustrated in figure 4.2.1. The intervention group had a 
higher mean level of profits than the control group but the difference was less than 3,000 
Ugandan shillings (32,830 versus 30,290 Ush, p>0.10). The mean level of profits was higher 
in the group of well-nourished children compared to the malnourished group (35,790 versus 
27,350). The difference is yet not statistically significant (p>0.10). Non parametric tests 
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reveal significant differences in monthly profits according to the respondent sex (p<0.01). 
The level of profits of women is significantly lower than that of men. In fact, the mean profits 
were 25,590 Ush among women while they were more than 40,000 Ush by men. Figure 4.2.1 
illustrates this gender difference in income level. Men had a median income which was twice 
that of women (25,000 versus 12,000 Ush). There were also apparent differences in income 
level according to marital status (p<0.05), education level (p<0.01) and type of activity 
(p<0.10). Profits were significantly higher by men (45,170 versus 24,680 by women) and by 
respondents with higher levels of education: The mean profits were of 47,400 Ush for 
respondents with a secondary school or university level while they were of only 27,300 Ush 
for those with a primary school level and of 20,700 Ush for those without formal education. 
Profits were also significantly higher among married respondents (34,450 versus 14,800 
Ush). Regarding types of business, the highest mean profits were found in handicraft 
activities, followed by trading and catering, respectively. The profits were the lowest among 
respondents brewing alcohol. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4.2-1 Individual income by microfinance, child nutritional statsus & gender (N=141 
respondents) 
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Income Generating Activities: A closer investigation of the characteristics of income 
generating activities shows that most of the respondents (91 percent) earned their own 
money. The number of income generating activities varied between zero and three activities 
and is 1.6 on average. Some 65 percent had two or more sources of income. For some 
eleven percent of them, one source of income was a regular or odd job but for the majority 
money was earned from an enterprise activity solely. The most important business activities 
were trading (55 percent of the respondents), farming (42 percent), small industry or 
handicraft (26 percent), brewing of alcohol (18 percent) and catering (16 percent). Trading 
activities consisted of petty trade of fish or items like sugar, soap, onions, fuel, charcoal, etc. 
Farming comprises cultivation and selling of either food crops like cassava, beans, maize, 
groundnuts, millet, sorghum (23 percent of the respondents) or of cash crop like sesame (37 
percent). Some respondents also reared and sold animals (six percent). Small industry 
included activities like tailoring, carpentry, bicycle repair, pottery or grinding mills. Some 62 
percent of the respondents were the owner of their enterprise activity. The others owned the 
business together with partners not in households (24 percent) or household members (four 
percent). Some 49 percent of the respondents did not receive help for their business activity. 
The others were helped by household members (33 percent) or people from outside (18 
percent). Respondents with a business started their activity 62.5 months (5.2 years) ago on 
average (min: 1.7 months; max: 20 years). For starting their activity two third of them (66 
percent) got the capital mostly from their own savings. The rest borrowed from an institution 
(13 percent) or a friend (6 percent). Business products were mostly sold to local consumers 
(48 percent) or at the market (37 percent). A small proportion (eight percent) sold its products 
to local traders. Economic characteristics of the respondents were compared by microfinance 
categories. They are described in table 4.2.1. Some significant disparities exist across 
categories regarding the type of business run. There were significantly more traders (p<0.01) 
and farmers (p<0.10), and significantly less respondents brewing alcohol (p<0.05) or doing 
handicraft (p<0.10) among microfinance beneficiaries. Respondents in the intervention group 
tended to diversify their source of income more often than respondents in the control group 
(1.6 versus 1.4 activities, p<0.10). They also had more often other people who help them 
(p<0.01). Comparisons across nutritional categories show no significant differences in the 
characteristics of income generating activities run by the respondents. The only significant 
difference relates to the running of catering as business activity (p<0.10).  The proportion of 
children living in a household with a respondent involved in catering is significantly higher 
among well-nourished than among malnourished (17 versus only seven percent). 
Comparisons across gender categories show that women tended to diversify their income 
more often than men (1.7 activities versus 1.4 activities, p<0.10). The size of their business 
was  in contrast significantly smaller than that of men. This is demonstrated by a significantly 
 66 
lower proportion of women having other people who help them or share ownership of the 
business activity (p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively). The type of business activity also varied 
significantly between men and women with catering or brewing of alcohol being typical 
business activities of women (p<0.05 respectively).  
 
Use of Profits: The respondent’s use of profits was assessed. It appeared that profits were 
most often invested in food or medical care (89 percent of the respondents), followed by 
school, enterprise, clothing, savings, housing and emergency, respectively. The use of profits 
is described in figure 4.2.2.A by microfinance category. Respondents in the microfinance 
intervention group used profits more often for food, health, school and enterprise than 
respondents from the control group. The difference was significant only for health (p<0.10) 
and for school (p<0.01). Figure 4.2.2B describes the areas in which profits were used for 
each of the nutritional categories. It appears that well-nourished children have a significantly 
higher proportion of respondents investing their profits in schooling (p<0.05) and a 
significantly lower proportion using profits for savings (p<0.10) and housing (p<0.10). Women 
used profits more often for health or for food, but the difference is not significant across 
gender (p>0.10). 
 
Fig. 4.2-2 Use of profits by microfinance & nutritional status 
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Subjective Economic Empowerment: Respondents’ perception of change in income was 
assessed. The mean subjective change in income was positive but low (0.14 on a scale from 
minus one to plus one). Some 35 percent felt an economic empowerment, 44 percent felt no 
change and 21 percent had an impression of worsened income. Comparisons between 
microfinance categories indicate that the differences in perception of income change are 
statistically not significant (p>0.10). Comparisons between the group of well-nourished and of 
malnourished children show that respondents feeling an improvement in income are 
significantly more represented among well-nourished (44 percent versus 29 percent, p<0.10). 
The differences in perceived income change are illustrated in figure 4.2.3.  
 
 
Fig. 4.2-3 Subjective economic empowerment by microfinance & nutritional status 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance Effect on Individual Income: First Stage Multivariate Analysis 
Microfinance effect on income is tested through a linear regression taking into account 
gender of the respondent, household and children inherent factors (regression 0.2 in table 
4.2.2).  
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Tab. 4.2-2 Microfinance effect on individual income: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
The positive sign of the coefficient a11 indicates that microfinance effect on recipient’s income 
might be ameliorative. The t-test shows however that this effect is not significant (p>0.10). 
What mattered for individual income was the sex of the respondent and the education level. 
Women tended to have a lower income and this relation is significant at one percent level. 
Profits are positively and significantly associated with higher education levels in the family 
(p<0.05). The other covariates did not affect income significantly.  
Microfinance trivial effect on income is illustrated in figure 4.2.4 by plotting the mean 
predicted values for monthly profits by microfinance category holding all other covariates at 
their mean. The regression line shows that profit levels increase from the control group to the 
intervention group but this increase is extremely weak. 
 
  Outcome Variable M1:  
Monthly profits in Ush  
 
 Predictors (0.2)  
  Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months    a11    2040.365 7344.265 [-12444  -  6524] 0.781  0.020 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors       
 Madi-Okollo Settlement -12752.603 15656.152 [-43629  -  8124] 0.416  -0.061 
 Imvepi settlement   185.895 7945.598 [-15484  - 15856] 0.981   0.002 
 Household Size -    533.035 1456.132 [-  3404  -   2338] 0.715 -0.027 
 Household Education Level    2615.667 1254.598 [141       -    5089] 0.038**  0.151 
 Shock    3876.32 8064.395 [-12028  -   9780] 0.631  0.034 
 Female Respondent -29597.983 7055.403 [-43512 - -15683] 0.000*** -0.291 
 Child Age -   112.699 209.999 [-   526   -     301] 0.592 -0.037 
 Child Sex -     80.320 6829.216 [-13548  - 13388] 0.991 -0.001 
 Constant 32248.773 16834.117 [-    951  - 65449] 0.057*  
 R2M1,X=0.119     0.003***  
 N=205 children  
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Fig. 4.2-4: Microfinance effect on individual Income (N=205 children) 
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4.2.2 Individual Social Power 
Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
This section is a descriptive and bivariate analysis of social power and its relationship to 
microfinance. It aims at testing hypothesis H2.3.2. Respondent’s profile according to different 
social power dimensions are given in table 4.2.3.  
 
Tab. 4.2-3 Individual social power by microfinance & nutritional profile: group means & 
proportions 
Inherent Variables All  Microfinance  Child Height-for-
Age 
   Interv. Control p  OK <-2SD p 
          
Respondent Level (N=141)  (N=84) (N=57)   (N=150)a (N=55)a  
Personal Power 0.92 0.92 0.91   0.91 0.94  
  Disagree “Only men should take important 
decisions” (1) 
87% 89% 84%   85% 93%  
 Disagree ‘Women should accept being 
beaten to maintain peace in the 
household’(1) 
94% 98% 89% **  93% 96%  
 Disagree ‘It is better to send a boy to school 
than a girl’ (1) 
96% 93%a 100%b **  97% 95%  
 Agree “Partner should help at home if 
woman works outside” (1) 
91% 89%a 93%b   89% 93%  
Has a full positive gender attitude (4/4) 73% 74% 72%   71% 78%  
Relational Power  
0.90
0.91 0.88   0.88 0.90  
Involved in all decisions areas    63% 68% 56%   57% 65%  
Involved in all decisions regarding 
health/food 
  76% 77% 74%   73% 75%  
 Infant feeding in the first year of life (1)  82% 82% 81%   79% 82%  
 Taking children for medical care (1)  90% 90% 89%   88% 93%  
 Food expenditures everyday (1)  94% 94% 93%   92% 91%  
Involved in all decisions in other areas  77% 81% 72%   74% 80%  
 Buying clothes for the children (1)  91% 94% 86%   91% 93%  
 Sending children to school (1)  88% 90% 84%   89% 87%  
 Buying important things for the family (1)  89% 88% 89%   85% 89%  
 How to spend your income (1)  95% 98% 91% *  94% 94%  
Collective Power 0.40 0.43 0.34   0.39 0.40  
  Participates in social activities (1) 55% 61% 46% *  54% 56%  
  Leader in social activities (1) 25% 26% 23%   24% 25%  
Cumulative Social Power Scale 0.74 0.76 0.71   0.73 0.75  
  High Social Power (score ≥0.80) 14% 15% 11%   13% 19%  
  Medium Social Power (score 0.4-0.79) 84% 82% 87%   84% 81%  
  Low Social Power (score<0.40) 3% 3% 2%   2% 0%  
Subjective Change in Decision’s Making 0.30 0.28 0.33   0.32 0.26  
  Improved 32% 32% 32%   35% 27%  
  Stayed the same 63% 62% 65%   61% 71%  
  Worsened 3% 5% 0% *  3% 2%  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; a: The sample of children is compared here (155 + 55=205 children) 
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Gender Attitudes: Personal power was tested through respondent’s opinion regarding 
different statements related to gender role. The proportion of respondents who agreed or 
disagreed to the statements is given in table 4.2.3. Of the respondents, 96 percent disagreed 
that it is better to send boys than girls to school, 94 percent disagreed that a woman should 
accept being beaten to maintain peace at home, 91 percent agreed that partners should help 
at home if women work outside and 87 percent disagreed that only men should take 
important decisions. A gender attitude scale was constructed based on the responses of the 
respondents with four gender equality related statements corresponding to a full positive 
gender attitude. Accordingly 73 percent of the respondents had a full positive attitude to 
women. The mean women attitude scale was 0.92. Attitudes towards women were similar 
across gender categories and for each of the statements (p>0.10). Gender attitudes are 
described in the second and third columns of table 4.2.3 from the microfinance perspective. 
Gender attitudes were generally similar across microfinance categories. This is 
demonstrated by non significant differences in the mean gender attitude scale and in the 
proportion of respondents with a full positive gender attitude (p>0.10 respectively). Some 
significant differences exist for specific statements. Microfinance beneficiaries had a more 
negative attitude towards gender equality in sending children to school and a more positive 
attitude against women violence (p<0.05 respectively). The group of children with a good 
height-for-age was compared to the malnourished group according to the gender attitude of 
the respondent living in their household (fifth and sixth columns of table 4.2.3). Non-
parametric tests show no significant differences according to respondent personal power. 
 
 
Household’s Decision Making: Respondents were asked about who usually takes decisions 
in their household in specific areas: the repondent alone, the partner alone or both jointly. An 
index was constructed based on positive responses for involvement in the seven following 
household decision–making areas: daily food expenditures, important purchases, how to 
spend their income, taking children for medical care, sending children to school, buying 
clothes for children and infant feeding in the first year of life. The decisionmaking scale was 
generally high (0.90 on average). Some 63 percent of the respondents had the maximal 
score of one, meaning that they are involved in all decisions areas (table 4.2.3). Overall, the 
decision-making score does not vary significantly between microfinance comparison groups 
(p>0.10) and between well-nourished and malnourished children (p>0.10).  
A closer observation of specific decision areas shows that in each area, decisions were 
taken by the respondent alone in less than 50 percent of the cases. Depending on the 
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specific area between 41 and 58 percent of the respondents participated jointly with their 
partner in the decisional process. Microfinance participation is significantly associated with 
involvement in decisions only for the area related to spending income. Here there is a lowly 
significant difference with 98 percent of the established clients being involved in how to 
spend their income compared to 91 percent in the control group (p<0.10). Involvement in 
specific decisional areas was similar across nutritional categories (p>0.10, respectively). 
Comparisons between well-nourished and malnourished children and between microfinance 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are illustrated in figure 4.2.5 according to the respondent 
involvement in household decisions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2-5 Respondent decisional power by microfinance & nutritional status 
 
 
Household’s Decision Making by Gender: Figure 4.2.6 portrays decision making power by 
gender categories. Globally women had a significantly higher relational power as they were 
involved in more decisional areas than men (mean = 0.89 versus 0.82). They had a 
significantly higher decision involvement in areas related to food and health (86 versus 47 
percent, p<0.00) while men had a higher decision involvement in other decision areas (90 
versus 82 percent, p<0.05). A closer observation reveals that there are three areas where 
women were significantly more involved than men: medical care, daily food expenditures and 
infant feeding (p<0.00, p<0.05 and p<0.00, respectively). Men were significantly more often 
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involved than women in decisions regarding sending children to school (90 versus 82 
percent, p<0.05).  
 
Fig. 4.2-6: Household decision areas by gender 
 
 
Subjective Relational Empowerment: Respondents were asked about their perception of 
change in household decision’s making. In the year preceding the survey, 32 percent of the 
respondents had noticed an improvement in their ability to take decisions in the household. 
For 63 percent there was no change and three percent had an impression of worsened 
involvement in decision making. The mean subjective change was of 0.30 which is positive 
but not very high. Perceptions of change in decision’s making were compared between 
microfinance beneficiaries and the control group. Figure 4.2.7.A shows that the proportion of 
respondents feeling an improved decisional power was exactly the same in both groups (32 
percent). Yet respondents feeling a worsening in their involvement in household decisions 
were represented only among established clients (five versus zero percent, p<0.10). 
Comparisons across nutritional categories indicate that differences in subjective change in 
decision making are statistically not significant (p≥0.10). These comparisons are illustrated in 
figure 4.2.7.B.  
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Fig. 4.2-7 Subjective relational empowerment by microfinance & nutritional status 
 
 
Additional statistical analyses compared perceptions of change in decision making between 
female and male respondents. It appears that disparities existed between men and women 
with regard to subjective decision empowerment. In fact, less than one fourth of the women 
felt a positive change in decision-making while this was the case for 60 percent of the men. 
Nobody perceived a worsening in decision power among men while this was the case for 
about half of the women. The difference across gender is statistically significant at a level of 
one percent.  
 
Social Engagement: Social engagement was measured by participation in community 
activities and by leadership position. In the sample, more than half of the respondents (55 
percent)was socially engaged. Respondents were members of different kinds of 
organizations. Some participated in formal camp administration committees like the food, 
water,education or security committees. Others particpated in church activities either as 
members, leaders or they have other functions like assistant, usher or treasurer. Several 
were engaged as volunteers in social activities at community level: community facilitators, 
traditional birth attendants, peace groups, etc. A total of 25 percent were leaders, 
chairpersons in their organizations (high social engagement). Some 30 percent particpated 
also in community organizations but just as members or with a secondary function like 
assistant, treasurer, etc. (middle social engagement). The mean social engagement scale 
was 0.39. Comparisons by microfinance profile show that established microfinance clients 
had a higher mean social collective power score (0.43 versus 0.34); they participated more 
often in social activities (61 versus 46 percemt) and had more often leadership positions (26 
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versus 23 percent). The statistical tests show, however, that these differences are significant 
only for global participation in social activity (p<0.10). The social engagement of the 
respondents is illustrated in Figure 4.2.8A for the microfinance intervention group and for the 
control group. Comparisons of respondent collective power by child nutritional status show 
that the well-nourished group had a lower respondent’s collective power score (0.39 verus 
0.40), a lower proportion of respondents who participated in social activities (54 verus 56 
percent) or had a leadership position (24 versus 25 percent). But in all these aspects the 
difference is too small to be statistically significant (p>0.10). This similarity in social 
engagement across nutritional categories is illustrated in Figure 4.2.8 B. Further, statistical 
comparisons by gender show disparities in social engagement between men and women and 
indicate that men used to participate more often in social activities than women (71 versus 44 
percent, p<0.00) and they used to have more often leadership positions (44 versus 12 
percent, p<0.00). Some 57 percent of the socially engaged men were leaders while this was 
the case for only 28 percent of all socially engaged women. The mean social engagement 
index was 0.28 for women and 0.55 for men (p<0.00). 
 
Fig. 4.2-8 Respondent collective power by microfinance & nutritional status 
 
Cumulative Social Power: A cumulative social power index was constructed by adding the 
scores of the three main empowerment dimensions: personal, relational and collective 
power. Respondents were categorized as having a low, a medium or a high social 
empowerment profile based on the final score (table 4.2.3). The mean social power was 0.74 
in the study population corresponding to a medium empowerment level. The typical 
respondent had a high personal power, a high relational power and a low collective power. 
The cumulative social power was compared by microfinance category (figure 4.2.9A). The 
group of established clients had a higher mean social power score (0.76 versus 0.71) and a 
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higher proportion of respondents with a high social power (19 versus 11 percent). These 
differences were however statistically not significant (p>0.10). Comparisons between well-
nourished and malnourished children regarding the cumulative social power of the 
respondent living in their households indicate that in the well-nourished group, the cumulative 
social power score was lower (0.73 versus 0.75) and the proportion with a high social power 
index was also lower (13 versus 19 percent). These differences are statistically not 
significant (p>0.10). Figure 4.2.9B shows that the global social power of the respondents was 
similar in the group of well-nourished and malnourished children. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2-9 Individual social power by microfinance & nutritional status 
 
 
Microfinance Effect on Individual Social Power: First Stage Multivariate Analysis 
Microfinance effect on social empowerment was tested through a linear regression of the 
social power score controlling for respondent gender, household shock, household size, child 
sex and age. The results are given in table 4.2.4 (regression 0.3). The positive sign of the 
coefficient a12 indicates that microfinance main effect on recipient’s social power might be 
ameliorative. But this effect is not significant according to the parametric analysis (p>0.10). 
Female gender acts as an influential negative predictor (p<0.01). Significant and ameliorative 
determinants of social power are household shocks, size and education level (p<0.01, 
p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively).  
 
 77 
Tab. 4.2-4 Microfinance effect on individual social power: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 & ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance’ trivial effect on social power is illustrated in figure 4.2.10. As can be seen, the 
regression line along the microfinance status is almost a constant. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2-10 Microfinance effect on individual social power (N=205 children) 
   Outcome Variable  M2  
Cumulative Social Power index 
 
 Predictors  (0.3)  
   Coeff. B SE 95% CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention        
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a12  0.009 0.023 -0.036 to 0.054 0.701  0.026 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.059 0.048 -0.154 to  0.037 0.228 -0.083 
 Imvepi Settlement   0.002 0.025 -0.047 to  0.050 0.942  0.005 
 Household Size   0.010 0.005  0.001 to  0.019 0.024**  0.153 
 Household Education Level   0.015 0.004  0.007 to  0.023 0.000***  0.261 
 Shock   0.072 0.025  0.022 to  0.121 0.005***  0.190 
 Female Respondent  -0.070 0.022 -0.113 to -0.027 0.002*** -0.205 
 Child Age  -0.001 0.001 -0.002 to  0.001 0.307 -0.066 
 Child Sex  -0.033 0.021 -0.075 to  0.008 0.116 -0.101 
 Constant   0.544 0.052  0.442 to  0.647 0.000***  
 R2M2,X=0.243      0.000***  
 N=205 children   
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4.2.3 Simple Mediation Analysis at a Distal Level 
 
Tab. 4.2-5 Microfinance effect on height-for-age at distal level: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01,  
 
Effect of Individual Income & Social Power on Nutritional Status: Second Stage Multivariate 
Analysis 
The effect of individual social or economic power on child nutritional status can be derived 
from the linear regression (1.1) of the child height-for-age z-score along social power, 
monthly profits and other inherent covariates (table 4.2.5). It equals the coefficients b1j which 
is positive for individual income (b11=0.001) and negative for social power (b12=-0.564). For 
both factors the effect on child nutritional status is not significant (p>0.10, respectively).  
Indirect Effect of Microfinance on Nutritional Status at a Distal Level 
The indirect effect of microfinance on child height-for-age through a mediator Mj equals a1jb1j 
which is 0.001 for individual income and -0.005 for social power (table 4.2.6). The mediated 
effect through individual income is thus positive. The effect through social power is negative. 
These indirect effects are statistically not significant according to bootstrapped confidence 
intervals at a bias-corrected confidence level of 90 percent. In fact, the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals include zero for both mediators. Thus, the regression analysis does not 
confirm that microfinance effect on child nutritional status is mediated by either individual 
income or social power. 
   Outcome Variable Y:  
Child Height-for-Age z-score 
 
 Predictors  (1.1)  
  Coeff. B SE 95% CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months c’1  0.461 0.243 -.0018 to  0.940 0.059* 0.139 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.193 0.520 -1.219 to 0.832 0.711 -0.028 
 Imvepi settlement   0.195 0.263 -0.323 to 0.713 0.458 0.053 
 Household Size   0.041 0.049 -0.055 to 0.138 0.398 0.064 
 Household Education Level   0.107 0.043  0.022 to 0.193 0.014** 0.191 
 Shock  -0.525 0.272 -1.061 to 0.012 0.055* -0.143 
 Female Respondent   0.155 0.247 -0.332 to 0.643 0.530 0.047 
 Child Age   0.002 0.007 -0.012 to 0.016 0.793 0.019 
 Child Sex   0.339 0.227 -0.109 to 0.787 0.137 0.105 
 Level 1: Mediators        
M1 Respondent’s Monthly 
Profits in Ush 
b11 0.001 0.000  0.001 to 0.001 0.986 0.001 
M2 Respondent’s Social Power  b12 -0.564 0.773 -2.088 to 0.961 0.467 -0.058 
 Constant  -2.109 0.695 -3.479 to -.0.738 0.003***  
 R2Y,XM1M2=0.097      0.045**  
 N=205 children   
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Tab. 4.2-6 Mediation of microfinance effect on height-for-age at distal level 
95% Model Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised
Estimate 
MODEL 0  WITHOUT MEDIATOR      
 MF→HAZ (c)  0.456 0.242 0.061* [ 0.057   -  0.856]  0.138 
DISTAL MODEL 1        
 Direct effect: MF→HAZ (c’1)  0.461 0.243 0.059* [ 0.060   - 0.862]  0.139 
 Total indirect effect (c- c’1) -0.005 0.029  [-0.067   - 0.032]a -0.001b 
 Individual Income M1       
 MF → PROFITS (a11)  2040.365 7344.265 0.781 [-12444  -   16524]  0.020 
 PROFITS → HAZ (b11)  0.001 0.000 0.986 [ 0.001   - 0.001]  0.001 
 Indirect effect (a11 b11)  0.0001  0.015  [-0.023 -  0.026] a 0.000b 
Social Power M2       
 MF → POWER (a12)  0.009 0.023 0.701 [-0.036   - 0.054]  0.026 
 POWER → HAZ (b12) -0.564 0.773 0.467 [-2.088   - 0.961] -0.058 
 Indirect effect (a12 b12) -0.005 0.024  [-0.084   - 0.012] a -0.001b 
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant;  a: 90%BootCI also includes zero (b: Completely 
Standardized Indirect Effect 
4.2.4 Concluding Remarks 
The mediation analysis of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at distal level shows 
that: 
- Microfinance effect on nutritional status is neither mediated through individual income 
nor through social power (95%BootCI=[-0.023 to 0.026] & [-0.084 to 0.012], 
respectively) 
- Microfinance effect on individual income is not significant (p>0.10) 
- Microfinance effect on individual social power is not significant (p>0.10) 
- The effect of individual income on child nutritional status is not significant (p>0.10) 
- The effect of individual social power on child nutritional status is not significant 
(p>0.10) 
- Microfinance direct effect at distal level is still lowly significant, ameliorative and small 
(B=0.461; 95%CI: 0.060, 0.862; p=0.059; β=0.139) 
The bivariate analysis shows that:  
- Microfinance beneficiaries have a more negative attitude towards gender equality in 
sending children to school and a more positive attitude against violence against 
women (p<0.05 respectively). 
- There are more established clients involved in decisions on how to spend their 
income compared to the control group (p<0.10). 
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- Women are significantly more involved than men in decisions regarding medical care, 
daily food expenditures and infant feeding (p<0.00, p<0.05 and p<0.00, respectively). 
Men are significantly more often involved than women in decisions regarding sending 
children to school (p<0.05). 
- Less women feel a positive change in decision-making than men (p<0.01). 
-  Men participate more often in social activities than women (p<0.00) and they have 
leadership positions more often (p<0.00). 
The following diagram illustrates the results of the mediation analysis at a distal level. The 
dash arrows represent non-significant effects; the sollid line indicates a significant direct 
effect. The lines are red when the effect is negative. They are green when the effect is 
positive. 
 
Result 24-2: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at a distal level 
 
In summary, the mediation analysis at a distal level does not confirm an indirect effect of 
microfinance on child nutritional status through individual income or social power. The results 
suggest that the ameliorative and significant effect of microfinance on child nutritional status 
corresponds to a full direct and unmediated effect. 
In the next section, we will extend the distal model by considering an additional potential 
mediator at an intermediate level: household wealth. 
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4.3 MEDIATION AT AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STATUS 
 
This section aims at testing the mediating role of household wealth for microfinance effect on 
nutritional status. The analysis is based on a simple mediationnal model (Model 3). At first, 
household wealth is described and microfinance effect on household wealth is tested using 
bivariate and first stage regression analyses. In a second stage, the effect of household 
wealth on child nutritional status is assessed and its mediated effect derived. The results are 
summarised in a diagram as concluding remarks (Result 3).  
 
 
Model 34: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at an intermediate 
level 
 
The main hypothesis being tested is: 
H3: At an intermediate level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through higher 
household economic status. 
 
The following third  hypotheses will be also tested: 
- H3.1 Microfinance has an ameliorative effect on household wealth 
- H3.2 Household wealth has an ameliorative effect on child nutritional status 
- H3.3 microfinance effect on household wealth is mediated through individual income and 
social empowerment 
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4.3.1 Household Wealth 
Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
Wealth status was measured through the following three variables: subjective wealth, asset 
ownership and household expenditures. They are described in table 4.3.1 for the whole 
household sample as well as by microfinance and child nutritional status. 
Tab. 4.3-1 Household wealth by microfinance & nutritional profile: group means & 
proportions 
 All  Microfinance  Child Height-for-Age 
   Interv. Control p  OK <-2SD  
 (N=139)  (N=83) (N=56)   (N=150)a (N=55)a p 
Perception of wealth  0.27  0.36 0.14 *  0.35 0.15 * 
    Better off 43%  49% 34% *  49% 33% **
   The same 41%  37% 46%   37% 49%  
   Worse off 16%  13% 19%   14% 18%  
Material Asset Ownership          
   Bicycle/Motorcycle 72%  75% 68%   75% 73%  
   Radio 60%  61% 59%   64% 62%  
   Cows (mean) 0.99  0.94 1.05   0.73 1.45 * 
   Goats/Sheep//Pigs (mean) 7.23  7.54 6.77 *  7.56 6.25  
   Poultry (mean) 8.19  8.79 7.32   8.59 6.27 * 
Household expenditures          
   Monthly Consumption 
Expenditures/Adult Ush (mean) 
38514  41122 34647   40422 33647  
   Monthly Savings/Ad Ush 
(mean) 
9102  8974 9301   9306 8114  
  Monthly Food Expenditures/Ad. 
Ush (mean) 
18479  19618 16792   19066 16531  
*p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01, a: The sample of children is compared here (155 + 55=205 children) 
Subjective Wealth: Of the households 43 percent perceived themselves as better off, 41 
percent as the same as others and 16 percent as worse off. The mean wealth perception is 
significantly higher in both the microfinance intervention group and the group of well-
nourished children than in the comparison groups (p<0.10 respectively). The proportion of 
subjectively rich households was 49 percent in the microfinance intervention group compared 
to only 34 percent in the control group. Some 49 percent of the well-nourished children were 
living in rich households compared to only 33 percent of the malnourished. 
Asset Ownership: Regarding asset ownership, 72 percent had a bicycle or a motorcycle, 60 
percent a radio and 96 percent had domestic animals. Well-nourished children were living in 
households with a significantly lower number of cows (0.7 versus 1.5 among malnourished; 
p<0.10) and a significantly higher number of poultry (8.6 versus 6.3; p<0.10). Households 
benefiting from microfinance have a significantly higher number of goats, sheep or pigs (7.5 
versus 6.8 in the control group; p<0.10). 
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Households’ Expenditures: Households’ expenditures were adjusted for intrahousehold 
inequalities (household age and composition effects) using adult equivalence scales. The 
total monthly expenditures per adult equivalent varied between 0 and 173,750 Ugandan 
Shillings (Ush). They were 41,100 Ush on average. Households saved between zero and 
100,000 ush monthly and 9,100 on average. The households spent most of their money for 
food (51 percent of their expenditures on average) followed by education (20 percent), 
transport (14 percent) and health (13 percent). The monthly food expenditures were 18,480 
Ugandan Shillings. Household expenditures did not vary significantly neither by microfinance 
nor by nutritional status. 
Microfinance Direct Effect on Household Wealth 
Microfinance Direct Effect on household wealth was tested through a linear regression of the 
perceptive wealth status controlling for basic and immediate factors (respondent sex, 
location, household shock, household size, child sex, child age, individual income and 
individual social power). The results are given in table 4.3.2 (regression 1.4). The regression 
analysis shows a highly significant positive effect of microfinance on household wealth 
(p<0.01 and a13 has a positive sign). This effect is small according to cohen standards 
(β=0.190). Other significant and ameliorative determinants of household wealth are higher 
education levels in the family, higher individual income and social power (p<0.05, p<0.01, 
p<0.01 respectively). Being a woman act as influential negative predictor (p<0.10). 
Tab. 4.3-2 Microfinance direct effect on household wealth: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
   Outcome Variable  M3  
Household Perceived Wealth 
 
 Predictors  (1.4)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention        
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a13 0.280 0.097  0.088 to 0.472 0.004*** 0.190 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.547 0.208 0.137  to 0.957 0.009***  0.179 
 Imvepi Settlement   0.227 0.105 0.020 to  0.435 0.032**  0.137 
 Household Size  -0.019 0.020 -0.057 to 0.020 0.333 -0.065 
 Household Education Level   0.037 0.017  0.003 to 0.071 0.033**  0.149 
 Shock   0.065 0.109 -0.149 to 0.280 0.549  0.040 
 Female Respondent  -0.194 0.099 -0.389 to -0.001 0.051* -0.132 
 Child Age   0.004 0.003 -0.001 to 0.010 0.128  0.097 
 Child Sex   0.133 0.091 -0.046 to 0.313 0.144  0.093 
 Level 1: Immediate Factors       
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 to 0.0001 0.008*** 0.177 
M2 Social Power    0.911 0.309  0.301 to 1.520 0.004*** 0.210 
 Constant  -1.035 0.278 -1.584 to -0.487 0.000***  
 R2 M3,XM1M2=0.272       0.000***  
 N=205    
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Microfinance effect on household wealth is illustrated in figure 4.3.1. The regression line 
demonstrates higher predicted wealth status among those households benefiting from 
microfinance intervention compared to the control group.  
 
 
 Fig. 4.3-1 Microfinance effect on household wealth (N=205 children) 
 
 
Microfinance Indirect Effect on Household Wealth 
The mediation of microfinance effect on household wealth has also been analysed. 
  
Tab. 4.3-3 Microfinance total effect on household wealth: linear regression estimates 
 *p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01; 
   Outcome Variable  M3  
Household Perceived Wealth 
 
 Predictors  (0.4)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention        
X Credit since ≥ 6 months   0.293 0.101  0.094 to 0.493 0.004***  0.199 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Madi-Okollo Settlement   0.461 0.216  0.035 to  0.886 0.034**  0.151 
 Imvepi Settlement   0.230 0.109  0.014 to  0.445 0.037**  0.139 
 Household Size  -0.011 0.020 -0.051 to  0.029 0.584 -0.038 
 Household Education Level   0.058      0.017  0.024 to  0.092 0.001***  0.231 
 Shock   0.140 0.111 -0.079 to  0.359 0.208  0.086 
 Female Respondent  -0.334 0.097 -0.525 to -0.142 0.001*** -0.227 
 Child Age   0.003 0.003 -0.002 to  0.009 0.247  0.076 
 Child Sex   0.103 0.094 -0.083 to  0.288 0.276  0.072 
 Constant  -0.457 0.232 -0.914 to  0.000 0.050*  
 R2 M3,X=0.201      0.000***  
 N=205    
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Estimates from regression 1.4 in table 4.3.2, regression 0.4 in table 4.3.3, regressions 0.2 in 
table 4.2.2 and 0.3 in table 4.2.4 do not confirm the hypotheses that microfinance effect on 
household wealth might be mediated through either respondents’ income or social power. 
For each distal factor, microfinance mediated effect is positive but not significant according to 
90 percent bias-corrected bootstrap tests. In fact, for both factors, the bootsrapped 
confidence intervals include zero ([minus 0.031 to 0.036] for income and [minus 0.022 to 0.052] 
for social power). Both factors are apparently not influenced through microfinance (p≥0.10). 
They do yet have an ameliorative affect on household wealth which is highly significant 
(p<0.01, respectively) and small (standardised effect β=0.177 and 0.210, respectively). 
Estimates from the mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household wealth are 
summarised in table 4.3.4. 
 
 
Tab. 4.3-4 Mediation of microfinance effect on household wealth 
95% Model Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised 
Estimate 
MODEL 0  WITHOUT MEDIATOR      
 MF→WEALTH (c3)      0.293 0.101 0.004*** [ 0.126   -  0.460]  0.199DISTAL MODEL 1       
 Direct effect: MF→WEALTH (a13)       0.280 0.097 0.004*** [ 0.121   - 0.441] 0.191 Total indirect effect (c3- a13)       0.013 0.034  [-0.042   - 0.067] 0.009 b Individual Income M1       MF → PROFITS (a11) 2040.365 7344.265 0.781 [-1244    -    16524]  0.020 PROFITS→WEALTH (b11)     0.0001 0.0001 0.008*** [ 0.0001 - 0.0001] 0.177
 Indirect effect (a11 b11)       0.005 0.021  [-0.031    - 0.036] 0.004b 
Social Power M2       MF → POWER (a12)       0.009 0.023 0.701 [-0.036    - 0.054]  0.026 POWER →WEALTH (b12)       0.911 0.309 0.004*** [ 0.400    - 1.422] 0.210
 Indirect effect (a12 b12)       0.008 0.022  [-0.022    - 0.052] 0.006 b
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant; b: Completely Standardized Indirect Effect 
 
 
 
Summary 
The following diagram illustrates microfinance effect on household wealth (result 3.1). The 
solid lines indicate a significant and small direct effect of microfinance on household wealth 
and of individual income or social power on household wealth. The analysis does not confirm 
an indirect effect of microfinance on household wealth through socio-economic 
empowerment at individual level. 
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Result 3.14-3 : Mediation of microfinance effect on household wealth 
 
In particular, the mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household wealth shows that: 
- Microfinance total effect on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative and 
small (unstandardised effect=0.293; 95%CI: 0.126, 0.460; p=0.004; standardised 
effect=0.199) 
- Microfinance direct effect on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative and 
small (unstandardised effect=0.280; 95%CI: 0.121, 0.441; p=0.004; standardised 
effect=0.191) 
- Microfinance indirect effect on household wealth through individual income is not 
significant (90%BootCI:-0.031, 0.036) 
- Microfinance indirect effect on household wealth through individual social power is 
not significant (90%BootCI: 0.022, 0.052) 
- Microfinance effect on individual income is not significant (p>0.10) 
- Microfinance effect on social power is not significant (p>0.10) 
- The effect of individual income on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative 
and small (unstandardised effect=0.0001; 95%CI: 0.0001, 0.0001; p=0.008; 
standardised effect=0.177) 
- The effect of individual social power on household wealth is highly significant, 
ameliorative and small (unstandardised effect=0.911; 95%CI: 0.400, 1.422; p=0.004; 
standardised effect=0.210). 
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4.3.2 Simple Mediation Analysis at an Intermediate Level 
 
 
Tab. 4.3-5 Microfinance effect on height-for-age at intermediate level: linear regression 
estimates 
*p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Effect of Household Wealth on Nutritional Status: Second Stage Multivariate Analysis 
The effect of household wealth on child nutritional status can be derived from the linear 
regression (2.1) of the child height-for-age z-score along with household wealth and other 
covariates at a distal and inherent level (table 4.3.5). It equals the value 0.270 of the 
coefficient b13. The effect of household wealth on child nutritional status is positive but not 
significant (p>0.10). 
 
 
   Outcome Variable Y:  
Child Height-for-Age z-score 
 
 Predictors  (2.1)  
  Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months c’1  0.385 0.247 -0.102 to 0.873 0.121 0.117 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.341 0.527 -1.381 to 0.699  0.519 -0.050 
 Imvepi settlement    0.134 0.265 -0.389 to 0.656 0.614  0.036 
 Household Size    0.046 0.049 -0.050 to 0.143 0.342  0.071 
 Household Education Level    0.097 0.044 0.011 to 0.183 0.027**  0.173 
 Shock  - 0.542 0.271 -1.078 to   -0.007 0.047** -0.148 
 Female Respondent    0.208 0.249 -0.283 to 0.670 0.404  0.063 
 Child Age    0.001 0.007 -.0131   to 0.014 0.922  0.007 
 Child Sex    0.303 0.228 -0.146 to 0.752 0.185  0.094 
 Level 1: Distal Factors        
M1 Respondent’s Monthly Profits in Ush 
b11  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 to 0.0001 0.789 -0.020 
M2 Respondent’s Social Power  b12 -0.810 0.788 -2.364 to 0.744 0.305 -0.083 
 Level 2 : Intermediate Factor      
M3 Household Wealth b13  0.270 0.179 -0.083 to 0.624 0.133  0.120  Constant  -1.829 0.717 -3.243 to -0.414  0.012**  
 R2Y,XM1M2M3=0.107       0.034**  
 N=205 children   
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Indirect Effect of Microfinance on Nutritional Status at an Intermediate Level 
The indirect effect of microfinance on child height-for-age through household wealth equals 
a13b13 which has the positive value of 0.076 (table 4.3.6). This mediated effect is statistically 
significant at ten percent level according to bootstrap tests. In fact, the 90 percent bias-
corrected bootstrapped confidence interval failed to include zero. It varies from plus 0.010 to 
plus 0.179. The regression analysis confirms that microfinance effect on child nutritional 
status is mediated through household wealth. This mediated effect is lowly significant and 
small (standardised effect=0.022). 
 
 
Tab. 4.3-6 : Mediation of microfinance effect on height-for-age at intermediate level 
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant; a: 90%BootCI (0.010, 0.179) does not include zero;  
b: Completely Standardised Indirect Effect 
 
 
 
95% Model Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised 
Estimate 
DISTAL MODEL 1       
Total effect: MF→HAZ (c’1) 0.461 0.243 0.059* [-0.018 - 0.940] 0.139 
INTERMEDIATE MODEL 2       
 Wealth M3       
 MF → WEALTH (a13) 0.280 0.097 0.004*** [ 0.088 - 0.472] 0.190 
 WEALTH → HAZ ( b13) 0.270 0.180 0.133 [-0.083 - 0.624] 0.120 
 Direct effect: MF→HAZ (c’1) 0.385 0.247 0.121 [-0.102 - 0.873] 0.117 
 Indirect effect (a13 b13) 0.076 0.051   [-0.001 - 0.227]a* 0.022b 
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Summary 
The mediation analysis at an intermediate level shows that: 
- microfinance indirect effect on child nutritional status through household wealth is 
lowly significant, ameliorative and small (unstandardised effect=0.076; 90%BootCI: 
0.010, 0.179; standardised effect=0.022) 
- microfinance direct effect on child nutritional status at an intermediate level is not 
significant (p>0.10) 
- microfinance effect on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative and small 
(unstandardised effect= 0.280; 95%CI: 0.088, 0472; p=0.004; standardised effect= 
190) 
- The effect of household wealth on child nutritional status is not significant (p>0.10) 
 
The following diagram portrays the results of the analysis of household wealth as a potential 
mediator of microfinance effect on child nutritional status (result 3.2). The mediation analysis 
confirms the positive and mediating role of household wealth which is illustrated by the solid 
green line of the "wealth" box. This mediation of microfinance effect through household 
wealth is a full mediation as the direct effect at intermediate level is no longer significant. 
 
Result 3.24-4: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at an 
intermediate level 
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4.3.3 Concluding Remarks 
The mediation analysis of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at distal and 
intermediate levels so far showed that: 
- Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is significantly mediated through 
household wealth. This effect is lowly significant, ameliorative and small. 
- Microfinance effect on household wealth is not significantly mediated through 
individual income.  
- Microfinance effect on household wealth status is not significantly mediated through 
individual social power. 
- Microfinance effect on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative and small. 
- Microfinance effect on individual income is not significant. 
- Microfinance effect on social power is not significant. 
- The effect of household wealth on child nutritional status is not signifiant 
- The effect of individual income on child nutritional status is not significant  
- The effect of individual social power on child nutritional status is not significant 
- Microfinance direct effect on child nutritional status is lowly significant at distal level 
but no longer significant at intermediate level. 
These results are illustrated on the following diagram (result 3.3).  
 
Result 3.34-5: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at distal & 
intermediate levels 
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The dashed lines indicate that there is no indirect effect of microfinance on child nutritional 
status through individual income or social power. The solid line confirms an indirect full effect 
through improved household wealth.  
In the next section, we will consider an extended model which includes the following potential 
mediators at a proximal level: household diet, child feeding practices and health care. 
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4.4 MEDIATION AT A PROXIMAL LEVEL: HOUSEHOLD NUTRITION SECURITY 
 
 
Model 45: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at a proximal level 
 
At a proximal level, we hypothesize that microfinance influences child nutritional status 
through better household nutrition security in its three dimensions: household diet, health 
care and child feeding practices (Hypothesis H4). This central hypothesis can be divided in 
the following part hypotheses: 
- H4.1 Microfinance influences household diet 
- H4.2 Microfinance influences child feeding practices 
- H4.3 Microfinance influences household health care 
- H4.4 Household diet influences child nutritional status 
- H4.5 Child feeding practices influence child nutritional status 
- H4.6 Household health care influence child nutritional status 
- H4.7 Microfinance effect is mediated through household diet 
- H4.8 Microfinance effect is mediated through child feeding practices 
- H4.9 Microfinance effect is mediated through household health care 
 
The analysis exposed in this chapter consists in describing the nutritional situation of the 
sampled households and in testing each of the hypothesized effects in the corresponding 
following sub-sections. 
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4.4.1 Household Diet 
Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
Household diet has two aspects: a quantitative and a qualitative one. The quantitative aspect 
can be expressed as the frequency of meals taken by the family members during a day. The 
qualitative aspects include the diversity of food items that have been consumed. An index 
taking into account both dimensions is a good mean of categorising households according to 
their diet profile. This diet profile is given in table 4.4.1 for all 139 households as well as by 
microfinance and nutritional status.  
 
Tab. 4.4-1 Household diet by microfinance & nutritional profile: group means & 
proportions 
 All  Microfinance  Child Height-for-Age 
   Interv.  Control p  OK <-2SD  
 (N=139)  (N=83) (N=56)   (N=150) (N=55)  
Diet Summary index -0.27  -0.18 -0.41 *  -0.25 -0.29  
   Ideal Diet (index=1) 17%  20% 13%   17% 16%  
   Middle Diet (index=0) 38%  41% 34%   40% 38%  
   Bad diet (index=-1) 45%  39% 54% *  43% 45%  
Meal Frequency 2.48  2.60 2.30 *  2.53 2.58  
   1 meal/day 18%  13% 25% *  14% 22%  
   2 meal/day 27%  25% 29%   29% 24%  
   ≥3 meals/day 55%  61% 46% *  57% 55%  
Dietary diversity Index 2.83  2.86 2.77   2.85 2.76  
   Fully balanced diet (index=4) 23%  25% 19%   22% 26%  
   Minimum Dietary diversity (3 or 4) 61%  60% 62%   64% 57%  
   Dietary diversity =3 38%  35% 43%   42% 31%  
   Dietary diversity=2 32%  36% 27%   31% 35%  
   Dietary diversity=1 4%  1% 7%   3% 7% * 
   Carbohydrate-rich food 94%  98% 90% **  95% 89%  
   Protein-rich food 94%  94% 94%   93% 98%  
   Fat-rich food 53%  56% 50%   55% 46%  
   Vitamin-rich Food 41%  40% 43%   41% 42%  
Subjective Change in Diet -0.07  -0.05 -0.09   -0.05 -0.20  
   Improved (1) 27%  28% 25%   28% 22%  
   No Change(0) 40%  40% 39%   40% 36%  
   Worsened(-1) 33%  33% 34%   32% 42%  
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
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The results indicate that the household diet tended to be rather bad than ideal. The mean 
diet summary index was negative. Only 17 percent of the households had an ideal diet. The 
households took two meals per day on average. Some 45 percent did not manage to eat 
thrice daily. The results on the diet quality indicate that about one fourth had a fully balanced 
diet. Some 61 percent reached the minimum dietary diversity composed of at least three 
nutrient categories. The diet was generally rich in carbonhhydrat and in protein. Vitamin and 
fat-rich food were less frequent. The respondents were asked about their perception of 
change in the household’s diet in the year preceding the interview. Their responses reveal 
that the diet tended to be worse on average. Only 27 percent felt an improvement in the diet 
quantity and quality.  
A comparison along the microfinance variable shows that households benefiting from 
microfinance had a significantly better diet compared to controls. The microfinance group 
had a higher mean summary index, a lower proportion with a bad diet, a higher mean 
frequency of meals, a lower proportion with only one meal per day, a higher proportion with 
three meals per day and a higher proportion with a carbonhydrate-rich diet. The difference 
was significant at five percent level for the indicator of carbonhydrate-rich diet. It was lowly 
significant for the other indicators (p<0.10).   
A comparison between malnourished and well-nourished children indicates a significant 
difference only for the quality of the household diet. The group of malnourished children had 
a significantly higher proportion with a household diet composed of only one food category 
(p<0.10). This could suggest that an unbalanced diet at household level could be a risk factor 
for child malnutrition.  
 
Microfinance Direct Effect on Household Diet 
Microfinance Direct Effect on household diet can be assessed from regression 2.5 in table 
4.4.2 which takes into account all potential predictors of household diet at distal and 
intermediate levels. The positive sign of coefficient a14 indicates that microfinance direct 
effect on household diet might be ameliorative. This effect equals 0.244 and the t-test shows 
that it is significant at five percent level. It is considered as a small effect according to Cohen 
benchmarks (β=0.162). Some inherent factors also affect household diet. The education 
level of the family members is a positive and significant predictor of a better household diet 
(p<0.05). In contrast, female respondents and large families have a lower household diet 
level and this relation is highly significant.  
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Tab. 4.4-2 Microfinance effect on household diet at intermediate level: linear regression 
estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01   
 
 
 
Microfinance direct effect on household diet is illustrated in figure 4.4.1. The curve shows a 
clear increase in the level of the predicted diet from the control group to the intervention 
group. 
 
Fig. 4.4-1 Microfinance effect on household diet (N=205) 
   Outcome Variable  M4  
Diet Summary Index 
 
 Predictors  (2.5)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention        
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a14   0.244 0.100 0.046 to 0.442 0.016**  0.162 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors        
 Madi-Okollo Settlement   -0.214 0.214 -0.636 to   0.209 0.320  -0.068 
 Imvepi Settlement   -0.154 0.108 -0.366 to   0.059 0.155  -0.091 
 Household Size  -0.068 0.020 -0.107 to  -0.029 0.001*** -0.229 
 Household Education Level   0.044 0.018  0.009 to   0.079 0.013**  0.173 
 Shock  -0.165 0.110 -0.383 to   0.052 0.136 -0.099 
 Female Respondent  -0.409 0.101 -0.608 to - 0.209 0.000*** -0.271 
 Child Age  -0.001 0.003 -0.006 to   0.005 0.834 -0.013 
 Child Sex  -0.075 0.093 -0.258 to   0.107 0.418 -0.051 
 Level 1: Distal Factors      
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush b11  0.0001 0.000  0.000 to  0.000 0.408 -0.055 
M2 Social Power  b12 -0.105 0.320 -0.737 to  0.526 0.743 -0.024 
 Level 2: Intermediate Factor      
M3 Household Wealth b13 0.323 0.073  0.179 to  0.466 0.000*** 0.315 
 Constant  0.183 0.291 -0.392 to  0.758 0.531  
 R2 M4,XM1M2M3=0.290      0.000***   N=205    
 96 
 
Microfinance Indirect Effect on Household Diet through Household Wealth 
Mediation analyses based on estimates from regression 1.4, 2.5, and 1.5 (tables 4.3.2, 4.4.2, 
and 4.4.3, respectively) showed that microfinance effect on household diet might be 
mediated through household economic wealth. In fact, microfinance is a significantly 
ameliorative predictor of wealth (effect=0.280; p<0.01) and wealth is a significantly 
ameliorative predictor of household diet (effect=0.323; p<0.01). These effects are 
respectively small and medium as inferred from the beta coefficients (β=190; β=0.315, 
respectively). Bootstrap tests show a positive and highly significant indirect effect of 
microfinance on household diet through household wealth (indirect effect =0.090; %99BootCI 
[0.005, - 0.249]). This indirect effect is small according to Cohen benchmarks (standardised 
indirect effect=0.061). Microfinance’s direct path to household diet remains nevertheless 
significant (direct effect=0.244; p<0.05). The direct effect is small (β=0.161). The indirect 
microfinance effect through household wealth is thus a partial one. According to the ratio 
indirect to total effect, household wealth mediates approximatively one fourth of the total 
effect of microfinance on household diet.  
 
 
 
 
Tab. 4.4-3 Microfinance effect on household diet at distal level: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
   Outcome Variable  M4  
Diet Summary Index 
 
 Predictors  (1.5)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months   0.334 0.103 [ 0.131   - 0.537] 0.001***  0.222 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors     
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.037 0.220 [-0.472    - 0.398] 0.866 -0.012 
 Imvepi Settlement  -0.080 0.111 [-0.300    - 0.139] 0.471 -0.048 
 Household Size  -0.074 0.021 [-0.115   -   -0.033] 0.000*** -0.250 
 Household Education   0.056 0.018 [ 0.020   - 0.093] 0.002***  0.220 
 Shock  -0.144 0.115 [-0.372   - 0.083] 0.213 -0.086 
 Female Respondent  -0.471 0.105 [-0.678   - -0.265] 0.000*** -0.313 
 Child Age   0.001 0.003 [-0.005   - 0.007] 0.793  0.017 
 Child Sex  -0.032 0.096 [-0.222   - 0.158] 0.739 -0.022 
 Level 1: Distal Factors      
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush   0.000 0.000 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.993  0.001 
M2 Social Power    0.188 0.328 [-0.458   - 0.835] 0.566  0.043 
 Constant  -0.151 0.295 [-0.732   - 0.430] 0.609  
 R2 M4,XM1M2=0.218      0.000***   N=205    
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Microfinance Indirect Effect on Household Diet through Individual Income and Social Power 
In contrast, estimates from regression 1.5 in table 4.4.3 and regressions 0.2 and 0.3 in tables 
4.2.2 and 4.2.4 do not confirm the hypotheses that microfinance effect on household diet 
might be mediated through respondent’s income or social power at immediate level. Both 
factors do not affect household diet significantly and are not apparently influenced through 
microfinance. Microfinance mediated effect through individual income is negative. The 
indirect effect through social power is positive. But for each individual factor, bootstrap tests 
indicate a non-significant indirect effect (90%BootCI: [-0.009, 0.010] for income and [-0.006, 
0.027] for social power, respectively). 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Tab. 4.4-4 Microfinance total effect on household diet: linear regression estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
Summary 
Estimates from the mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household diet are 
summarised in table 4.4.5. 
 
 
   Outcome Variable  M4  Diet Summary Index 
 
 Predictors  (0.5)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months   0.336 0.102 [0.134    - 0.538] 0.001***  0.223 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors     
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.048 0.218 [-0.479    - 0.383] 0.825  -0.016 
 Imvepi Settlement  -0.080 0.111 [-0.299    - 0.139] 0.471 -0.047 
 Household Size  -0.072 0.020 [-0.112   - -0.032] 0.000*** -0.244 
 Household Education   0.059 0.018 [ 0.025   - 0.094] 0.001***  0.232 
 Shock  -0.131 0.113 [-0.353   - 0.091] 0.247 -0.078 
 Female Respondent  -0.485 0.098 [-0.679   - -0.291] 0.000*** -0.322 
 Child Age   0.001 0.003 [-0.005   - 0.006] 0.825  0.014 
 Child Sex  -0.038 0.095 [-0.226   -   0.150] 0.687 -0.026 
 Constant  -0.048 0.235 [-0.512   - 0.415] 0.838  
 R2 M4,X=0.217      0.000***   N=205    
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Tab. 4.4-5 Mediation of microfinance effect on household diet 
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant; a : 99%BootCI also includes zero: [0.005, 0.249]; b: 
90%BootCI does not include zero neither: for individual income (-0.09, 0.010) nor for social power (-0.006, 0.027) 
nor for both distal mediators (-0.012-0.024); c: Completely Standardized Indirect Effect  
 
 
The mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household diet indicates that: 
- Microfinance total effect on household diet is highly significant, ameliorative and small 
(unstandardised effect=0.336; 95%CI: 0.134, 0.538; p=0.001; standardised 
effect=0.223 in table 4.4.4). 
- Microfinance effect on household diet is significantly mediated through household 
wealth. This effect is highly significant, ameliorative and small (unstandardised 
indirect effect: 0.090; 99%BootCI: 0.005, 0.249; standardised indirect effect: 0.061). 
- The effect of household wealth on household diet is highly significant, ameliorative 
and medium (unstandardised effect=0.323; 95%CI: 0.179, 0.466; p=0.000; 
standardised effect=0.315). 
- Microfinance effect on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative and small 
(unstandardised effect=0.280; 95%BootCI: 0.088, 0.472, p=0.004; standardised 
effect=0.190). 
 95% 
 
Estimate SE p 
Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised 
Estimate 
INTERMEDIATE MODEL 2       
Wealth M3        First Stage X→M3 (a13) 0.280 0.097 0.004*** [0.088  - 0.472] 0.190  Second Stage M3→M4 (b13) 0.323 0.073 0.000*** [0.179  - 0.466] 0.315 
 Direct Effect X→ M4 (a14) 0.244 0.100 0.016** [0.046  - 0.442] 0.162 
 Indirect Effect X→M3→M4 0.090 0.038 - [0.030  - 0.177]***a  0.061c  Total intermediate Effect X→ M4 0.334 0.103 0.001*** [0.131  - 0.537] 0.222 
 Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.270 0.003 - [0.075  - 0.069] - 
DISTAL MODEL 1      
Individual Income M1       First Stage X→M1 (a11) 2040.4 7344.3 0.781 [-12444 - 16524] 0.020 
 Second Stage M1→M4 0.000 0.000 0.993 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.001  Indirect Effect X→M1→M4 0.000 0.007 - [-0.017  - 0.013]b  0.000c 
 Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.000 0.029 - [-0.052  - 0.054] - 
Social Power M2       First Stage X→M2 (a12) 0.009 0.023 0.701 [-0.036  - 0.054] 0.026 
 Second Stage M2→M4 0.188 0.328 0.566 [-0.458  - 0.835] 0.043  Indirect Effect X→M2→M4 0.002 0.010 - [-0.011  - 0.031]b  0.001c  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.005 0.043 - [-0.041  - 0.119] - 
All Distal Mediators      
 Direct Effect X→ M4 0.334 0.103 0.001*** [ 0.131   - 0.537] 0.222  Indirect Effect  X→M1,M2→M4 0.002 0.011 - [-0.023  - 0.026]b  0.001c  Total distal Effect  X→ M4 0.336 0.102 0.001*** [ 0.134   - 0.538] 0.223  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.005 0.049 - [-0.075  - 0.092] - 
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- Microfinance effect on household diet is neither mediated through individual income 
nor through social power (90%BootCI=-0.009 to 0.010 and -0.006 to 0.027, 
respectively). 
 
   
 
 
These results are illustated on a diagram (result 4.1). 
 
Result 4.14-Mediation of microfinance effect on household diet 
 
 
The dashed lines show that microfinance effect on household diet is neither mediated 
through individual income nor through social power. The solid lines confirm a partial 
mediation through household wealth.  
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4.4.2 Child Feeding Practices 
Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
Child care was assessed by recording feeding practices for only one child per household. 
These 139 index children are the youngest children of the household aged between 6 and 60 
months. Children breastfeeding and feeding practices19 are described in table 4.4.6 for the 
whole sample as well as by presence or absence of stunted children and established 
borrowers in the household.  
Tab. 4.4-6 Child feeding practices by microfinance & nutritional profile: group means & 
proportions 
 All Microfinance Child Height-for-Age 
  Interv. Control p OK <-2SD p 
 (N=139) (N=83) (N=56)  (N=150) (N=55)  
Child Feeding Index 0.27  0.25 0.30   0.33 0.22  
   Ideal Feeding Practice (Score=4) 29%  28% 32%   33% 25%  
   Middle Feeding Practice (Score 2-3) 68%  70% 66%   66% 71%  
   Bad Feeding Practice (Score 0-1) 2%  2% 2%   1% 4%  
Child Feeding Practices          
   Ever Breastfed (1) 99%  99% 100%   100% 98%  
   Breastfeeding Initiation  ≤ 24h (1) 57%  58% 55%   57% 56%  
   Continued Breastfeeding 2 years(1) 85%  84% 86%   91% 75% *** 
   Complementary Foods (1) 68%  67% 68%   66% 71%  
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
All index children but one (99 percent) had ever been breastfed. Breastfeeding was initiated 
between 30 minutes and 60 days within birth (average: 41.9 hours). Some 14 percent of the 
children were breastfed in the hour following their birth and in total 57 percent within 24 
hours. According to the 24-hour recall, 48 percent of the children were not breastfed at the 
time of the survey. Among those children already weaned, the breastfeeding duration varied 
between zero and 48 months and was of an average of 22 months. None of the children 
were exclusively breastfed. Two third received solid foods either in addition to breast milk 
(complementary breastfeeding: 31 percent) or without breast milk (35 percent). The rest was 
receiving only water or other liquids like tea, sweet water or milk either in addition to breast 
milk (predominant or mixed breastfeeding: 21 percent) or just so (10 percent). Fifteen 
percent were no longer breastfed although younger than 20 months. 
                                                
19 The child feeding indicators are adjusted for age according to the official WHO recommendations 
(WHO, 2007). Breastfeeding patterns, complementary feeding and assistance to eat vary significantly 
according to the age of the index child. 
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A child feeding index was constructed based on the following four criteria: ever breastfed, 
early breastfeeding initiation, continued breastfeeding at 20 months and receiving solid 
foods. According to this index, the majority of the index children benefited from middle 
feeding practices (68 percent). Only 29 percent had ideal feeding practices. A comparison 
along the microfinance or the nutritional status profile of the children shows that there were 
no significant differences in the child feeding index. Only the specific practice of prolonged 
breastfeeding varied significantly between well-nourished and malnourished children 
(p<0.00). In fact 25 percent of the malnourished children did not benefit from a prolonged 
breastfeeding while this was the case for only nine percent among the well-nourished ones.  
Microfinance Direct Effect on Child Feeding Practices: First Stage Multivariate Analysis 
Microfinance direct effect on child feeding practices can be assessed from regression 2.6 in 
table 4.4.7 which takes into account all potential predictors of child feeding. The negative 
sign of coefficient a15 indicates a deteriorative effect of microfinance on child care. This effect 
equals -0.137 and the t-test shows that it is significant at the ten percent level. It is a small 
effect according to Cohen benchmarks (β=-0.136). Some inherent factors like the presence 
of household shocks also adversely affect child feeding practices. These negative effects are 
highly significant and of medium size (p<0.01; β=-0.384). In contrast, household wealth 
represents a positive and lowly significant predictor of child care (p<0.10). 
Tab. 4.4-7 Microfinance effect on child feeding practices at intermediate level: linear 
regression estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
   Outcome Variable  M5  Child Feeding Index 
 
 Predictors  (2.6)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a15 -0.137 0.070 [-0.275  -  0.001] 0.052* -0.136 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors      
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  - 0.600 0.149 [-0.894   - -0.306] 0.000***  -0.289 
 Imvepi Settlement  -0.230 0.075 [-0.378   - -0.082] 0.002***  -0.204 
 Household Size   0.015 0.014 [-0.012   - 0.043] 0.265  0.078 
 Household Education   0.019 0.012 [-0.006   - 0.043] 0.131  0.110 
 Shock  -0.428 0.077 [-0.579   - -0.276] 0.000*** -0.384 
 Female Respondent   0.021 0.070 [-0.118   - 0.159] 0.771  0.020 
 Child Age   0.003 0.002 [-0.001   - 0.007] 0.186  0.087 
 Child Sex   0.042 0.064 [-0.085   -   0.168] 0.519  0.042 
 Level 1: Distal Factors        
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush  0.000 0.000 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.531  0.044 M2 Social Power   -0.275 0.223 [-0.714  - 0.164] 0.219 -0.093 
 Level 2: Intermediate Factor      
M3 Household Wealth  0.088 0.051 [-0.012   - 0.188] 0.085*  0.129 
 Constant  0.553 0.203 [ 0.154 - 0.953] 0.007***  
 R2 M5,XM1M2M3=0.228      0.000***   N=205    
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Microfinance direct effect on child feeding practices is illustrated in figure 4.4.2. The curve 
shows a clear decrease in the level of the predicted child feeding index from the control 
group to the intervention group. 
 
Fig. 4.4-2 Microfinance effect on child feeding practices (N=205) 
 
Microfinance indirect Effect on Child Feeding Practices through Household Wealth 
Mediation analyses based on estimates from regressions 1.4 and 2.6 (tables 4.3.2 and 4.4.7) 
show that microfinance effect on child feeding practices might be mediated through 
household economic wealth. In fact, microfinance is a significant ameliorative predictor of 
wealth (effect=0.280; p<0.01) and wealth is a significant ameliorative predictor of child 
feeding practices (effect=0.088; p<0.10). Bootstrap tests show a positive and significant 
indirect microfinance effect on child feeding practices through household wealth (indirect 
effect =0.025; 95% BootCI=[0.000 to 0.069]). This effect is moderately significant and of 
small size (standardised indirect effect: 0.026). Microfinance’s direct path to child feeding 
practices yet remains lowly significant (direct effect= minus 0.137; p<0.10). The indirect 
microfinance effect on child feeding practices through household wealth is thus a partial one. 
According to the ratio indirect to total effect, household wealth mediates about 22 percent of 
the total effect of microfinance on child feeding practices. 
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Tab. 4.4-8 Microfinance effect on child feeding practices at distal level: linear regression 
estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
Microfinance Indirect Effect on Child Feeding Practices through Individual Income and Social 
Power 
In contrast, estimates from regression 1.6 in table 4.4.8 and regressions 0.2 and 0.3 in tables 
4.2.2 and 4.2.4 do not confirm the hypotheses that microfinance effect on child feeding 
practices might be mediated through either respondents’ income or social power at distal 
level. Both factors do not significantly affect child feeding practices and they are not 
apparently influenced through microfinance. Microfinance mediated effect through individual 
income is positive. The indirect effect through social power is negative. But for each 
individual factor, bootstrap tests indicate a non-significant indirect effect (90%BootCI: [minus 
0.007 to plus 0.017] for income and [minus 0.025 to 0.006] for social power).  
 
 
   Outcome Variable  M5  
Child Feeding Index 
 
 Predictors  (1.6)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months  -0112 0.069 [-0.248   - 0.023] 0.104 -0.112 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors     
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.552 0.147 [-0.842    
- 
-0.262] 0.000*** -0.265 
 Imvepi Settlement  -0.210 0.074 [-0.357   - -0.063] 0.005*** -0.186 
 Household Size   0.014 0.014 [-0.014   -   0.041] 0.322  0.069 
 Household Education   0.022 0.012 [-0.002   - 0.046] 0.074*  0.129 
 Shock  -0.422 0.077 [-0.574   - -0.270] 0.000*** -0.378 
 Female Respondent   0.003 0.070 [-0.135   - 0.142] 0.961  0.003 
 Child Age   0.003 0.002 [-0.001   - 0.007] 0.131  0.100 
 Child Sex   0.053 0.064 [ -0.074  - 0.180] 0.409  0.054 
 Level 1: Distal Factors      
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush   0.000 0.000 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.334  0.067 
M2 Social Power   -0.195 0.219 [-0.626   - 0.237] 0.375 -0.066 
 Constant   0.462 0.197 [ 0.074   - 0.850] 0.020**  
 R2 M5,XM1M2=0.216      0.000***   N=205    
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Tab. 4.4-9 Microfinance total effect on child feeding practices: linear regression estimates  
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
Summary 
Estimates from the mediation analysis of microfinance effect on child feeding practices are 
summarised in table 4.4.10. 
Tab. 4.4-10 Mediation of microfinance effect on child feeding practices 
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant; a: 99%BootCI includes zero: ; b: 90%BootCI also 
includes zero (for individual income, socia power and both distal mediators); c: Completely Standardised Indirect 
Effect 
   Outcome Variable  M5  
Child Feeding Index 
 
 Predictors  (0.6)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months  -0.113 0.069 [-0.248   - 0.023] 0.102 -0.112 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors     
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.549 0.146 [-0.838   - -0.260] 0.000***  -0.264 
 Imvepi Settlement  -0.210 0.074 [-0.357   - -0.064] 0.005***  -0.186 
 Household Size   0.011 0.014 [-0.015   - 0.038] 0.403  0.058 
 Household Education   0.021 0.012 [-0.002   - 0.044] 0.078*  0.122 
 Shock  -0.433 0.075 [-0.582   - -0.285] 0.000*** -0.389 
 Female Respondent  -0.002 0.066 [-0.132   - 0.128] 0.971 -0.002 
 Child Age   0.003 0.002 [-0.001   - 0.007] 0.122  0.102 
 Child Sex   0.060 0.064 [-0.066   -   0.186] 0.351  0.061 
 Constant   0.377 0.157 [0.067   - 0.688] 0.017**  
 R2 M5,X=0.210      0.000***   N=205    
95%  Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised 
Estimate 
INTERMEDIATE MODEL       
Wealth M3        First Stage X→M3 (a13) 0.280 0.097 0.004*** [0.088    -  0.472]  0.190  Second Stage M3→M5 (b13) 0.088 0.051 0.085* [-0.012     -  0.188]  0.129  Direct Effect X→ M5 (a15) -0.137 0.070 0.052* [-0.275  -  0.001] -0.136  Indirect Effect X→M3→M5 0.025 0.017 - [0.000  -  0.069]a**   0.026c  Total intermediate Effect X→ M5 -0.112 0.069 0.104 [-0.248  -  0.023] -0.112  Ratio indirect/Total Effect -0.219 82.278 - [-6.095  -  0.138] - 
DISTAL MODEL      
Individual Income M1       First Stage X→M1 (a11) 2040.365 7344.265 0.781 [-12444  - 16524] 0.020  Second Stage M1→M5 0.000 0.000 0.334 [0.000     -  0.000] 0.067  Indirect Effect X→M1→M5 0.001 0.008 - [-0.009  -  0.022]b  0.001c  Ratio indirect/Total Effect -0.012 0.658 - [-1.206  -  0.125] - 
Social Power M2       First Stage X→M2 (a12) 0.009 0.023 0.701 [-0.036  -  0.054]  0.026  Second Stage M2→M5 -0.195 0.219 0.375 [-0.626  -  0.237] -0.066  Indirect Effect X→M2→M5 -0.002 0.007 - [-0.025  -  0.007]b - 0.002c  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.015 0.699 - [-0.093  -  0.758] - 
 All Distal Mediators      
 Direct Effect X→ M5 -0.112 0.069 0.104 [-0.248   -  0.023]   Indirect Effect  X→M1,M2→M5 0.000 0.010 - [-0.022  -  0.016]b  0.000c  Total distal Effect  X→ M5 -0.113 0.069 0.102 [-0.248   -  0.023] -0.112  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.003 1.110 - [-0.617  -  0.367] - 
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The mediation analysis of microfinance effect on child feeding practices reveals that: 
- Microfinance total effect on child feeding practices is not significant (p>0.10 in table 
4.4.9) 
- Microfinance effect on child feeding practices is significantly mediated through 
household wealth. This indirect effect is moderately significant, ameliorative and small 
(unstandardised indirect effect: 0.025; 95%BootCI: 0.000, 0.069; standardised 
indirect effect= 0.026) 
- Microfinance direct effect on child feeding practices is lowly significant, deteriorative 
and small (unstandardised effect= -0.137; 95%CI: -0.275, 0.001; p=0.052; 
standardised effect=-0.136) 
- The effect of household wealth on child feeding practices is lowly significant, 
ameliorative and small (unstandardised effect: 0.088; 95%CI: -0.112, 0.188; p=0.085; 
standardised effect=0.129) 
- Microfinance effect on household wealth is highly significant, ameliorative and small  
(unstandardised effect:0.280; 95%CI: 0.088, 0.472; p=0.004) 
- Microfinance effect on child feeding practices is neither mediated through individual 
income nor through social power (90%BootCI=-0.007 to 0.017 and -0.025 to 0.006, 
respectively).   
 
In summary, the analysis confirms a partial mediation of microfinance effect on child feeding 
practices through improved household wealth. This effect is illustrated by solid lines in the 
following diagram (result 4.2). The direct microfinance effect on child feeding practices is also 
significant but deteriorative. 
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Result 4.24-6: Mediation of microfinance effect on child feeding practices 
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4.4.3 Household Health Care 
Descriptive & Bivariate Analysis 
Health caring practices encompass curative practices, preventive practices and 
environmental hygiene. They are described in table 4.4.11 for the 139 households and index 
children.  
 
Tab. 4.4-11 Household health care: descriptive & bivariate analysis 
 All  Microfinance  Child Height-for-Age 
   Interv.  Control p  OK <-2SD p 
 (N=139)  (N=83) (N=56)   (N=150) (N=55)  
Health Care index 0.39  0.45 0.30 **  0.47  0.16 *** 
   Ideal health Care (index=1) 45%  53% 34% **  53% 24% *** 
   Middle Health Care (index=0) 48%  39% 63%* ***  42% 69% *** 
   Bad Health Caret (index=-1) 7%  8% 4%   5% 7%  
Child Illness in the 2 last weeks  78%  82% 73%   78% 82%  
Sick child to health centre 96%  95% 98%   99% 93% ** 
Full Immunization + Vitamin A 81%  81% 82%   83% 71% * 
Use of Antenatal Care 99%  99% 98%   99% 100%  
Sensitization about nutrition 90%  89% 91%   89% 91%  
Clean compound 72%  76% 66%   76%  62% ** 
Safe Drinking water 96%  99% 91% **  97% 93%  
Pit Latrine 84%  86% 82%   87% 82%  
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
About three fourth of the children (78 percent) had diarrhea, fever, cough/cold and/or 
shortness of breath in the two weeks preceding the survey. Of those children four percent 
were not brought to a health centre despite being sick. The proportion of children not brought 
to a health centre despite illness is significantly higher among malnourished children (seven 
versus one percent; p<0.05). The immunization rates were adjusted for age according to the 
MOH/UNEPI National immunization Schedule (MOH, 2003). In total 81 percent of the 
children were fully immunized with BCG, polio, DPT and Measles (>9 months) and received 
vitamin A supplementation. Full immunization was significantly associated with adequate 
child nutritional status (p<0.10). Some 83 percent of the well-nourished children were living in 
households with full immunized children while this was the case for only 71 percent of the 
malnourished children. Almost all mothers (99 percent) used antenatal care during their last 
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pregnancy. Some 90 percent did ever receive information about the nutrition requirements of 
children either through health workers (87 percent20) or through radio or print media (seven 
percent20). Environmental hygiene was measured through the cleanliness of the compound, 
the use of safe water and the ownership of a pit latrine. About 72 percent of the households 
had a clean or very clean compound. This rate was significantly lower among malnourished 
children (p<0.05). Some 62 percent of the malnourished children lived in a clean or very 
clean compound compared to 76 percent among well-nourished children. Most of the 
households got drinking water from a safe source (borehole). Only four percent got it from 
rivers. The proportion of households drinking unsafe water was significantly lower among 
households benefiting from microfinance (p<0.05; one versus nine percent). Some 84 
percent of the households owned a pit latrine. The rest was either sharing a pit latrine with 
other households (14 percent20) or had no toilet (one percent20). 
A health index was constructed which encompasses the preventive, curative and 
environmental dimensions of health care. Accordingly, 45 percent of the households had 
ideal health care practices. Ideal health care practices were significantly correlated with both 
microfinance and nutritional status. In fact, 53 percent of the households in the microfinance 
intervention had ideal health care practices while this was the case for only 34 percent of the 
households in the control group (p<0.05). Some 53 percent of the well-nourished children 
were living in households with ideal health care while this proportion was only 24 percent 
among malnourished children (p<0.01). Middle health care practices were present in 48 
percent of the households. They were significantly more frequent in the microfinance 
intervention group and in the group of well-nourished children (p<0.01 respectively). Ranging 
from minus one to plus one, the health index had a mean value of 0.34, meaning that 
households had globally a tendency to middle health care practices. The mean health index 
was significantly and positively associated with microfinance and good child nutritional 
status. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 according to own additional calculations 
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Microfinance Direct Effect on Household Health Care: First Stage Multivariate Analysis 
Microfinance direct effect on household health care was tested through a linear regression of 
the health care index that controlled for respondent, household and children inherent factors 
as well as for potential mediators at immediate and intermediate levels (regression 2.7 in 
table 4.4.12).  
 
 
Tab. 4.4-12 Microfinance effect on household health care at intermediate level: linear 
regression estimates 
*p<0.10;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
The regression analysis shows a positive but not significant effect of microfinance on 
household health care (p>0.10). Significant and ameliorative predictors of health care include 
household size and individual income (p<0.01, respectively).  
   Outcome Variable  M6  Health Care Index 
 
 Predictors  (2.7)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a16  0.113 0.089 [-0.062  - 0.289] 0.205  0.092 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors      
 Madi-Okollo Settlement   0.162 0.190 [-0.062   - 0.289] 0.205  0.092 
 Imvepi Settlement   0.336 0.095 [ 0.148   - 0.524] 0.001***  0.244 
 Household Size   0.053 0.018 [ 0.019   - 0.088] 0.003***  0.221 
 Household Education  -0.015 0.016 [-0046   - 0.016] 0.354 -0.070 
 Shock  -0.034 0.098 [-0.227   - 0.159] 0.728 -0.025 
 Female Respondent   0.077 0.090 [-0.100   - 0.253] 0.392  0.063 
 Child Age  -0.001 0.003 [-0.006   - 0.004] 0.585 -0.038 
 Child Sex   0.071 0.082 [-0.091   -   0.233] 0.388  0.059 
 Level 1: Distal Factors        
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush   0.000 0.000 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.004***  0.211 
M2 Social Power   -0.202 0.283 [-0.761  - 0.357] 0.477 -0.056 
 Level 2: Intermediate Factor      
M3 Household Wealth   0.015 0.065 [-0.113   - 0.142] 0.820  0.018 
 Constant   0.007 0.258 [-0.501   - 0.516] 0.977  
 R2 M6,XM1M2M3=0.161      0.001***   N=205    
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Microfinance predicted effect on household health care is illustrated in figure 4.4.3. The 
regression line suggests higher predicted health care scores among those households 
benefiting from microfinance intervention compared to the control group. The difference has 
yet not proved statistically noteworthy.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4-3 Microfinance effect on household health care (N=205 children) 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance indirect Effect on Household Health Care through Household Wealth 
Mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household care through household wealth is 
based on estimates from regression 1.4 and 2.7 (tables 4.3.2 and 4.4.12). They show that 
microfinance effect on household health care might not be mediated through household 
economic wealth. Though microfinance is a significant ameliorative predictor of wealth 
(unstandardised effect a13=0.280; p<0.01), the ameliorative effect of wealth on health care 
appears to be non significant (unstandardised effect=0.015; p>0.10). Bootstrap tests show a 
positive but not significant indirect microfinance effect on household heath care through 
household wealth (unstandardised indirect effect =0.004; 90%BootCI: -0.029, 0.039).  
Microfinance’s direct path to household health care is not significant either (direct 
effecta16=0.113; p>0.10). 
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Tab. 4.4-13 Microfinance effect on household health care at distal level: linear regression 
estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Microfinance Indirect Effect on Household Health Care through Individual Income and Social 
Power 
Similarly, estimates from regression 1.7 in table 4.4.13 and regressions 0.2 and 0.3 in tables 
4.2.2 and 4.2.4 do not confirm the hypotheses that microfinance effect on household health 
care might be mediated through either respondents’ income or social power at distal level. 
Microfinance’s mediated effect is positive through individual income and negative through 
social power. The bootstrap tests indicate non-significant indirect effects (90%BootCI: minus 
0.034 to 0.041 for income and minus 0.020 to 0.006 for social power). Both proximal factors 
are not influenced by microfinance. Individual income affects household health care 
significantly and positively (p<0.01). The influence of social power on health care is negative 
and statistically not important (p>0.10).  
   Outcome Variable  M5  
Health care Index 
 
 Predictors  (1.7)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months   0.117 0.087 [-0.054   - 0.289] 0.179  0.096 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors     
 Madi-Okollo Settlement   0.170 0.186 [-0.197   - 0.537] 0.362  0.067 
 Imvepi Settlement   0.340 0.094 [ 0.155   - 0.525] 0.000***  0.247 
 Household Size   0.053 0.017 [ 0.019   -   0.087] 0.003***  0.220 
 Household Education  -0.014 0.015 [-0.045   - 0.016] 0.366 -0.067 
 Shock  -0.033 0.097 [-0.225 - 0.159] 0.735 -0.024 
 Female Respondent   0.074 0.088 [-0.101   - 0.248] 0.404  0.060 
 Child Age  -0.001 0.002 [-0.006   - 0.004] 0.599 -0.036 
 Child Sex   0.073 0.081 [-0.087   - 0.233] 0.371  0.061 
 Level 1: Distal Factors      
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush   0.000 0.000 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.003***  0.214 
M2 Social Power   -0.188 0.277 [-0.734   - 0.357] 0.496 -0.052 
 Constant  -0.008 0.249 [-0.498   - 0.483] 0.975  
 R2 M5,XM1M2=0.160      0.000   N=205    
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Tab. 4.4-14 Microfinance total effect on household health care: linear regression estimates 
 
Summary 
Estimates from the mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household health care are 
recapitulated in table 4.4.15. 
Tab. 4.4-15 Mediation of microfinance main effect on household health care 
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant; ; a: 90%BootCI also includes zero (-0.029, 0.039 for 
household wealth, -0.034, 0.041 for individual income, -0.020, 0.006 for social power, -0.035, 0.040 for both distal 
mediators); b: Completely Standardised Indirect Effect 
 
   Outcome Variable  M5  
Health care Index 
 
 Predictors  (0.7)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months   0.121 0.088 [-0.054   - 0.295] 0.173  0.098 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors     
 Madi-Okollo Settlement   0.148 0.188 [-0.224   - 0.520] 0.433  0.058 
 Imvepi Settlement   0.340 0.096 [ 0.151   - 0.529] 0.000***  0.247 
 Household Size   0.050 0.018 [ 0.015   - 0.084] 0.005***  0.206 
 Household Education  -0.010 0.015 [-0.040   - 0.020] 0.504 -0.049 
 Shock  -0.037 0.097 [-0.228  - 0.155] 0.707 -0.027 
 Female Respondent   0.011 0.085 [-0.157   - 0.178] 0.900  0.009 
 Child Age  -0.001 0.003 [-0.006   - 0.004] 0.560 -0.040 
 Child Sex   0.079 0.082 [-0.083   -   0.241] 0.338  0.066 
 Constant  -0.027 0.203 [-0.427   - 0.373] 0.894  
 R2 M5,X=0.121       0.002***   N=205    
95% Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised 
estimate 
INTERMEDIATE MODEL       
Wealth M3        First Stage X→M3 (a13) 0.280 0.097 0.004*** [ 0.119    -  0.441]  0.190  Second Stage M3→M6 (b13) 0.015 0.065 0.820 [-0.092   -  0.121]  0.018  Direct Effect X→ M6 (a16) 0.113 0.089 0.205 [-0.062  -  0.289]  0.092  Indirect Effect X→M3→M6 0.004 0.021 - [-0.034  -  0.050]a   0.003b  Total intermediate Effect X→ M6 0.117 0.087 0.179 [-0.054  -  0.289]  0.096 
 Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.035 2.325 - [-0.410  -  5.697] - 
DISTAL MODEL      
Individual Income M1       First Stage X→M1 (a11) 2040.365 7344.265 0.781 [-12444  - 16524]  0.020  Second Stage M1→M6 0.000 0.000 0.003*** [ 0.000   -  0.000]  0.214  Indirect Effect X→M1→M6 0.005 0.023 - [-0.043   -  0.050]a   0.004b  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.044 5.807 - [-1.299   -  1.757] - 
Social Power M2       First Stage X→M2 (a12) 0.009 0.023 0.701 [-0.036  -  0.054]  0.026  Second Stage M2→M6 -0.188 0.277 0.496 [-0734   -  0.357] -0.052  Indirect Effect X→M2→M6 -0.002 0.008 - [-0.027  -  0.010]a  -0.001b  Ratio indirect/Total Effect -0.014 2.247 - [-3.393  -  0.123] - 
 All Distal Mediators      
 Direct Effect X→ M6 0.117 0.087 0.179 [-0.054   -  0.289]  0.096  Indirect Effect  X→M1,M2→M6 0.004 0.023 - [-0.045  -  0.048]a   0.003b  Total distal Effect  X→ M6 0.121 0.088 0.173 [-0.054   -  0.295]  0.098  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.030 7.001 - [-1.452  -  1.833] - 
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The mediation analysis of microfinance effect on household health care showed that: 
- Microfinance total effect on household health care is not significant (p>0.10 in table 
4.4.14) 
- Microfinance’s effect on household health care is neither mediated through household 
wealth nor through individual income nor social power (90%BootCI: -0.029, 0.039 for 
household wealth; -0.034, 0.041 for income and -0.020, 0.006 for social power, 
respectively). 
- Microfinance direct effect  on household health care is not significant (p>0.10) 
- The effect of individual income on household care is highly significant, ameliorative 
and small (unstandardised effect=0.0001; 95%CI: 0.00001, 0.00001; p=0.003; 
standardised effect=0.214).  
 
These results are illustrated on the following diagram (result 4.3). The dashed lines show that 
microfinance effect on household health care is neither mediated through household wealth 
nor through individual income nor through social power. The solid lines illustrate a significant 
ameliorative effect of microfinance on household wealth and of individual income on 
household health care.  
 
 
Result 4.34-7: Mediation of microfinance effect on household health care 
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4.4.4 Simple Mediation Analysis at a Proximal Level 
The estimates of the linear regression of the child-height-for-age z-score on microfinance, 
inherent factors and all potential mediators are given in table 4.4.16. This regression as well 
as regressions 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 of respectively household diet (table 4.4.2), child feeding 
(table 4.4.7) and household care (table 4.4.12) are used to analyse the mediation of 
microfinance effect on child nutritional status at proximal level. 
 
Tab. 4.4-16 Microfinance effect on height-for-age at proximal level: linear regression 
estimates 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
Effect of Household Nutrition on Child Nutritional Status: Second Stage Multivariate Analysis 
The main effect of household nutrition security on child nutritional status can be derived from 
the linear regression 3.1 of the child height-for-age z score along all potential predictors 
(table 4.4.16). It equals the coefficient b1j which is positive for household health care but 
negative for child feeding practices and household diet (b16= 0.483, b15=-0.048 and b14=-
0.188, respectively). Only the ameliorative effect of household health care appears to be 
significant (p<0.05).  
   Outcome Variable  Y 
Child Height-for-Age z-score 
 
 Predictors  (3.1)  
   Coeff. B SE 95%CI p Coef.  β 
 Microfinance Intervention       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months c’1  0.370 0.253 [-0.129   - 0.868] 0.145  0.112 
 Level 0: Inherent Factors      
 Madi-Okollo Settlement  -0.488 0.546 [-1.564   - 0.588] 0.372  -0.071 
 Imvepi Settlement   -0.069 0.278 [-0.618   - 0.481] 0.806  -0.018 
 Household Size   0.009 0.052 [-0.093   - 0.111] 0.866  0.013 
 Household Education   0.113 0.044 [ 0.026   - 0.201] 0.011**  0.202 
 Shock  -0.578 0.290 [-1.150   - -0.005] 0.048** -0.158 
 Female Respondent   0.095 0.259 [-0.415   - 0.605] 0.713  0.029 
 Child Age   0.001 0.007 [-0.012   - 0.015] 0.845  0.014 
 Child Sex   0.257 0.227 [-0.191 0.705) 0.259  0.080 
 Level 1: Distal Factors        
M1 Monthly Profits in Ush   0.000 0.000 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.417 -0.062 M2 Social Power   -0.745 0.785 [-2.293   - 0.803] 0.343 -0.077  Level 2: Intermediate Factors        
M3 Household Wealth   0.328 0.187 [-0.041   - 0.697] 0.081*  0.146 
 Level 3: Proximal Mediators       
M4 Household Diet b14 -0.188 0.179 [-0.542   - 0.166] 0.297 -0.086 
M5 Child Feeding Practices b15 -0.048 0.256 [-0.553   - 0.456] 0.850 -0.015 
M6 Household Health Care b16  0.483 0.200 [ 0.087   - 0.878] 0.017**  0.179  Constant  -1.771 0.724 [-3.200   - -0.342) 0.015**  
 R2 Y,XM1M2M3M4M5M6= 0.137      0.017**   N=205    
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Indirect Effect of Microfinance on Nutritional Status at a Proximal Level 
The indirect effect of microfinance on child height-for-age through a mediator Mj equals a1jb1j. 
It has the value minus 0.046 for household diet, 0.030 for child feeding practices and 0.055 
for household health care (table 4.4.17). The mediated effect through household diet is thus 
negative while it is positive for child feeding practices and household health care. These 
effects are yet statistically not significant according to bootstrap tests (90%BootCI: minus 
0.163 to 0.012 for household diet; minus 0.041 to 0.078 for child feeding practices and minus 
0.008 to 0.155 for household health care, respectively). The regression analysis does not 
confirm that microfinance effect on child nutritional status is mediated by factors at a proximal 
level. 
 
Tab. 4.4-17 Mediation of microfinance effect on height-for-age at proximal level 
*lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant; b: 90%BootCI also includes zero (-0.163, 0.012 for 
household diet, -0.041, 0.078 for child feeding practices, -0.08, 0.155 for household health care, -0.122, 0.153 for 
all proximal mediators); c: Completely Standardised  Indirect Effect 
  
Summary 
The second stage mediation analysis of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at a 
proximal level shows that: 
- Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is neither significantly mediated through 
household diet, nor through child feeding practices nor through health care 
(90%BootCI: [-0.163, 0.012], [-0.041, 0.078] and [-0.008, 0.155], respectively).  
95%  Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised
 Estimate 
PROXIMAL MODEL       
Household Diet M4        First Stage X→M4 (a14) 0.244 0.100 0.016** [ 0.046     -  0.442]  0.162  Second Stage M4→Y (b14) -0.188 0.179 0.297 [-0.542     -  0.166] -0.086  Indirect Effect X→M4→Y ( a14b14) -0.046 0.051 - [-0.191    -  0.025]b  -0.013c  Ratio indirect/Total Effect -0.119 12.345 - [-2.673 -  0.356] - 
Child Feeding Practices M5       First Stage X→M5 (a15) 0.137 0.070 0.052* [-0.275  -  0.001] -0.136  Second Stage M5→Y (b15) -0.048 0.256 0.850 [-0.553     -  0.456] -0.015  Indirect Effect X→M5→Y (a15b15) 0.007 0.038 - [-0.058   -  0.101]b   0.002c  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.017 4.954 - [-0.353 -  1.247] - 
Household Health Care M6       First Stage X→M6 (a16) 0.113 0.089 0.205 [-0.062  -  0.289]  0.092  Second Stage M6→Y (b16) 0.483 0.200 0.017** [ 0.087     -  0.878]   0.179 
 Indirect Effect X→M6→Y (a16b16) 0.055 0.053 - [-0.017  -  0.218]b   0.016c  Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.142 10.041 - [-0.102  -  4.367] - 
 All Proximal Mediators      
 Direct Effect X→ Y ( c’1) 0.370 0.253 0.145 [-0.129   -  0.868]  0.112  Indirect Effect  X→M4,M5,M6→Y 0.015 0.085 - [-0.141  -  0.216]b   0.004c  Total proximal Effect  X→ Y 0.385 0.247 0.121 [-0.102   -  0.873]  0.117 
 Ratio indirect/Total Effect 0.040 16.100 - [-1.012  -  2.349] - 
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- At proximal level, microfinance direct effect on child nutritional status is not significant 
(p>0.10).  
- The effect of household diet on child nutritional status is not significant (p>0.10). 
- The effect of child feeding practices on child nutritional status is not significant 
(p>0.10). 
-  The effect of household health care on child nutritional status is moderately 
significant, ameliorative and small (unstandardised effect= 0.483; 95%CI: 0.087, 
0.878; p=0.017; standardised effect=0.179). 
- Microfinance effect on household diet is moderately significant, ameliorative and 
small (unstandardised effect: 0.244; 95CI: 0.046, 0.442; p=0.016; standardised 
effect= 0.162). 
- Microfinance effect on child feeding practices is lowly significant, deteriorative and 
small (unstandardised effect: 0.137, 95%CI: -0.275, 0.001; p=0.052; standardised 
effect=-0.136). 
- Microfinance effect on household health care is not significant (p>0.10). 
 
 
These results are summarised on the following diagram (result 4.4).  
 
Result 4.44-8: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at proximal level 
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The solid lines suggest that microfinance might significantly improve household diet and 
deteriorate child feeding practices, but at a proximal level child nutritional status is essentialy 
influenced by household health care. The dashed lines indicate that none of the proximal 
factors mediates microfinance effect on child nutritional status. There is no effect of 
microfinance on health care and no effect of household diet or child feeding practices on 
child nutritional status.  
 
4.4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The results of the mediation analyses are summarised in the following diagram (Result 
4.5). 
Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status could be confirmed only for 
household wealth. Microfinance has a significant ameliorative effect on household wealth 
and household diet and a significant deteriorative effect on child feeding practices. There 
is no effect of microfinance on individual income, social power and household health 
care. Household health care has a significant ameliorative proximal effect on child 
nutritional status while none of the other potential mediators affects child nutritional status 
significantly.   
 
Result 4.54-9: Mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at distal, 
intermediate & proximal levels 
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4.5 GENDER MODERATION OF MICROFINANCE EFFECT ON CHILD NUTRITIONAL STATUS 
 
This chapter aims at testing if there are some differences in microfinance effect on child 
nutritional status between men and women. In a first section, the moderating effect of gender 
is tested for the total effect of microfinance effect on child nutritional status. In order to better 
understand gender moderation of microfinance on child nutritional status, the moderation of 
the mediational processes has also been tested at each level. The second section tests 
gender moderation of microfinance effect on each of the potential mediators: individual 
income, individual social power, household wealth, household diet, child care and household 
health care. This analysis is called “first stage moderation analysis”. In a third section, gender 
moderation of the mediation of microfinance effect on child nutritional status is analyzed. 
Gender moderation is tested by adding an interaction term (Gender x Microfinance) in the 
different regressions run in former sections for testing main effects. The new regressions 
estimated for the moderation analysis are given in tables A2.3 and A2.4 presented in Annex 
A2. 
 
4.5.1 Total Effect Moderation Analysis 
 
Model 56: Gender moderation of microfinance total effect on child nutritional status 
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This section tests the moderating effect of gender on microfinance effect on child nutritional 
status. The main hypothesis being tested is: 
H5: Microfinance’s positive effect on child nutritional status is stronger when the microfinance 
participant is female. 
Differences across gender in microfinance total effect on child nutritional status were tested 
through a linear regression of the height-for-age z-score that controls for gender interaction 
and potential inherent covariates. The regression results are given in table A.2.4 in annex A2 
(regression 0.8) and summarised in table 4.5.1.  
 
Tab. 4.5-1 Gender Moderation of microfinance total effect on nutritional status 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
The regression shows that microfinance total effect on child nutritional status is positive but 
non significant among men as well as among women (p>0.010, respectively). There is a 
higher total microfinance effect among men. But the difference between both groups is not 
significant as demonstrated by a p value of the gender and microfinance interaction term 
being higher than 0.10 (p=0.612). These results are illustrated in figure 4.5.1. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5-1 Microfinance total effect on nutritional status by gender (N=205 children) 
 
95%  Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised 
Estimate 
TOTAL CONDITIONALEFFECT  X→Y      
 Men 0.612 0.391 0.119 -0.159 1.384 0.185 
 Women 0.363 0.304 0.233 -0.236 0.962 0.110 
 Differences  -0.249 0.490 0.612 -1.215 0.718 -0.076 
men 
women 
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4.5.2 First Stage Moderation Analysis 
Gender differences in microfinance effect on each of the potential mediators were tested 
through a linear regression controlling for gender interaction and potential inherent 
covariates. The results are given in table A2.3 in annex A2: regression 0.9 for individual 
income, 0.10 for individual power, 1.11 for household wealth, 2.12 for household diet, 2.13 
for child feeding practices and 2.14 for household health care. The regression estimates are 
summarised in table 4.5.2.  
 
Tab. 4.5-2 Gender moderation of microfinance effect on potential mediators 
lowly significant;**moderately significant;***highly significant 
 
The analysis of the first stage effect of microfinance on each potential mediator shows that 
among women, microfinance makes a significant difference for only the household wealth 
status which significantly improves (p<0.05), while microfinance is significantly related to 
better household wealth, better household diet and worse child feeding practices among men 
(p<0.10, p<0.01, p<0.05, respectively). Microfinance effect on household wealth is lowly 
significant for men (p<0.10) while it shows a higher significance level for women (p<0.05). 
But in general the observed differences between men and women could not be confirmed 
statistically as the interaction terms were not significant in any of the regressions.
95% First Stage Effect (XMi Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised
Estimate 
DISTAL MODEL       
Individual Income M1        Men -2346.957 11880.053 0.844 [-25777.6  - 21083.7] -0.023 
 Women 4655.007 9222.083 0.614 [-13533.4  - 22843.4] 0.046 
 Differences 7001.964 14884.456 0.639 [-22354.2  - 36358.1] 0.069 
 Social Power M2        Men -0.028 0.037 0.443 [-0.100     -     0.044] -0.083 
 Women 0.031 0.028 0.281 [-0.025     -     0.087] 0.090 
 Differences 0.059 0.046 0.201 [-0.032     -     0.150] 0.174 
INTERMEDIATE MODEL       
Wealth M3        Men 0.295 0.157 0.062* [-0.015     -     0.606] 0.201 
 Women 0.271 0.122 0.028** [0.029      -     0.512] 0.184 
 Differences -0.025 0.198 0.901 [-0.415     -     0.365] -0.017 
PROXIMAL MODEL       
 Household Diet M4        Men 0.426 0.160 0.008*** [0.110      -     0.741] 0.282 
 Women 0.136 0.125 0.279 [-0.111     -     0.382] 0.090 
 Differences -0.290 0.199 0.147 [-0.683     -     0.103] -0.193 
 Child Feeding Practices M5        Men -0.272 0.111 0.015** [-0.491    -    -0.052] -0.270 
  Women -0.056 0.087 0.516 [-0.228    -     0.115] -0.056 
  Differences 0.215 0.138 0.122 [-0.058    -     0.488] 0.215 
 Household Health Care M6        Men 0.102 0.142 0.474 [-0.179    -    0.383] 0.083 
  Women 0.120 0.111 0.283 [-0.100    -      0.339] 0.097 
  Differences 0.017 0.177 0.922 [-0.332    -      0.367] 0.014 
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Fig. 4.5-2  Microfinance effect on the potential mediators by gender 
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The gender conditional effect of microfinance is illustrated for each potential mediator by 
plotting the mean predicted values for the mediators by microfinance and gender holding all 
other covariates at their mean (figure 4.5.2). Even if differences between men and women 
are statistically not significant, it is possible to observe some difference in the size of 
microfinance effect along the gender variable. This is particularly true for household diet and 
child feeding practices. In fact, the slopes illustrate a trivial effect of microfinance on 
household diet among women while this ameliorative effect is stronger among men. 
Regarding child feeding practices, the deteriorative effect of microfinance is particularly 
strong among men compared to women 
 
 
4.5.3 Moderated Mediation Analysis 
Gender moderation of the mediation processes between microfinance and child nutritional 
status have been tested based on the regression estimates in both table A2.3 and A2.4: 
regressions 0.9 and 1.8 for individual income, 0.10 and 1.8 for individual power, 1.11 and 2.8 
for household wealth, 2.12 and 3.8 for household diet, 2.13 and 3.8 for child feeding 
practices and regressions 2.14 and 3.8 for household health care. 
The conditional indirect effect of microfinance on child height-for-age through each of the six 
potential mediators has been tested according to bootstrap tests at distal, intermediate and 
proximal level.  
Moderated Mediation at Distal Level 
The results of the “moderated mediation analysis” at distal level are summarised in table 
4.5.3. 
 
Tab. 4.5-3 Moderated mediation of microfinance effect on nutritional status at distal level 
*effect is lowly significant;**effect is moderately significant;***effect is highly significant 
95%  Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
DIRECT EFFECT  X→Y      
 Men  0.597 0.393 0.131 [-0.178   - 1.373] 
 Women  0.379 0.306 0.216 [-0.224   - 0.983] 
 Differences -0.218 0.494 0.660 [-1.192   0.757] 
INDIRECT EFFECT  X→MI→Y       Individual Income M1       Men  0.000 0.028 - [-0.054  - 0.055] 
 Women  0.000 0.015 - [-0.032  - 0.035) 
 Social Power M2        Men  0.015 0.043 - [-0.033  - 0.167] 
 Women -0.016 0.035 - [-0.145   - 0.021] 
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The bootstrapped tests do not confirm neither individual income nor social power as 
mediators for microfinance effect on nutritional status. This is true among men as well as 
among women. In fact, the bootstrapped confidence intervals include zero at a bias-
corrected level of 90 percent, 95 percent or 99 percent.  
   
Moderated Mediation at Intermediate Level 
The gender-sensitive analysis of the mediation process at intermediate level confirms that 
the household wealth status mediates significantly microfinance effect on nutritional status 
among either women or men. At a bias-corrected level of 90 percent, the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals failed to include zero, which is an indication of a moderately significant 
effect. The interval varies from 0.000 to 0.243 for men and from 0.012 to 0.217 for women21 
(table 4.5.4). This indirect effect though household wealth is similar between men and 
women (0.080 versus 0.073). The p value of the interaction term confirms no difference in 
the mediation process between men and women regarding household wealth (p=0.669). The 
direct effect of microfinance is not significant in each gender population at intermediate level 
(p=0.192 for men and 0.322 for women). 
 
Tab. 4.5-4 Moderated mediation of microfinance effect on nutritional status at intermediate 
level 
*effect is lowly significant;**effect is moderately significant;***effect is highly significant 
 
   
Moderated Mediation at Proximal Level 
The analysis of moderated mediation at proximal level indicates that none of the proximal 
factors mediates microfinance effect on nutritional status among either men or women. The 
bootstrapped confidence intervals displayed at a 95 percent level in table 4.5.5 include zero 
for each potential mediator. The intervals also incule zero at a bias-corrected level of 90 
                                                
21 At a 95% level of confidence, BootCI varies from -0.033 to 0.461 for men and from -0.012 to 0.431 for women 
95%  Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
Standardised
 Estimate 
DIRECT EFFECT  X→Y       
 Men 0.518 0.396 0.192 [-0.263   - 1.298] 0.156 
 Women 0.306 0.309 0.322 [-0.303   - 0.915] 0.093 
 Differences (c3') -0.211 0.493 0.669 [-1.183   - 0.760] -0.064 INDIRECT EFFECT  X→MI→Y       Household Wealth M3         Men 0.080 0.070 - [0.000   - 0.243]*  
  Women 0.073 0.057 - [0.012   - 0.217]*  
 124
percent or 99 percent expressing statistically non significant indirect effects. The direct 
microfinance effect on child nutritional status remains non significant for men or women 
(p=0.183 and p=0.375 respectively) and this direct effect is similar in both groups (p of the 
interaction term equals 0.584). 
 
 
Tab. 4.5-5 Moderated mediation of microfinance effect on nutritional status at proximal 
level 
*effect is lowly significant;**effect is moderately significant;***effect is highly significant 
 
 
 
4.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
The simple gender moderation analysis shows that: 
- Microfinance total effect on child nutritional status is positive but non-significant for 
men as well as for women (p>0.10, respectively). The gender difference is not 
significant (p>0.10). 
The first stage moderation analysis shows that: 
- Microfinance effect on individual income is positive and not significant for neither men 
nor women (p>0.10); 
- Microfinance effect on social power is not significant for neither men nor women 
(p>0.10). The tendency is yet negative for men and positive for women. 
- Microfinance effect on household wealth is positive and significant for both men and 
women. The significance level is yet higher for women (p<0.05 and p<0.10, 
respectively); 
 Estimate SE p Lower CI Upper CI Standardised Estimate 
DIRECT EFFECT  X→Y       
 Men 0.545 0.408 0.183 [-0.259     - 1.349]  0.165 
 Women 0.274 0.308 0.375 [-0.334     - 0.881]  0.083 
 Differences -0.271 0.495 0.584 [-1.248 0.705] -0.082 
INDIRECT EFFECT  X→MI→Y       
Household Diet M4        Men -0.085 0.088 - [-0.337     - 0.043] - 
 Women -0.027 0.044 - [-0.175     - 0.019] - 
Child Feeding Practices M5        Men 0.008 0.073 - [-0.153     - 0.157] - 
 Women 0.002 0.027 - [-0.035     - 0.085] - 
Household Health Care M6        Men 0.050 0.073 - [-0.075     - 0.241] - 
 Women 0.058 0.062 - [-0.037     - 0.225] - 
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- Microfinance effect on household diet is positive for both men and women, but it is 
only significant for men (p<0.01 and p>0.10, respectively). 
- Microfinance effect on children feeding practices is significant and negative for men 
while it is non-significant and negative for women (p<0.05 and p>0.10, respectively). 
- Microfinance effect on household health care is non significant and positive for both 
men and women (p>0.10). 
The moderated mediation analysis shows that: 
- Microfinance mediation through individual income is not significant and positive for 
both men and women (90%BootCI includes zero); 
- Microfinance mediation through social power is not significant for both men and 
women (90%BootCI includes zero). Yet the tendency is positive for men and negative 
for women. 
- Microfinance mediation through household wealth is positive and significant for both 
men and women (90%BootCI does not include zero for both women and men). 
- Microfinance mediation through household diet is non significant and negative for 
both men and women (90%BootCI includes zero). 
- Microfinance mediation through child feeding practices is non significant and positive 
for both men and women (90%BootCI includes zero). 
- Microfinance mediation through household health care is non significant and positive 
for both men and women (90%BootCI includes zero). 
The differences between men and women were statistically not significant for all tests 
(p>0.10). 
 
 
 126
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
5.1.1 Definition of Child Nutritional Standards 
A fundamental goal of this work is to assess the factors determining child nutritional status 
and to test if microfinance is an effective household’s mechanism for achieving optimal 
nutritional status. An important initial step was to diagnose if there was a nutritional problem 
at child level and based on the comparison between households with or without nutritional 
problems to check if microcredits represented effective strategical options. The diagnosis 
was established by contrasting the height of the sampled children to international standard 
heights of children from the same age and sex group (WHO, 2006). When a child was 
deviating more than two units negatively from the normal z-score, he was considered as 
malnourished and his family as confronted with pediatric malnutrition. Such a definition of 
nutritional standards raises several issues. They relate mainly to 1) the use of height-for-age 
rather than micronutrient status or other indicators of macronutrient deficiencies, 2) the use 
of international standards rather than standards defined at local level or from the households 
themselves.  
Low height-for-age has been applied as an indicator of malnutrition, although it does not 
represent the most important nutritional problem in the region. The analysis of the nutritional 
public health problems in West Nile suggests that micronutrient deficiencies might represent 
more severe problems in the study population (figure 3.1.5). There is thus a high probability 
that a big number of children classified as well-nourished according to their height-for-age 
status had in reality anemia or other micronutrient deficiencies. Yet the use of an indicator of 
macronutrient deficiency was justified by the practicability of anthropometric assessment and 
the time and financial constraints of the survey. Diagnoses of micronutrient deficiencies often 
require laboratory analyses which are more difficult to put in place in terms of logistics and of 
financial, physical or human resources. Micronutrient assessments at community level are 
therefore less frequent than anthropometric surveys. 
In a previous analysis, an attempt has been made to analyze the role of microfinance for 
each of the three anthropometric indicators: height-for-age, weight-for-age and weight-for-
height. This has added to the complexity of the analysis. For the sake of clarity, the decision 
was made to focus on only one indicator. Height-for-age has been preferred over other 
indicators of macronutrient deficiencies. The reasons are that: 1) it is an indicator of long-
term deficiency which captures better nutritional outcomes of socio-economic factors, 2)  it 
represents a more severe problem in the study region, 3) it represents a critical problem in 
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the sample while this is not the case for weight-for-height and weight-for-age and 3) the width 
of the 95% confidence interval is within 30 percent of the estimated prevalence of stunting 
and underweight but not for wasting, indicating a survey sufficiently precise and a sample 
size sufficiently large for the first two measures of malnutrition (PRUDHON & SPIEGE, 2007).  
The WHO standards have been used as reference for establishing malnutrition. They 
describe the optimal growth of children under five years and certainly represent the best and 
most robust tool for assessing children malnutrition everywhere (WHO, 2006). Yet, when the 
aim of a survey is not just to depict the nutritional situation but to discover which strategical 
options work in a specific context, it might be important to also assess deviance from local 
standards. In this case, positive deviants are children who deviate positively from the ‘norm’ 
for that population and not just those who deviate positively from ‘optimal’ growth. This 
difference in definition is important as the set of determinants for optimal growth might be 
different from the set of determinants for positive deviance (SHEKAR, HABICHT, & LATHAM, 
1992). The concept of positive deviance is increasingly applied for discovering effective 
nutritional strategies in impoverished environments and for designing and improving 
programs accordingly (ZEITLIN, GHASSEMI, & MANSOUR, 1990). It would have been interesting 
to test not only the ameliorative effect of microfinance on the nutritional status of the sample 
children but also to inquire if it acts as a protective factor from negative deviance.  
Children’s nutritional standards have been defined according to international conventions but 
do these externally defined standards correspond to the particular standards of the families? 
This question is important because standards give an orientation for action. And if a mother 
has the impression that her child is well-nourished although he is not according to external 
standards, she might not have an improvement of the child’s nutritional status as her goal. 
One assumption of this study is that families want to achieve better child nutritional status. 
But is it true? And what do they mean by ‘’better’? It might have been useful to inquire the 
household attitudes towards child nutritional status and standards. As studies show that 
mothers can have an accurate perception of the nutritional status of their children (LAZZERI ET 
AL., 2006; MONETTE, SÉGUIN, GAUVIN, & NIKIÉMA, 2007), such qualitative insights could have 
ideally complemented the quantitative survey. It was the case for a microfinance survey in 
Mali (DE GROOTE ET AL., 1996). One could also imagine to control for such motivational 
factors in a regression or to test for their moderating effect by achieving optimal nutritional 
status. 
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5.1.2 Quantitative, Crosssectional & Quasi-experimental Design 
The study is characterized by its quantitative, cross-sectional and quasi-experimental nature. 
These features can be seen as limiting in comparison to qualitative designs better adapted 
for capturing social mechanisms, to randomized designs eliminating selectivity bias and to 
longitudinal studies better suited to follow long-term impacts. Nevertheless there was an 
attempt to overcome these limits.  
One major quantitative method versus mixed methods 
In this thesis, only one method – a quantitative household survey - was applied to answer the 
research question. Yet increasingly authors argue for a mix of methods because it provides 
more perspectives on the phenomena being studied (EASTERBY-SMITH, 1991: 31 as cited in 
PERRY 2011; GABLE, 1994). Others remind that within the time and other resource constraints 
of most theses, it might be advisable to consider only one major method which suits the 
research problem and associated research gaps (PERRY, 2011). In our case, although initially 
planned and although important time resources had been invested in the development of 
qualitative survey instruments, personal constraints did not allow going back to the survey 
region and undertaking a qualitative survey with a couple of households. Such in-depth 
interviews might have given more insights into the mechanisms involved in the 
‘transformation’ of microfinance into better child nutritional status. They would have ideally 
complemented the quantitative structured interviews which can provide only limited answers 
when it comes to better understand complex mechanisms. In an attempt to compensate for 
this lack, open-ended questions and questions on the subjective improvement felt by the 
respondents in different household domains have been incorporated in the questionnaire 
(Annex A1). Indices have been constructed wich integrate several dimensions of the 
observed phenomena (cumulative social power, child feeding, diet, health care indices). The 
author also ran several complementary surveys based on secondary data from the literature, 
from microfinance institutions and from formative/evaluation studies undertaken for the GTZ 
food and nutrition security project in Arua. Theses studies have been partly analyzed and 
summarised in different reports. They represent an interesting field for further research on 
the subject22.  
                                                
22 YEO, A.E. (2005). Formative research: Health workers semi-structured interview on Nutrition knowledge and 
practices In refugee-hosting sub-counties of Arua, Uganda (Unpublished report) ; YEO, A.E. (2005). Formative 
research: focus group discussions on nutritional and child care practices in refugee-hosting sub-counties of Arua, 
Uganda (Unpublishd report) ;  Yeo A.E. 2005. Formative research: Positive deviance inquiry on nutritional and 
child care practices in refugee-hosting sub-counties of Arua, Uganda (Unpublished  report).  
 129
Cross-sectional versus longitudinal design 
Longitudinal studies survey the same individuals in several rounds and over a long period 
(two to three years in general). They are ideal to capture long-term impacts through a 
before/after comparison of the household situation in different domains. Yet, they present the 
disadvantages of being highly demanding in terms of budget, statistical expertise and time 
(HULME, 2000). The present study had a single cross-sectional design, meaning that the 
respondents were interviewed only once. It had the advantage of fitting into the financial and 
time constraints put on this study. It also suits the explorative purpose of the study which 
aimed at detecting interesting significant associations that could serve as more specific 
hypotheses for future longitudinal investigations. Nevertheless, the option of going back in 
the study region and of interviewing the same households in a second round had been 
analyzed. This option was judged difficult to implement. In fact, the signing of a peace 
agreement in Sudan in 2005 led to an acceleration of repatriation processes in the West Nile 
region. It was thus unlikely to find the same househods in a follow-up study. For measuring 
impact, a with/without design was rather adopted which assigned the households to either a 
microfinance intervention or a control group. 
Quasi-experimental versus randomised design 
Randomised trials consist of a random selection of respondents and in their subsequent 
random assignment to comparison groups. They are considered the most rigorous method 
for impact evaluation because any difference between the comparison groups can be 
confidently attributed to the impact (BAUCHET, MARSHALL, STARITA, THOMAS, & YALOURIS, 
2011). In contrast, quasi-experimental surveys select the respondents on the basis of their 
participation in microfinance institutions. The quasi-experimental design is applied because a 
random selection requires a very large sample in order to get a representative sub-sample of 
participants. Yet quasi-experimental surveys are more likely to generate selection bias. In 
fact, they compare microfinance participants to non-participants who are two types of 
people. Those who choose to participate likely have more entrepreneurial spirit, more 
tolerance for risk and other characteristics. Their success might not only be the result of 
microfinance. In order to correct for selectivity bias, the study rather compares established to 
incoming clients, who are supposed to differ from the former only by not having received a 
credit for longer than six months. Yet, one might argue that there might also be some 
reasons, why one takes a credit at certain points in life or not (KARLAN, 2001). 
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5.1.3 Sampling & Representativeness 
The study is based on data collected in a specific geographical and insititutional context. The 
refugee settlements of Arua district in Uganda have been selected as study area. Within 
these settlements, only communities were the DED loan program was operating have been 
visited. The DED members were over-sampled and over-sampling bias are not corrected for 
in the statistical analysis. Thus, the descriptive statistics obtained in the survey are not 
representative of the general population of the refugee settlements, but of a sub-population 
with a high proportion of participants in the DED loan program. The overall descriptives 
should therefore be interpreted with caution.  
Furthermore, the survey focused on one type of institution only: a semi-formal loan program. 
The statements gathered from the analysis are only valid for this particular institution, and not 
for microfinance in the form of informal loans or microcredits from more formal banks.  
The focus on only villages where the DED microfinance institution had clients is also likely to 
have produced selection bias as the control group might be contaminated by contact with the 
treatment group. 
 
5.1.4 Statistical Mediation & Moderation Procedures 
The mediation and moderation procedures and particularly their operationalisation for SPSS 
(HAYES, 2012a) have been very useful for getting insights into the process through which 
microfinance contributes to child nutritional status. Yet they present several limitations, 
namely the requirement of using the same covariates in all equations and the unavailaibility 
of an operationalised model with multiple mediators operating in parallel for some and in 
serial for the others. 
Same covariates in all the equations 
It was technically not possible to specify separate sets of covariates for different 
treatment/mediator/outcome combinations although it is obvious that the different outcome 
variables do not have exactly the same determinants. So we used the same covariates in all 
equations and had for example to specify child sex or age as potential predictors of individual 
income although these inherent factors probably affect the ultimate outcome “child nutritional 
status” without affecting proximal or intermediate factors. This lack of flexibility in the 
specificication of covariates is a limitation of the SPSS Macro "PROCESS". 
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Statistical inference in mediation analysis 
We used bootstrap confidence intervals for making statistical inferences about indirect 
effects in statistical mediation analysis. Other available methods include causal step 
approach (BARON & KENNY, 1986), sobel test, Monte Carlo and distribution of the product. 
Bootstrapping has several advantages. It has superior statistical characteristics and 
performance; it is easy to implement in existing software such as SPSS, and it does not 
assume the normality of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect (HAYES & PREACHER, 
2013].  
Causal inference 
Mediation is a causal phenomenon, yet causability can not be established by a statistical 
model (HAYES & PREACHER, 2013). Statistics only ascertain whether a relation between 
variables is likely to exist, and of what magnitude. The statistical results thus do not prove 
causability but they help in establishing the soundness of the logical arguments described in 
the theoretical framework (Model 0).  
Inherent characteristics have been taken into account in the model. Yet it should be noted 
that an important limitation of this study is that information on participation in other 
microfinance programs and in aid programs is missing in the model. Such factors are also 
likely to affect household processes and child nutritional status.  
 
5.2 CONCLUSIONS ON SPECIFIC RESEARCH ISSUES 
This section discusses the main results and their theoretical implications. The following 
hypotheses have been empirically tested: 
- H1. Microfinance has a positive and significant total effect on child nutritional status. 
- H2: At a distal level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through individual 
socio-economic empowerment.  
- H3: At an intermediate level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through 
higher household economic status. 
- H4: At a proximal level, microfinance influences child nutritional status through better 
household diet, health care and child feeding practices.  
- H5: Microfinance’s positive effect on child nutritional status is stronger when the 
microfinance participant is female. 
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5.2.1 Mediating Role of Individual Socio-economic Empowerment 
Even if the statistical tests globally suggest that individual income and social power are not 
significant mediators of microfinance effect on nutritional status, some relations between 
individual income, household wealth and health care suggest that improvement in individual 
income might be a key strategy for household nutrition security. 
Regarding individual income, the mediation analysis shows that: 
- Microfinance effect on nutritional status is not mediated through individual income. 
- Individual Income has a non-significant effect on child nutritional status. 
- Microfinance effect on individual income is not significant. 
- The effect of individual income on household wealth is significant and ameliorative. 
- Individual income has a significant and positive effect on household health care. 
- Microfinance effect on individual income is not significant for either men or women. 
- Microfinance mediation through individual income is not significant for both men and 
women. 
 
These relations indicate that microfinance affects child nutritional status without increasing 
individual income, which itself makes no difference for child nutritional status, but contributes 
to improve household wealth and household health care. 
Methodological issues 
Although a pre-analysis of extreme values using boxplot diagrams showed coherent data, 
measurement bias cannot be totally excluded when it comes to assess monetary income. 
Recall and response bias are likely to occur. Moreover, levels of profits were assessed for 
one enterprise activity, - the main one – but not for all activities. So profits might represent 
only a part of the total income of the respondent. It has also been suggested that gender, 
age, season and type of activities are important components of income (DE GROOTE, 1997). 
Disagregating the data along these components might have yielded differential effects. In this 
study, it was only done for gender and the gender difference was tested only for microfinance 
effect on individual income, not for paths linking individual income to child nutrition or other 
potential outcomes. The omission of seasonal variations is an important limit as studies 
indicate that income smoothing rather than income levels might matter for microfinance 
effect. Despite these limits, the results reflect a common reality that is worth explaining. 
Microfinance might not improve income  
The classical expectation that microcredits could serve as capital for initiating or expanding a 
business, that would result in more individual income did not hold in our study. There was no 
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relation between mature credits and profit levels. In fact, this hypothesis implies that 
borrowers invest their whole loans in enterprises, an assumption which was not always 
verified in the sample. Some 22 percent of the borrowers used parts of the loans for other 
purposes, mainly food consumption and loan repayment. Using microcredits as consumptive 
rather than productive assets might be an explanation for the lack of evidence of raised 
income through microcredits. But it also points out the fact that the direct use of credits for 
consumption and particularly for consumption smoothing might be a more effective 
household strategy against poverty. The microfinance industry has to be adjusted toward 
supporting such resilience strategies by offering a mix of loans and other services and more 
flexibility to accomodate the use of microfinance for consumption smoothing rather than 
income generation (DUNFORD, 2013). The classical microfinance theory also implies that 
micro-entrepreneurs manage the business for major returns. This assumption holds if 
sufficient management skills and capital are available (DUNFORD, 2012). And the generalized 
low overall returns of microenterprises prove that these conditions are often not prevailing. In 
this survey, the program participants showed most dissatisfaction with the loan amount, 
which was judged tiny in comparison of what they demanded for (figure 4.1.2). Microfinance 
providers have to take this into account and adjust the loans to the needs of the 
microentrepreneurs to assure profitability. Some studies support the theory that microcredits 
might not induce the expected income growth. But there was also evidence of improved 
individual incomes as the result of access to credits (DE GROOTE, 1998), suggesting that 
other issues might also matter. 
 
Microfinance might improve income, but rather at household than at individual level 
The results reveal that microcredits might lead to better household wealth without increasing 
income at individual level. The hypothesis that credits would improve incomes at individual 
level implies that borrowers have control over loans. Empirical evidence challenges this 
assumption by showing that individuals and particularly women do not always control their 
loans directly (GOETZ & GUPTA, 1996). A loan might be taken by an indivudual and used by 
other family members, leading to no change in income for that particular individual but an 
overall economic improvement for the family. One other explanation would be that borrowers 
invest their loans in rather collective family enterprises than individual businesses. Such 
cases were encountered in the sample. But they were not frequent. Only four percent of the 
respondents share their business with other family members. The majority (62 percent) owns 
their business alone. The study yet shows that household wealth is partially explained by 
higher individual profits. The relation was positively significant. 
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Household health care might be determined by income at individual level rather than at 
household level 
The mediation analysis suggests a direct link between higher individual income and better 
health care while no similar relation was found for household wealth (result 4.3). The fact that 
individual rather than household resources improve the household health situation suggests 
that intrahousehold allocation might proceed according to the collective rather than the 
unitary model (HAZARIKA & GUHA-KHASNOBIS, 2008). The health care index in this study 
includes positive practices regarding treatment of children in health centres, full immunization 
and antenatal care. Such strategies might require financial resources and it is likely that 
particularly money controlled by the mother would be invested for such goals. This means 
that if the goal is to improve household health security, which is known to directly affect child 
nutritional status, improvement in the individual economic situation of the caregiver might be 
a key strategy. 
Individual social power might improve household wealth 
The statistical analysis demonstrates the following associations:   
- Microfinance effect on nutritional status is not significantly mediated through 
individual social power. 
- Microfinance effect on individual social power is not significant. 
- The total effect of individual social power on child nutritional status is not significant . 
- The effect of individual social power on household wealth is significant and 
ameliorative. 
- Microfinance effect on social power is not significant for both men and women . The 
tendency is yet negative for men and positive for women. Gender differences are 
statistically not significant. 
- Microfinance mediation through social power is not significant for both men and 
women (p>0.10, respectively). Yet the tendency is positive for men and negative for 
women. Gender differences are statistically not significant. 
 
These results denote that microcredits affect child nutritional status without increasing 
individual social power, which itself contributes to an improved household wealth, but makes 
no difference for child nutritional status. 
 
5.2.2 Mediating Role of Household Economic Status  
The mediation analysis at an intermediate level shows that: 
- Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is significantly and positively mediated 
through household wealth. 
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- Household wealth has a non-significant effect on child nutritional status. 
- Microfinance total effect on household wealth is significant and ameliorative. 
- Microfinance direct effect on household wealth is significant and ameliorative. 
- Microfinance direct effect on child nutritional status at an intermediate level is 
significant and ameliorative. 
- Microfinance indirect effect on household wealth through individual income is not 
significant. 
- Microfinance indirect effect on household wealth through individual social power is 
not significant. 
- The effect of individual income on household wealth is significant and ameliorative. 
- The effect of individual social power on household wealth is significant and 
ameliorative. 
- Microfinance effect on household wealth is positive and significant for both men and 
women. The significance level is yet higher for women (p<0.10 and p<0.05, 
respectively); gender differences are statistically not significant. 
- Microfinance mediation through household wealth is positive and significant for both 
men and women.. Gender differences are statistically not significant (p>0.10). 
 
 
This means that microfinance improves the household economic situation and this 
improvement leads to better nutritional status at child level. Economic improvement at 
household level is related to both economic and social empowerment at individual level, 
which are themselves not related to microfinance. Microfinance improves household wealth 
for both men and women. The mediating effet is confirmed for both sexes.  
 
The mediation analysis confirms the expectation that household wealth would act as a 
mediatior between microfinance and child nutritional status. Yet, a deeper investigation using 
moderated mediation procedures indicates that this mediating effect deploys particularly 
among women. 
Microfinance might improve household wealth, particularly for women and even without 
improving female income 
The study could not confirm an improvement in female income as a result of borrowing. Yet, 
it suggests that microcredits in the hands of women could have a different effect on their 
family wealth than credits taken by men. The significance level of microfinance effect on 
household wealth status was higher for women. This suggests gender-sensitive use of 
credits. The data show that a higher proportion of women use part of their loans directly for 
acquiring household goods. Some 26 percent of the female borrowers diverted loans from 
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their initial productive purpose and used it rather for education, food and other household 
related expenditures (figure 4.2.4). This was the case for only 17 percent among men who 
more frequently tend to invest the whole loan in their business. This consumptive use of 
credits might not be an ideal and effective strategy to raise individual profits. But it might be 
effective in improving the whole situation of the family by smoothing consumption (DUNFORD, 
2013).  Data from Brazil support this hypothesis, as unearned income under control of 
mothers had more than 20 times bigger effects on child survival than paternal income 
(THOMAS, 1990).  
 
5.2.3 Mediating Role of Household Nutrition Security 
The second stage mediation analysis of microfinance effect on child nutritional status at 
immediate level shows that microfinance effect on child nutritional status is not significantly 
mediated through proximal factors. 
Microfinance improves household diet  
The process analysis of microfinance effect on child nutritional status through household diet 
indicates that: 
- Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is not significantly mediated through 
household diet. 
- Microfinance total effect on household diet is significantly ameliorative. 
- Household diet has a non-significant effect on child nutritional status . 
- Microfinance effect on household diet is significantly and positively mediated through 
household wealth. 
- Microfinance effect on household diet is neither mediated through individual income 
nor through social power. 
- Household wealth has a significant and ameliorative effect on household diet. 
- Microfinance direct effect on household diet is significant and ameliorative. 
- Microfinance effect on household diet is positive for both men and women, but it is 
only significant for men (p<0.05 and p>0.10, respectively). Gender differences are 
statistically not significant. 
- Microfinance mediation through household diet is non significant for both men and 
women. Gender differences are statistically not significant (p>0.10). 
 
This means that microfinance improves the household diet by improving the household 
economic situation, but an improved diet at household level does not imply a better 
nutritional status for children. Microfinance effect on the household diet is only confirmed for 
men.   
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The relation between microfinance and household diet is obvious. When their economic 
resources increase, households might tend to increase and diversify their meals. Financial 
assets might be used to improve access to food by improving food production or by 
increasing the capacity to buy enough and high-quality food. 
In a refugee context where the strategy is to gradually reduce food aid, this suggests that the 
promotion of loan programs could effectively contribute to increase self-reliance. In fact, a 
study conducted in a drought affected area of Ethiopia shows that female participation in 
microfinance programs results in an improved household diet and a lower likelihood to be 
food aid recipient (DOOCY ET AL., 2005).  A positive effect of microfinance on household diet 
was also found in Bangladesh. Members of the Grameen Bank increased food intake and 
added food of higher quality to the normal family diet (RAHMAN, 1987 as cited in QUANINE, 
1989). In Malawi, female access to credits appears to increase household expenditures on 
food (HAZARIKA & GUHA-KHASNOBIS, 2008).  
Thus, microfinance improves household food security, but this improvement does not explain 
why children from households with mature credits are nutritionally better off than those from 
control households. This is plausible as children do not necessarily share the family diet and 
even in this case, the quantity and the quality they receive might be different. This raises the 
question of child care and of intra-household resources allocation, which represent essential 
predictors of children nutitional status (ENGLE, MENON, & HADDAD, 1999). 
Microfinance might worsen child feeding practices 
Regarding child feeding practices, the mediation and moderation analysis has established 
the following relations: 
- Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is not significantly mediated through 
child feeding practices. 
- Microfinance effect on child feeding practices is positively and significantly mediated 
through household wealth. 
- Child feeding practices have a non significant effect on child nutritional status. 
- Microfinance direct effect on child feeding practices is significant and deteriorative. 
- Microfinance total effect on child feeding practices is not significant. 
- Household wealth has a significant ameliorative effect on child feeding practices. 
- Microfinance effect on child feeding practices is neither mediated through individual 
income nor through social power. The tendency is yet positive for income and 
negative for social power. 
- Microfinance effect on child feeding practices is significant and negative for men while 
it is non-significant and negative for women (p<0.05 and p>0.10, respectively); 
Gender differences are statistically not significant. 
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- Microfinance mediation through child feeding practices is non significant and negative 
for both men and women; Gender differences are statistically not significant (p>0.10). 
 
These results suggest that microfinance affects child feeding practices through two ways: an 
indirect and a direct path. The indirect effect consists in an improvement in household 
economic conditions that positively affect child feeding practices. In contrast, there is an 
unfavorable direct effect of microfinance on child feeding practices, so that the total effect is 
no more substantial, but maintains the negative tendency. Child feeding practices do not 
considerably influence children’s nutritional status. Microfinance deteriorative effect on child 
feeding practices is only confirmed for men. 
A direct and negative relation has been found between mature credits and child feeding 
practices. An indepth moderation analysis showed that this effect was less pronounced for 
women. In fact, it was expected that participation in microfinance programs would result in 
increased resources at household level, which in turn would lead to an improvement of 
proximal determinants of child nutritional status. Yet, the study showed negative linkages 
between microfinance participation and child feeding practices. Three issues might be central 
in explaining the negative microfinance outcomes: care, time and education. In fact, one 
could expect that group participation which is typical for microfinance would stimulate more 
social support from peers with regard to child care. But the reality shows that borrowing also 
means having less time for children, since borrowers are micro-entrepreneurs and having a 
business is a time-consuming activity. There is also the fact that, what matters most in child 
care are not material resources. ENGLE, MENON, and HADDAD (1999) define resources for 
care as caregiver education, knowledge and beliefs, caregiver physical health and nutritional 
status, caregiver mental health and self-confidence, autonomy and control of resources, 
workload and time availability, and family and community social support. Some of these 
resources like self-confidence or autonomy are linked to social empowerment, which was not 
substantially improved by microfinance in our study. An important care resource is education. 
In fact, credit programs intergrating education services on nutrition and child care are more 
likely to induce positive changes for child care than pure microfinance models. In Ghana, 
children from participants experienced significantly greater improvement in the nutritional 
practices promoted by the Credit with Education program (MKNELLY & DUNFORD, 1998). This 
means that such complementary interventions might mitigate the negative effects of the 
credits and the entrepreneurial activity on care.  
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Household health care improves child nutritional status 
The mediation analysis at proximal level produced the following results: 
- Microfinance effect on child nutritional status is not significantly mediated through 
household health care. 
- Household health care has a significant and ameliorative effect on child nutritional 
status. 
- Microfinance effect on household health care is not significant. 
- Microfinance total effect on household health care is significant and positive. 
- Microfinance effect on household health care is neither mediated through household 
wealth nor through individual income nor social power . 
- Individual income has a significant and positive direct effect on household health 
care. 
- Microfinance effect on household health care is non significant for both men and 
women . Gender differences are statistically not significant. 
- Microfinance mediation through household health care is non significant for both men 
and women (p>0.10, respectively); Gender differences are statistically not significant 
(p>0.10). 
 
The results indicate that in total, microfinance improves the health conditions of the family. 
But it is unclear how this happens since household wealth which is improved by microfinance 
does not affect household health care while individual income which is not related to 
microfinance improves health care. Improved household health and sanitation conditions 
have a positive influence on child nutritional status. 
An important result of this study is the confirmation that health and sanitation conditions at 
household level directly affect child nutritional status. The bivariate analysis suggests that 
particularly the cleanness of the compound, curative treatment in health centres and full 
immunization are important determinants. The mediating role of household health care is not 
statistically confirmed. Yet there is a relation between microfinance and health care and there 
is a relation between health care and child nutrititional status. This might indicate that health 
care might be the most determinant factor at a proximal level. The analysis suggests that 
what matters for improved health conditions at household level are not the general economic 
conditions of the family but an improved income at the individual level. 
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6 CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
This research was an attempt to describe microfinance outcomes for child nutrition in the 
specific context of refugee settlements in Uganda. It has given both methodological and 
theoretical insights as summarised below.  
Methodological Implications 
Mediation and moderation procedures were applied to study household and intervention 
processes in general and nutritional processes in particular. These relatively new procedures 
proved useful to answer analytical questions of ‘how’ and ‘when’ and better understand what 
determines child nutritional status at household level. This study confirms their relevance for 
nutrition research and is an incentive for wide use (LOCKWOOD ET AL., 2010). Future studies 
might consider innovative statistical tools that take into account the use of separate sets of 
covariates, of multicategorical predictors and of a model with multiple mediators operating in 
parallel for some and in serial for the others,  
The empirical approach included a household survey with a cross-sectional, quasi-
experimental and quantitative design. These features can be seen as limiting in comparison 
to qualitative designs better adapted for capturing social mechanisms, to randomized 
designs eliminating selectivity bias and to longitudinal studies better suited to follow long-
term impacts. There is thus a need to test the hypotheses with more robust instruments and 
to consider a mixed approach in future research. 
This research was also characterized by its interdisciplinary nature and a focus on nutrition 
and the household. It might contribute to the construction of a research-based 
ecotrophological identity, which is according to JARRE (2000) not always apparent. Such ‘self-
image’ of ecotrophology can develop only if significant sub-areas like nutritional sciences and 
household sciences are integrated.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
This project evidenced that in a refugee setting, microfinance can enhance a child nutritional 
status by improving his/her household wealth without affecting the socio-economic 
empowerment at the individual level. In this context, what really matters for a child nutritional 
status is his/her household health security, which is considerably influenced by the individual 
income. The overall effect of microfinance on the child nutritional status is not substantially 
influenced by gender, although there might be some gender differences in the underlying 
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mediational mechanisms. In fact, among men, microfinance negatively affects child care and 
positively affects household diet while these effects are not noticeable for women.  
This research has particularly shown that: 
- Microfinance affects child nutritional status without increasing individual income, 
which itself makes no difference for child nutritional status, but contributes to improve 
household wealth and household health security. 
- Microfinance affects child nutritional status without increasing individual social power, 
which itself, makes no difference for child nutritional status, but contributes to improve 
household wealth. 
- Microfinance improves the household economic situation and this improvement leads 
to better nutritional status at child level. Economic improvement at household level is 
related to both economic and social empowerment at individual level, which are 
themselve not related to microfinance. 
- Microfinance improves the family diet by improving the household’s economic 
situation, but an improved diet at household level does not imply a better nutritional 
status for children. 
- Microfinance affects child feeding practices through two ways: an indirect and a direct 
path. The indirect effect consists in an improvement in household economic 
conditions that positively affect child feeding practices. In contrast, there is an 
unfavorable direct effect of microfinance on child feeding practices, so that the total 
effect is no more substantial, but maintains a negative tendency. Children feeding 
practices do not considerably influence child nutritional status. 
- In total, microfinance improves the health conditions of the family. But it is unclear 
how this happens since household wealth which is improved by microfinance does 
not affect household health care while individual income which is not related to 
microfinance improves health care. Improved household health and sanitation 
conditions have a positive influence on child nutritional status. 
These observations are summarised as a diagram (Result 4.5 on page 117). They have 
implications on the nutritional practice. They indicate that microfinance programs are 
appropriate in specific crises-affected areas; and there is a need for nutritionists to find a way 
to combine loans with effective health programs for such contexts. The results suggest 
proposing loans to both men and women. They also advocate for projects targeting rather 
households than individuals.  
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Further research is needed as the results of this study are valid only for the specific semi-
formal microfinance institution analysed and for the particular context of refugee settlements 
in West Nile. It is necessary to test the gathered theories in other contexts. It might be useful 
to also study the moderation effect of other factors that could also alter the effect of 
microfinance on nutritional status. Future research could analyse the moderating effect of 
household shocks, of different microfinance technologies or of the refugee status.  
 
The theoretical framework guiding this research is influenced by a welfarist conception of 
microfinance that contrasts an institutionalist approach. In fact, we share the view that 
microfinance -like any other institution - has to put the welfare of human beings at the bottom 
of each action. Nethertheless, institutional sustainability is a legitimate concern and future 
research on microfinance impact might integrate a cost-efficiency analysis of the 
microfinance institution. 
We also adopted a broad vision of nutrition that differs from a reductionist biomedical 
approach. This thesis confirms the social dimension of child nutrition and advocates for a 
household perspective to inquiry nutritional processes. The ecotrophological paradigm and 
particularly the personal and social system theory of the household developped by 
SCHWEITZER (2006) open ways for future investigations of the research problem.  
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SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: This thesis is the result of a thorough search for effective and 
sustainable solutions to the problem of pediatric malnutrition. Two considerations have led to 
the research problem. Firstly, the fact that malnutrition is not only a physiological problem, but 
also the result of complex socio-economic conditions at household level. Secondly, the 
potential of microfinance services as poverty alleviation tools. The question was the following: 
If microfinance services prove to be effective for improving the socio-economic situation of the 
families, should they not be used as suitable instruments of nutrition security at household and 
child level? This research aimed at investigating whether, how and when microfinance 
services effectively contribute to improve child nutritional status. 
THEORETICAL APPROACH: It was hypothesised that such a positive effect would deploy more 
often in the case of female borrowers and through an indirect path. Microfinance contribution 
to child nutritional status should mainly be explained by improved income and social power at 
individual level, which would in turn lead to better economic status at household level. An 
improved household wealth was supposed to have a positive impact on household food and 
health security and on child care. 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH : These hypotheses were tested drawing upon data from a cross-
sectional, quasi-experimental survey among refugee households from the West Nile region of 
Uganda. Regression-based moderation and mediation procedures were applied as statistical 
tool. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: The statistical analysis showed that children from households who 
benefited from microfinance had a significantly better height-for-age than control groups. This 
effect was mainly mediated through better household wealth, but not through individual socio-
economic empowerment. At a proximal level, what really mattered for child nutritional status 
was household health security, which was considerably influenced by individual income. 
Gender differences in microfinance overall effect on child nutritional status were not 
substantial in this context, although the underlying mediational mechanisms might differ. In 
fact, among men, microfinance negatively affected child care and positively household diet 
while those effects were not noticeable for women.  
IMPLICATIONS: This thesis suggests that microfinance might be an appropriate tool for 
improving child nutrition in specific crisis-affected settings. It confirms the social dimension of 
child nutrition and advocates for a household perspective to inquiry nutritional processes. 
KEYWORDS : Microfinance, Child nutritional status, Nutrition security, Uganda, Mediation, 
Moderation, Gender, Household, Children, Crises, Refugees, West Nile 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
HINTERGRUND UND ZIEL: Diese Dissertation ist das Ergebnis einer grundlegenden Suche nach 
effektiven und nachhaltigen Lösungen für das Problem der pädiatrischen Unterernährung. 
Zwei Feststellungen haben zum Forschungsproblem geführt. Zum einen, die Tatsache, dass 
Unterernährung nicht nur ein physiologisches Problem, sondern auch die Folge von 
komplexen sozioökonomischen Gegebenheiten auf der Ebene der Haushalte darstellt. Zum 
anderen, die Popularität von Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen als 
Armutsbekämpfungsmaßnahmen. Die Frage war die folgende: Wenn sich 
Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen als wirkungsvoll für die Verbesserung der sozioökonomischen 
Lage der Familien erweisen, sollten sie nicht als geeignete Instrumente der 
Ernährungssicherung auf Haushalts- und Kinderebene eingesetzt werden? Diese Doktorarbeit 
beschäftigte sich damit, zu erforschen ob, wie und wann Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen 
tatsächlich zur Verbesserung des Ernährungsstatus von Kindern beitragen.  
THEORETISCHER ANSATZ: Die empirische Literatur wies einen solchen positiven Effekt nur in 
einzelnen Fällen und unter bestimmten Bedingungen auf. Insbesondere das Geschlecht des 
Kreditnehmers schien von Bedeutung zu sein, wobei Frauen öfter den gewünschten Effekt 
begünstigten als Männer. Die Verbindung von Kredit zur Kinderernährung sollte sich 
hauptsächlich durch ein verbessertes Einkommen und soziale Macht auf der individuellen 
Teilnehmerebene erklären, die wiederum zur besseren wirtschaftlichen Lage des ganzen 
Haushalts führte. Ist der Haushalt weniger arm, so ist mit positiven Auswirkungen für die 
Nahrungs- und Gesundheitsversorgung zu rechnen. 
EMPIRISCHER ANSATZ: Diese Hypothesen wurden aufgrund von querschnitts-, quasi-
experimentellen Haushaltsdaten aus Flüchtlingssiedlungen in der West Nile Region in Uganda 
überprüft. Regressionsbasierte Modulations- und Mediationsverfahren wurden für die 
statistische Analyse angewandt. 
EMPIRISCHE ERGEBNISSE: Die statistische Analyse zeigt, dass Kinder der 
mikrofinanzteilnehmenden Haushalte tatsachlich eine bedeutsam bessere Körpergröße für 
das Alter aufweisen. Die Wirkung ist hauptsächlich durch den Wohlstand der Familie 
übermittelt, nicht aber über das individuelle sozioökonomische ‘Empowerment’. Auf proximaler 
Ebene sind für den Ernährungsstatus der Kinder die gesundheitlichen Bedingungen der 
Familie am meisten von Bedeutung. Es waren für die gesamte Wirkung von 
Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen auf den Ernährungsstatus keine Geschlechtsunterschiede 
festzustellen. Doch zeigen einige Prozesse Besonderheiten. Für Männer haben Mikrokredite 
negative Auswirkungen auf die Kinderfürsorge und positive Auswirkungen auf die 
Haushaltsdiät. Beide Beziehungen waren bei Frauen unbedeutsam. 
 x 
SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN: Diese Arbeit zeigt, dass Kleinkredite geeignete Instrumente zur 
Verbesserung der Ernährung von Kindern aus Krisengebieten darstellen können. Sie bestätigt 
die soziale Dimension von Kinderernährung und setzt sich für eine Haushaltsperspektive zur 
Untersuchung von Ernährungsprozessen ein. 
KEYWORDS: Microfinanzdienstleistungen, Ernährungsstatus, Kinder, Ernährungssicherung, 
Uganda, Mediation, Modulation, Geschlecht, Haushalt, Kinder, Krisen, Flüchtlinge,  West Nile. 
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ANNEX A1 DED HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
Interview by: Date of interview (mm/dd/yy) :            /         / 
Time Start Interview: Time finish Interview: 
 
 xx 
Introduce yourself; explain the purpose of the survey and the voluntary and confidential nature of the interview 
A. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENT 
HA1. Name of respondent: --------------------------------------- 
HA2. Sex:    1  Male   2  Female 
HA3. Age:  _______years old    99 Don't know  
HA4. Marital status:  1  Married/free union   2   Widowed    3  Separated/divorced  4  Single 
HA5. Highest Level of education: ________________    99 Don't know 
HA6. Status:   1  Refugee   2  National 
HA7. How long are you leaving here? _____________ years/months/date 
HA8. What tribe are you?   1  Lugbara    2  Madi     3  Kakwa      4  Aringa    5  Alur     6  Lingala 
   7  Kiswahili       8  Luo    9  Dinka   10  Lotuko   11 Lucibara  12 Other, specify _____ 
HA9. What is your religion?:  1  Roman catholic   2  Protestant   3  Muslim   4  other,specify _____ 
HA10. Number of children (alive): __________________ 
 
B. MICROFINANCE (only clients) 
HB1. Characteristics of Microfinancial services 
HB2. What’s the name of your credit group?  ________________________    2   individual 
HB3. When did you joined the credit group/DED?:  ____________months or years 
HB4. What is your amount of current savings?:__________ 
HB5. Have you already received a loan from DED. 1  Yes   0  No 
HB6. IF YES, Date of first credit ___________________ 
HB7. IF YES, How did you use the last loan you took ? (Do not read. Multiple answers possible.)
  
Invest the loan in a business, please specify ______________ 1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
Buy food for your household  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
Buy clothes or other household items  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
Pay for medical visits or buy medicines  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
Pay school expenses  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
Use it for an emergency  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
Use it to repay the loan  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
others, please specify ___________________  1  Yes   0  No 99  DK 
 
 HB8. What is ? HB9. Are you satisfied with…? HB10. Sug
gestion for? 
Number of credits  1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no  
First loan amount  1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no   
Last loan amount  1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no  
Repayment period   1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no   
Frequency of Loan 
Payment  
 1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no  
Conditions of access  1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no  
Interest Rate  1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no  
Frequency of group 
meetings 
 1  Yes  0  No  99 Neither yes or no  
 
  xxi
Have you already taken a loan from someone or an institution other than DED… 1  Yes    0 No 
IF YES,  which one? ______________________  
Where/from whom could you borrow money if you are in need? _____________________ 0  Nobody 
 
C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND COMPOSITION 
Household= those who live together and share the same food at least once in a day, including you 
Who heads your household?   1  Self   2  Wife  3  Husband        4  Daughter 
  5   Son         6  Sister  7   Brother    8 Other, please specify____________ 
Households members (head of household should be no. 1)  
 
Name Sex Age (years or 
months) 
Highest Level of 
education 
Occupation 
1.   1  M       2  F    
2.   1  M       2  F    
3.   1  M       2  F    
4.   1  M       2  F    
5.   1  M       2  F    
6.   1  M       2  F    
7.   1  M       2  F    
8.   1  M       2  F    
9.   1  M       2  F    
10.   1  M       2  F    
If more than 10 household members, continue on the back 
 
HOUSEHOLD ASSETS AND QUALITY OF HOUSING 
Observe the walls of the house: what are they made of? (spot observation) 
  1  unburned mud bricks    2  burnt bricks  3  mud with wattle   4  poles 
  5  Other , please specify: ______________________ 
 
Observe the roof of the house: What is it made of? (spot observation) 
  1  grass    2  iron sheets    3  Other , please specify: ____________________ 
 
Observe the cleanliness of the compound: 1 very clean  2 clean  3 satisfactory   4 dirty   5  very dirty 
 
Where does your household mainly obtain drinking water? 
  1  Bore-hole   2  Protected well    3  open well   4  River/stream   5  In-house tap 
  6  Piped to the compound   7  public stand pipe    8  Other, please specify_______________ 
 
What type of toilet facilities does your household mainly use? 
  1   Own Pit latrine   2  Shared pit latrine      3  Bush/no toilet  
  4  Own flush toilet    5  Shared flush toilet      6  Other, please specify ___________ 
During the last 12 months, would you say that your housing conditions has  
  1  Worsened   2  stayed the same  3  improved    99  Don’t know 
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Now I have some questions about items that your household might own. I will read a list of items and I 
would like you to indicate if you or anyone in your household owns any of these items and how many? 
House   1  Yes    0  No ________________ 
Bicycle/motorcycle   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Radio   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Car   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
 
Do you rear domestic animals?    1  Yes   0  No 
IF YES, which ones and how many do you rear?      Size 
Cows   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Goats   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Pigs   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Chicken   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
sheeps   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Fish farming   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
Other, please specify   1  Yes   0  No ________________ 
 
Do you own land ?  1  Yes   2  No, land is rented     3  No, land is allocated     4  no land at all 
IF yes, how many acres do you have ? ______________ acres 
 
How much would you estimate that your household spent on the following per month:  In ug shillings 
Food _____________________ 
Education (fees, school expenses…) _____________________
Health and Medical Care  _____________________
Transport _____________________
Special event (birth, burial, wedding, etc..) _____________________
Rent of house _____________________
Savings _____________________
 
How would you describe the wealth of your household within this village?   1  About the same as most 
people   2  A bit better off than most people   3  A bit worse off than most people  99 Don’t know 
D. SOURCES OF INCOME AND EMPOWERMENT 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
Do you earn your own money? 1  Yes    0  No 
 
IF YES, what were your most important sources of income in the last year? 
Activity 1 ________________________ 
Activity 2 ________________________ 
 
Is this first enterprise activity…? (Read answers and enter only one.) 
1  Primarily your own enterprise             2   a business partnership with others not in your household    
3  Primarily an enterprise belonging to a member of your household 
 
When did the business start? ___________ 99 Don't know 
 
What was your major source of capital for starting the enterprise?   1  Own savings   2  Loan from 
MFI   3  Loan from friends/relatives   4   other , please specify______________  99  Don’t know 
 
Where do you sell your products? 
1  Local consumers/passers-by  2  Market/shop  3  Local traders  4  othersSpecify 99  Don’t know 
Who helps you with your enterprise activities?  1  Children of the household   2  other family members   
3  Someone outside the familly   3  Nobody  
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What is your profit ? __________________________ug shillings per month/per week/ 
 
 During the last 12 months, in what ways (give the three principal ways) did you use the profit from 
your enterprise activity? Tell me the one you used the most money for first. (Do not read answers.) 
Buy food,    1  Yes    2  No 
buy clothing   1  Yes    2  No 
health-related costs   1  Yes    2  No 
Pay school expenses    1  Yes    2  No 
Pay for housing improvements     1  Yes    2  No 
Reinvest in my enterprise    1  Yes    2  No 
Spend it for emergency    1  Yes    2  No 
Save    1  Yes    2  No 
 Other (specify): ___________________    1  Yes    2  No 
Don't know    1  Yes    2  No 
During the 12 last months , would you say that the income you have been able to earn has… 
 1  Worsened   2  stayed the same   3  improved   99  Don’t Know 
EMPOWERMENT 
Do you receive help for the following tasks/household chores? 
Cooking   1  Yes   0  No  
Fetching water, fuel   1  Yes   0  No  
Caring, feeding, bathing for youngest child   1  Yes   0  No  
 
In your household, who usually takes decisions regarding … 
 I alone partner 
alone 
Both 
jointly 
Other, please 
specify 
Food expenditures everyday   2    0      1   _____________
Buying important things for the family   2    0      1   _____________
How to spend your income   2    0      1   _____________
Taking the children for medical care   2    0      1   _____________
Sending children to school   2    0      1   _____________
Buying clothes for the children   2    0      1   _____________
Taking out a loan   2    0      1   _____________
Using a loan   2    0      1   _____________
Infant feeding in the first year of life   2    0      1   _____________
 
During the last 12 months, would you say your involvement in household decision-making has 
  2  worsened     1  stayed the same     0  improve     99 Don't know 
Do you agree with the following statements….? 
 Agree Disagree Don’t know 
Only men should take important decisions   0     1   99  
A woman should accept being beaten to maintain the peace in her 
home 
  0     1   99 
It is better to send a boy to school than a girl   0     1   99 
Partner should help at home if woman works outside home   1     0   99 
Do you feel there is not enough time to … 
care for children   1  Never   2  Sometimes   3  Often 
do daily work   1  Never   1  Sometimes   1  Often 
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Do you participate in community groups and activities/village organisations? 
  1  Yes, please specify_______________________________    0   No  99 Don't know 
E. HOUSEHOLD’S VULNERABILITY AND NUTRITION 
HOUSEHOLD DIET 
Where do you get food from?   1  Own cultivation     2  WFP    3  purchase in market     4  Exchange     
5  other, specify _________________________ 
 
During the last 12 months, was there ever a time when it was necessary for your household to eat less 
or eat less well either because of a lack of food or a lack of money to buy food?/ 
  1  Yes     0  No     99   Don't know 
IF YES, How long did this period last? ____________ Number of months    99   Don't know 
IF YES, what were the reasons why you didn’t always have enough to eat? 
_______________________________________________ 
 
What did your household do to get through this difficult situation? (Read answers. Multiple answers 
possible.) 
Rely on less preferred and less expensive foods?   1  Yes   0  No 
Borrow food, or borrow money to buy food?   1  Yes   0  No 
Purchase food on credit?   1  Yes   0  No 
Rely on help from relative or friend outside household   1  Yes   0  No 
Limit portions at mealtimes?   1  Yes   0  No 
Reduce number of meals eaten in a day?   1  Yes   0  No 
Sold personal property   1  Yes   0  No 
Self or someone else in family left area to seek employment   1  Yes   0  No 
Other, please specify: _______________________________   1  Yes   0  No 
Don't know   1  Yes   0  No 
Yesterday, did you or anyone in your household consume ... 
Any food before a morning meal    1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
A morning meal    1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
Any food between morning and midday meals    1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
A midday meal    1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
Any food between midday and evening meals    1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
An evening meal     1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
Any food after the evening meal     1  Yes    0  No 99 DK 
Yesterday, did you or anyone in your household consume (circle the ones referred to)... 
Chapatti/bread   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Pigeon peas/cowpeas/ beans/peas   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Maize/Millet/Sorghum/Rice/Simsim   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Pumpkin/red or yellow yams/carrots/ red sweet potatoes   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Maatooke/Cassava/Yams/Sweet potatoes   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Greens/Other vegetables   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Groundnuts   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Milk/Milk tea/Milk products   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Eggs   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Meat/offal/poultry   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Fish/seafood   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Food mixed with oils, fat, butter, Ghee   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
Fruits   1  Yes   0 No 99 DK 
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.Increased percentage of households consuming minimum 
During the last 12 Months, would you say that your household diet has… 
   1  Worsened    2  stayed the same   3  improved   99 Don’t know  
HOUSEHOLD NEEDS AND CRISIS 
We would like to discuss your households needs and problems, and also, learn about what you do to 
cope with them. 
What are the main needs and worries of your household ? (please rank according to importance) 
Need 1 _____________________________ 99 Don’t know 
Need 2 ____________________________  
 
During the last 12 months, has anything happened to this household which has a serious negative 
effect on how the household operates? 
   If yes, give brief details 
Serious23 illness of an household 
member 
  1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Death of an household member   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Cessation of a reliable source of 
income to the household 
  1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Drought/ natural disaster   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Unexpected large payment had to be 
made 
  1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Financial shocks   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Business losses   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
New individual joined household   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
Other   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
No event   1  Yes   2  No ____________________________ 
 
How did you respond to these shocks? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
During the last 12 months, would you say that your household’s ability to survive this kind of crisis 
has…   1  worsened  2 stayed the same   3  improved  99  don’t know 
 
 
 
 
F. INFORMATION ON CHILD’S NUTRITION AND HEALTH 
Index child= last child between 6 months and five years 
CHILD’S HEALTH 
Has [name] had diarrhoea, fever, cough/cold and/or shortness of breath in the last two weeks? 
  1  Yes  0   No    99 Don't know    
IF YES, did you take [name] to health services?   1  Yes  0   No    99 Don't know  
Did [name] get immunised?     1  Yes  0   No    99 Don't know  
IF YES, which vaccination did [name] get?   1 Polio      2 measles      3 BCG    4 DPT     5 Vitamin A 
                                                
23 (Chronic illness’: persistent/recurring illness lasting three months or more which has decreased an individual’s 
productivity) 
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CHILD FEEDING PRACTICES 
Did you ever breastfeed [name]?    1  Yes  0   No    99 Don't know    
How long after birth did you first put [name] to the breast? _______________hours/days 
Yesterday have you breastfed [name]?   1  Yes  0   No    99 Don't know    
 When did you stopped breastfeeding [name]? __________________months 
Yesterday has [name] received any of the following? 
Plain water 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Sweetened or flavored water 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Fruit juice 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Tea or infusions 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Tinned, powdered or fresh milk 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Other liquids 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Mushy or solids foods 1  Yes   0   No   99 Don’t know 
Does anyone help the child to eat?  1  Yes  0  No  0   child doesn’t eat yet  99 Don't know    
What does caregiver do when child refuses to eat : multiple answer possible, do not read 
Nothing (child left alone) 1  Yes   0   No 
play with 1  Yes   0   No 
try to persuade 1  Yes   0   No 
force 1  Yes   0   No 
change food 1  Yes   0   No 
Not a problem 1  Yes   0   No 
other 1  Yes   0   No 
Did you use antenatal care during your last or current pregnancy?      1  Yes   0  No     99 Don't know 
Did you ever receive information about the nutrition requirements of children? 
  1  Yes  0   No    99 Don't know    
IF YES, source of information 
(Community) health worker   1  Yes   0  No 
Radio or television   1  Yes   0  No 
Print media: leaflets, newspapers, posters, or billboards   1  Yes   0  No 
Other, please specify_________________   
 
ANTHROPOMETRY: INDEX CHILD + ALL CHILDREN <  5 YEARS IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
 Age/Date of Birth Sex  Weight Height MUAC 
a.Index 
Child 
_______months/: 
mm/dd/yy 
 1  M  2  F _____,____kg ____,___cm _____,___cm
b.Child#2 _______months/: 
mm/dd/yy 
 1  M  2  F  _____,____kg ____,___cm _____,___cm
a.Child#3 _______months/: 
mm/dd/yy 
 1  M  2  F _____,____kg ____,___cm _____,___cm
b.Child#4 _______months/: 
mm/dd/yy 
 1  M  2  F  _____,____kg ____,___cm _____,___cm
 
 
 
 
 
End express thanks for their time, answer any questions or concerns they may have regarding the 
interview 
Verification by:  Date of verification (mm/dd/yy) :          /         /  
Data entry by :  Date of data entry (mm/dd/yy) :           /         / 
Checked by:  Date of data check (mm/dd/yy) :          /         / 
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Annex A2:  Complementary Tables and Figures  
Tab. A2.15.2-1 Trends in Wasting Prevalence in Arua refugee settlements 
Wasting Settlement Date sample 
Severe Global
Source 
06-oct 327 6,1 8,5 DDHS Arua 2006/10 
nov-05     DDHS Arua, 11/05 
03-nov 900 1,4 7,6 DDHS 2003/11b 
mai-03    6.2 DDHS. 2003 
02-nov    7.2 DDHS. 2002 
mai-02    5,6 DDHS. 2002 
01-nov    8,1 ACF-F. 2001 
01-avr     DED in WFP  25 May 2001 
nov-00     ? in WFP  25 May 2001 
oct-00   1,1 8,3
WFP 11-12/00; UNHCR 13/11/00 in RNIS 
32/33, April 2001 
mai-00    5,9 ACF-F. 2000 
oct-98    9,7   
mai-98    5,9 ACF-F.1998 
Rhino Camp juil-95    13,9 EPICENTRE. 1995. 
06-nov 401 4,2 10,1 DDHS Arua 2006/10 
03-nov 450 2,0 10,0 DDHS. 2003/11a. 
juin-02 556 0,5 8,6 DDHS-A 2002/06 
01-nov    8,8 AAH-USA. 2001 
mai-00    3,7 AAH-USA. 2000 
oct-98    5,4 AAH-USA. 1998 
mai-98    5,8 ACF-F. 1998 
04-sept 412 1,2 6,8 DED 2004/10 
Imvepi févr-04 549 2,6 8,8 DED.2004/02 
mai-99    8,5 Orach, 1999 
janv-96   1,1 11,2 MSF-H. 1996/02 in RNIS 14, February 1996 
8,2
juil-95    
or ? 8,8 
as 
reported 
in RNIS 
14, feb 96 EPICENTRE. 1995. 
févr-95    7,2 MSF-H. 1995 
déc-94   6,8 9,7 MSF-H Dec 94 
juil-94    12,2 MSF-H. 1994 
mai-94     SCF 15.07.94 in RNIS 6, Aug 1994 
mars-94    14,6 MSF-H. 1994 
janv-94   1,8 11,4 MSF-H 25/1/94 in RNIS 3, Feb 1994 
Koboko août-93    22,0 ? MUAC survey in RNIS 2, Decr 1993 
avr-95   2 6,9 Epicentre 24/07/95 in (RNIS 12, Oct 1995) 
Ikafe 03-nov 600 7,3 19,3 DDHS 2003/11 
Rhino camp & 
Imvepi    7,9 2,8 DDHS Arua, 11/05 
Source: www.unscn.org / RNIS/ own compilation 
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Fig. A2.1:5.2-1: Children's nutritional Status - z-scores distribution, DED study 2005 
 
Tab. A2.2:5.2-2 Child nutritional status by microfinance profile: group means & 
proportions 
Inherent Variables All Intervention 
group 
 Control group  
  Established 
Members 
 All Incoming  
Members 
Non-
Members 
p 
 (N=205 (N=150)  (N=55) (N=41) (N=37)  
HAZ value - 1.00 -0.80 a  -1.32b -1.62 b -1.00 a ** 
WAZ value - 0.50 -0.40 a  -0.67 a -1.05 b -0.24 a *** 
WHZ value +0.05 0.08  0.01 -0.17 0.22  
Negative Deviance        
 HAZ<-2SD dummy 26.8% 18.9% a  39.7% b 46.3% b 32.4 b *** 
 HAZ<-3SD dummy 8.8% 7.1%  11.5% 14.6% 8.1%  
 % HAZ<-2 &≥-3SD 18.0% 11.8%  28.2% 31.7% 24.3%  
 HAZ<-1SD dummy 50.7% a 48.8% a  53.8% a 65.9% b 40.5% a * 
 % HAZ<-1SD &≥-2 23.9% 29.9% a  14.1% b 19.5% a 8.1% b ** 
 HAZ≤Mean dummy 50.7% 48.8% a  53.8% a 65.9% b 40.5% a * 
 WAZ<-2SD dummy 7.3% 4.7% a  11.7% b 17.1% b 5.6% b ** 
 WHZ<-2SD dummy 4.9% 4.7%     5.3% 9.8% 0.0%  
Positive Deviance        
 HAZ≥-2 SD dummy 73.2% 81.1% a  60.3% b 53.7% b 67.6% *** 
 HAZ≥-1SD dummy 49.3% 51.2% a  46.2% 34.1% b 59.5% a * 
 % HAZ≥-1&≤+1SD 40.5% 41.7%  38.5% 29.3% 48.6%  
 HAZ>+1 dummy 8.8% 9.4%  7.7% 4.9% 10.8%  
 HAZ>+2SD dummy 3.9% 5.5%  1.3% 0.0% 2.7%  
 HAZ>+3 SD dummy 2.4% 3.9% a  0.0% b 0.0% a 0.0% a * 
 HAZ>Mean dummy 49.3% 51.2% a  46.2% a 34.1% b 40.5% a * 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
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Tab. A2.3:5.2-3 Microfinance conditional effect on potential mediators: linear regression 
estimates 
 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01; the inherent factors (settlement dummies, household size, household shock, 
household education) are included as covariates in the regression, but their estimates are not reported)  
 
 
 
 Predictors  Estimate SE p 95%CI  Coeff.  β 
 OUTCOME VARIABLE M1: INDIVIDUAL INCOME (0.9) X Credit since ≥ 6 months a11 -2346.96 11880 0.844 [-25777 - 21083] -0.023
W Female Respondent a21 -33936.65 11621 0.004*** [-56855 - -11017] -0.333
WX Gender x Microfinance a31 7001.96 14884 0.639 [-22354 -  36358] 0.069
 Constant  35290.10 18064 0.052* [-337.7  - 70917]
 R2 M1,YW(WX)=0.120    0.005***  
 OUTCOME VARIABLE M2: SOCIAL POWER (0.10) 
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a12 -0.028        0.037 0.443      [-0.100  -   0.044] -0.083W Female Respondent a22 -0.106 0.036 0.003***   [-0.177  -   -0.036] -0.312
WX Gender x Microfinance a32 0.059           0.046 0.201 [-0.032  -   0.150] 0.174
 Constant  0.570 0.056 0.000***   [ 0.460   -   0.680]
 R2 M2,YW(WX)=0.249    0.000***  
 OUTCOME VARIABLE M3: HOUSEHOLD WEALTH (1.11) 
X Credit since ≥ 6 months a13  0.295 0.157 0.062* [-0.015  -   0.606] 0.201W Female Respondent a23 -0.179 0.160 0.264 [-0.493  - 0.136] -0.121
WX Gender x Microfinance a33 -0.025 0.198 0.901 [-0.415  -   0.365] -0.017
M1 Monthly Profiits   0.000 0.000 0.008*** [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.177
M2 Social Power   0.914 0.311 0.004*** [ 0.300   -   1.528] 0.211
 Constant  -1.048 0.296 0.001*** [-1.633  - -0.463]
 R2M3, WM1M2(WX)=0.272     0.000***  
 OUTCOME VARIABLE M4: HOUSEHOLD DIET (2.12) X Credit since ≥ 6 months a14  0.426 0.160 0.008*** [ 0.110   - 0.741] 0.282W Female Respondent a24 -0.225 0.161 0.164 [-0.543  - 0.093] -0.150
WX Gender x Microfinance a34 -0.290 0.199 .0147 [-0.683  - 0.103] -0.193M1 Monthly Profiits   0.000 0.000 0.425 [ 0.000   - 0.000] -0.053
M2 Social Power  -0.064 0.320 0.841 [-0.696  - 0.568] -0.015
M3 Household wealth   0.322 0.073 0.000*** [ 0.178   - 0.465] 0.314
 Constant   0.033 0.308 0.915 [-0.575  - 0.641]
 R2M4, WM1M2 M3(WX)=0.298    0.000***  
M2 OUTCOME VARIABLE M5: CHILD FEEDING PRACTICES (2.13) X Credit since ≥ 6 months a15 -0.272 0.111 0.015** [-0.491  - -0.052] -0.270W Female Respondent a25 -0.115 0.112 0.305 [-0.336  - 0.106] -0.115
WX Gender x Microfinance a35  0.215 0.138 0.122 [-0.058  - 0.488] 0.215
M1 Monthly Profiits   0.000 0.000 0.551 [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.041
M2 Social Power  -0.305 0.223 0.172 [-0.744  - 0.134] -0.103
M3 Household wealth   0.089 0.051 0.081* [-0.011  - 0.188] 0.130
 Constant   0.664 0.214 0.002*** [ 0.242   - 1.087]
 R2M4, WM1M2 M3(WX)=0.238    0.000***   
M2 OUTCOME VARIABLE M6: HOUSEHOLD HEALTH CARE (2.14) X Credit since ≥ 6 months a16  0.102 0.142 0.474 [-0.179  - 0.383] 0.083W Female Respondent a26  0.066 0.144 0.647 [-0.217  - 0.349] 0.054
WX Gender x Microfinance a36  0.017 0.177 0.922 [-0.332  - 0.367] 0.014M1 Monthly Profiits   0.000 0.000 0.004*** [ 0.000   - 0.000] 0.211
M2 Social Power  -0.204 0.285 0.475 [-0.767  - 0.358] -0.057
M3 Household wealth   0.015 0.065 0.820 [-0.113  - 0.142] 0.018
 Constant   0.016 0.274 0.952 [-0.525  - 0.558]
 R2M5, WM1M2 M3(WX)=0.161    0.001***  
 N=205    
  xxx
Tab.A2 4:5.2-4 Gender moderation of microfinance on height-for-age: linear regression 
estimates 
 
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01; a:the inherent factors (settlement dummies, household size, household shock, 
household education) are included as covariates in the regression, but their estimates are not reported)  
 
 
 
 
   Outcome Variable  Y 
Child Height-for-Age z-score 
 
 Predictorsa    
   Estimate SE p 95%CI Coef.  β 
 INHERENT MODEL (0.8)       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months   0.612 0.391 0.119 [-0.159 1.384]  0.185 
W Female Respondent   0.348 0.383 0.365 [-0.407 1.102]  0.105 
WX Gender x Microfinance  -0.249 0.490 0.612 [-1.215 0.718] -0.076 
 Constant  -2.522 0.595 0.000*** [-3.695 -1.349] - 
 R2 X, YW(WX)=0.095     0.031**   
 DISTAL MODEL (1.8)       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months c'1 0.597 0.393 0.131 [-0.178 1.373]  0.181 W Female Respondent c'2 0.293 0.399 0.463 [-0.493 1.080]  0.089 
WX Gender x Microfinance c'3 -0.218 0.494 0.660 [-1.192 0.757] -0.066 M1 Monthly Profiits b1 0.000 0.000 0.979 [0.000 0.000]  0.002 
M2 Social Power b2 -0.534 0.778 0.493 [-2.068 1.000] -0.055 
 Constant  -2.220 0.741 0.003*** [-3.682 -0.759] - 
 R2X, YWM1M2(WX)=0.097    0.063   
 INTERMEDIATE MODEL (2.8)       
X Credit since ≥ 6 months c'1 0.518 0.396 0.192 [-0.263 1.298]  0.156 W Female Respondent c'2 -0.341 0.399 0.393 [-0.445 1.128]  0.103 
WX Gender x Microfinance c'3 -0.211 0.493 0.669 [-1.183 0.760] -0.064 
M3 Household wealth b3 0.270 0.180 0.135 [-0.085 0.624]  0.120 
 Constant  -1.938 0.762 0.012 [-3.441 -0.434] - 
 R2X, YWM1M2 M3(WX)=0.108    0.049**   
M2 PROXIMAL MODEL (3.8)       X Credit since ≥ 6 months c'1  0.545 0.408 0.183 [-0.259  1.349]  0.165 
W Female Respondent c'2  0.261 0.398 0.513 [-0.525  1.046]  0.079 
WX Gender x Microfinance c'3 -0.271 0.495 0.584 [-1.248  0.705] -0.082 
 Household diet b4 -0.200 0.181 0.271 [-0.557  0.157] -0.091 
 Child feeding practices b5 -0.030 0.259 0.908 [-0.540  0.480] -0.009 
 Household health b6  0.485 0.201 0.017 [0.089  0.881]  0.180 
 Constant  -1.919 0.774 0.014 [-3.447 -0.392] - 
 R2X, YWM1M2M3M4M5M6(WX)=0.138     0.024   
 N=205    
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